

# Review of: "Free will and the paradox of predictability"

Ehtibar Dzhafarov<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Purdue University

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I disagree with the author's main point. Consider an Omniscient Demon who tries to predict what he, Demon, will do in precisely one hour: whether he would move or stay put. Demon knows that whatever prediction he makes, he can contravene it, and this creates a vicious circle resulting in what can be called "predictive paralysis". As far as the prediction is concerned, this is nothing but a variant of the Lier Paradox. If this were the whole story the author would be right that the Paradox of Prediction has nothing to do with determinism or free will. However, the difference between the Lier Paradox and the Paradox of Prediction becomes apparent as soon as one shifts one's focus from the prediction to the predicted. In the Lier Paradox, one cannot say: I am unable to determine whether this statement is true or false, but in reality it is either true or false, and this is in principle ascertainable. There is no ontic truth there distinct from the epistemic truth of the statement. In the Paradox of Prediction, by contrast, the ontic and epistemic aspects are distinct: Demon cannot predict whether he will move or stay in one hour, but in one hour he will de facto move or stay. So, the paradox does address the problem of determinism, or at least the problem of determinism vs predictability. Either determinism somehow precludes the demon from contravening his predictions, or determinism is compatible with unpredictability. These solutions have been long since proposed in the literature.