

## Review of: "Free will and the paradox of predictability"

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<u>Alexandros Syrakos</u> provides a detailed analysis of the "paradox of predictability" and provides a rational, cogent argument for why the paradox of predictability (PoP) is erroneous and does not actually provide any meaningful support of compatibilism or the postulate of free will within a deterministic framework.

Systems demonstrating agency would at first seem to contradict the idea of a fully deterministic universe, as following a Cartesian dualistic purview, these agents would seem to be able to exercise free will, or stand-alone volition, outside of mechanistic causal influences. Indeed, this is one behavior that can serve as an unambiguous marker for the presence of consciousness within a system--- if the system demonstrates stand-alone volition, i.e., non-programmable or predictable responses to environmental conditions or events. Following the postulates of Roger Penrose, this is not necessarily because the agency exists apart from physical reality, but more so that consciousness involves non-computational elements, i.e., it is not programmable.

Therefore, much like quantum indeterminism, systems with agency can seem unpredictable to any subsystem with limited knowledge. However, to a universal system capable of containing knowledge of all variables and spacetime reference frames, even a quantum system or free agent has entirely predictable and pre-determined behavior. Free will remains a potent source to systems with agency because such a universal frame of reference is possessed by very few systems, and most of what humans interact with are subsystems, which do not contradict the notion of intrinsic volitional behavior.

in Alexandros Syrakos' work it is demonstrated that the idea of making a deterministic universe unpredictable, particularly within the special conditions of the PoP, is fallacious. It is demonstrated convincingly that the "paradox" arises not because determinism allows some freedom, but because it does not allow any. By removing the mental attribute of the PoP argument and analyzing it from a physical perspective only, the seeming paradoxy is resolved.

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