

Review of: "What is it like to be an AI bat?"

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The paper "What is it like to be an AI bat?" offers a comprehensive survey of various theories of consciousness, ranging from the Neural Correlate of Consciousness to the Higher Order and Multiple Draft Model. While the authors provide a thorough examination of these theories, it is disheartening to note that they rely solely on decades-old approaches. One would expect a field as dynamic as consciousness studies to have evolved beyond these traditional frameworks.

Furthermore, the authors acknowledge the challenge of defining consciousness but overlook many attempts to elucidate the concept through meaningful distinctions. Notably absent from their discussion are Fred Dretske's distinction between state and creature consciousness, as well as Ned Block's differentiation between phenomenal and access consciousness.

The paper rightly identifies qualia as central to the problem of consciousness. Of course, it fails--because no one has--to provide a satisfactory reduction of qualia to physical phenomena, a crucial aspect for understanding consciousness in artificial systems.

Despite its title, the paper falls short in addressing the issue of artificial consciousness. Instead, it primarily engages in a superficial exploration of the physicalist versus non-physicalist debate. The authors neglect to consider whether the constraints of physical substrates preclude the possibility of artificial consciousness, akin to the inability to fashion a bowl out of soup.

Overall, "What is it like to be an AI bat?" disappoints as it offers little beyond a rehashing of outdated theories and a cursory examination of the artificial consciousness dilemma. It lacks originality and fails to contribute significantly to the advancement of consciousness studies.