

Review of: "Free Will Stands When Properly Explained and Correctly Defined and Neuroscience Shows This to Be the Case"

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This article offers a great perspective to discuss the philosophical problem of free will from the lens of neuroscience. However, when engaging with philosophers, it relies too much on classical scholars like Locke, Hume, and Kant. It ignores the most critical discussions of today's philosophers, except Frankfurt. Such ignorance is unreasonable because philosophical debates about free will have become much more complicated in the past decades than Locke, Hume, and Kant could have imagined. These discussions not only cover the theories of Locke, Hume, and Kant but also significantly improve them. As a result of this ignorance, the author draws a wrong conclusion that "the objections to free will thus, are largely based on a conflation of the ability to freely choose an act, with the ability to act or not as Locke notes" (p. 15). What this conclusion mentioned is merely one definition of free will in today's philosophy. There is at least another definition of free will, which emphasizes an agent's capacity to be the ultimate source of an act. The author's article has no problem accepting this second definition of free will. Thus, this article does not redefine free will. Rather, it argues for one definition of free will in philosophy while against another. For more discussion on today's discussion of free will and its tension with determinism, see the entry on Compatibilism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which has more details about two definitions of free will in philosophy.