

Review of: "Straightening the 'Value-Laden Turn': Minimising the Influence of Values in Science"

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This paper is a timely and valuable contribution on the topic of values in science. In the following I will make some small remarks or point out areas of potential clarification/amendment.

The argument for the value-ladenness of science aims to paint a realistic picture of scientific activity rather than an ideal for science. Even the stronger versions which argue for value influence in science tend to start off from the observation that value-ladenness is inevitable. So, I tend to think that non-ideal philosophy of science would be a more fitting term to cover the range of positions that are depicted as subscribing to the "value-laden ideal".

The distinction between decision types, and the consideration of the level of sufficient evidence and of the relevance of non-scientific values sets the stage well for making insightful distinctions as to when non-scientific values can or cannot become applicable: We should ask (i) what kind of problems and actions are we referring to (theoretical or practical), and (ii) what level of evidence would be sufficient to take the needed kind of decisions? The author identifies the core threat to the epistemic integrity of science as the making of "factual statements whose LER has been deliberately lowered" in line with non-scientific values. I nonetheless think the terminology can be clearer here. There are occasions where scientists make factual claims with practical aims (possibly with lower LER) in the role of science advisors. But the important difference between scientific knowledge claims proper and factual claims to advice policy is that the scientific corpus builds on the former, not the latter.

While the distinction between facts and values may be blurry at times as underlined in the literature, uncertainty by itself does not legitimize value-ladenness (cf. Betz). Thus, it is an important requirement that the proposed "model does not cover up scientific uncertainties with values". Relatedly, it might help to underline with more emphasis that value-laden inductive risk considerations are essentially different from epistemic risk considerations (most importantly, of adding falsehoods to the scientific corpus), and opting for a lower inductive risk may elevate an epistemic risk, thus threaten the epistemic integrity of science.

The article provides a useful survey of distinctions between decisions, mental attitudes, statement of uncertainties and the like, but in my opinion leaves this survey rather scattered and does not arrive at a clear enough conceptual framework as the background of the author's argument for preserving the epistemic integrity of science. The scientific/non-scientific and epistemic/non-epistemic axes are clear but at places too coarse-grained and at other too fine-grained for the argument. Sometimes the connections between this 4-fold distinction and the literature is superficial (e.g. in relation to Lacey). Relatedly, scientific non-epistemic decisions does not seem to be a very suitable description of decisions taken in the

context of pursuit (rather than acceptance).