Research Article

The antithetical relationship of Entrepreneurship and Corruption on Radicalization among the Moroccan Youths: An Empirical study

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Terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Spain, Finland, or other high-profile terrorist strikes in November 2015 in Paris, which left 130 people dead and 500 wounded, or the March 2016 attack in Brussels that killed 32 people and injured more than 340 had one common denominator, they all instigated by Moroccan Networks. Poverty and lack of education have often been pointed out as possible causes for the radicalization of Moroccan youths. The Moroccan government, aided by other global NGOs such as USAID, has promoted entrepreneurship to bolster Morocco's economic development. This research investigates the effectiveness of Morocco's promotion of its entrepreneurship campaign in Morocco. Data were collected through a questionnaire from 1746 Moroccan citizens in the Middle Atlas region, one of the poorest regions of Morocco. One of the main findings of this paper is the high propensity for men to choose armed resistance to respond to social issues – with some 19.5% stating they would choose to take arms. Unemployment and low trust in the government were found to be positively correlated to the intention to take arms. Those who want to start a business are also more likely to consider arm resistance. Finally, this paper argues how institutional failure to aid and encourage entrepreneurship activities is somehow failing and leading to unstable economic development, persistent inequality, and the potential radicalization of Moroccan youths.

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1. Introduction

Recently, an up-to-date literature review by Chaudhary & Bansal (2022) covered a wide range of issues related to radicalization and terrorist activities associated with illegal money lending. The literature review revealed that distinct actions of entrepreneurs are to efficiently reallocate resources such as capital (including intellectual and skill sets, see Ali et al. 2016, Tinta 2022, Tahir et al. 2022)) and labour more efficiently and effectively to a geo-political and socio-economic stable country and/or location (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Cassia & Minola, 2012; Andersén & Samuelsson, 2016; Ali et al. 2016[1]; Discua Cruz *et al.*, 2020 and Thijs et al. 2022). In this sense, opportunities represent the offerings of a new product or service into existence (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) and the major outcome is the creation of wealth via the accumulation of profits. Entrepreneurship in economic development and inequality remains a relatively under-researched phenomenon. Lingelbach *et al.* (2005: p1) pointed out 'Entrepreneurship in developing countries is arguably the least studied significant economic and social phenomenon in the world today.

However, most of the above contributors failed to cover the literature on linkages and co-movement between businesses, corruption, terrorism and radicalization. This paper fills the gap by examining the key research question of '*entrepreneurship and its efficacies towards economic and social progress in the presence of uncertainties due to inequality and radicalism'*. It presents the case of Morocco where the process of entrepreneurship and economic development suffered due to radicalism. Over recent years, policymakers have shown increasing interest in the role of entrepreneurship to generate economic growth and development (Islam, 2015; Si *et al.*, 2020, Tinta 2022). The impediments facing entrepreneurship development in developing or emerging economies are the institutional structure and its activities are inherently flawed (Naude, 2011). These flaws are increasingly creating stress in the system and leading to dissatisfaction among the masses and leading to unrest and radical behaviours. The dynamics of entrepreneurship can be vastly different depending on institutional context and level of economic development. Hence, the environment shaping the economy affects the dynamics of entrepreneurship within any given country. This environment is marked by interdependencies between economic development and institutions, which affect other characteristics, such as quality of governance, access to capital and other resources, and the perceptions of entrepreneurs. Institutions are critical determinants of economic behaviour (North 2005) and economic transactions (Williamson 1998) in general, and they can impose direct and

indirect effects on both the supply and demand of entrepreneurs. North (2005), Baumol (2002) and associates like Baumal et al. (2007) emphasize the role that the institutional environment plays in fostering entrepreneurial development. This paper extends the idea to study the relationship between businesses, corruption, and radicalization. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the subsequent section literature review is presented to argue the importance of linkages and co-movement between entrepreneurship and its efficacies towards economic and social progress in 21st-century society when the world is linked via high-power computing facilities. It presents the case of Morocco where the process of entrepreneurship and economic development suffered due to radicalism.

2. Literature Review

Mc Mullen (2010) noted that, under impoverished contexts, entrepreneurship has emerged as a way out of income poverty and many of our societal challenges. The current study of entrepreneurship development in Morocco has been severely hampered due to a non-level playing field created by an extremely inefficient and biased bureaucracy aided by a poor institutional structure, that has led to radical behavior and unrest within the masses, particularly the business community. As per the work of Casson and Wadeson (2007: pp.239-240) and Klapper *et al.* (2007: p 2), pro-market institutions are integral for developing the economy and increasing. They are the institutional frameworks in which government behavior is realigned to support the proper functioning of the market economy (Williamson, 1990, 2000, 2004). The work of Douglass North (2005) and Baumol provide important theoretical insights about entrepreneurial development in differing institutional environments that support the problems facing our Moroccan case study. According to North, entrepreneurs are the main agents of change. Organizations such as firms set up by entrepreneurs will adapt their activities and strategies moulded to fit the opportunities and limitations provided through the formal and informal institutional framework. Though ideally, formal rules are designed to facilitate exchange reducing transaction costs, they are also likely to affect individuals or groups in different ways. Formal rules and institutions, since individuals create them in their own private interest, do not necessarily operate in the interest of social well-being. Baumol follows a similar logic but provides a greater analysis of the types of entrepreneurship that can emerge under different institutional environments. Institutions are important as the structures that provide the incentives for different types of economic activity. While various countries have adopted pro-market institutions in recent decades, there

remains no definitive answer as to how these pro-market institutions affect different types of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is commonly defined as creating new formal or legally registered businesses (Klapper *et al.,* 2007). Pro-market institutions are the regulatory frameworks that allow markets to function properly (IMF, 2004: p105). In countries with high levels of pro-market institutions, the government's role in the economy is transformed into providing the basic infrastructure, rules and regulations, law and order, and public goods required for individuals and businesses to operate and expand while limiting market imperfections (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). The ideas behind pro-market institutions date back to Adam Smith (1776) and were further developed by writers of the Austrian (Hayek, 1944) and Chicago schools (Friedman, 1962) of economics.

Recent research on pro-market institutions has examined country and firm-level behaviors from multiple angles, sparking a lively debate on the benefits of pro-market institutions (Ayyagari *et al.*, 2009; Banalieva and Sarathy, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009a/b/c; Dau, 2011, 2012, 2013; Khoury *et al.,* 2014). Many have proposed that increased pro-market institutions help countries because they lead to a reduction in the mismanagement of the economy by politicians and, as a result, country grow and unemployment decreases (Feldmann, 2006, 2007; Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003). Adis, Estrin & Mickiewicz (2008: p658) provided their hypothesis and evidence in their study of Russia's institutional environment, explaining its relatively low levels of entrepreneurship development, where the latter is measured in terms of both the number of start-ups and existing business owners. In addition, Russia's business environment and its consequences for the role of business networks contribute to the relative advantage of entrepreneurial insiders (those already in business) to entrepreneurial outsiders (newcomers) in terms of new business start-ups.

However, others argue that pro-market institutions have not led to the promised reduction in poverty (Fraga, 2004; Katz, 2004) and are therefore detrimental to the economy. In our study, we provide primary data and evidence of the Moroccan case to a situation that is supporting the growth of radicalism and hence detrimental to the development of pro-entrepreneurship policies. Economic liberalization is the reduction of the government's direct intervention in the economic arena. This includes the deregulation of industries and markets, the liberalization of prices, and the privatization of state-owned businesses (Peltzman, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Winston, 1993). Economic liberalization is the commonly recognized element of pro-market institutions (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Saunoris & Sajny, 2017; Nazareno et al., 2019; Xu *et al.,* 2019). Governance levels are the stronger implementation of rules that support contractual relationships and

market exchanges, which reduce the costs of setting up contracts (Fukuyama, 2004; Williamson, 2004). In countries with higher governance levels, the government ensures that the rule of law is applied and curbs misbehavior in contractual relationships. Governance levels are important because regulations are of little service if not properly implemented (Williamson, 2004). Despite their value, governance levels have been largely overlooked in the studies of developing countries. A reason for this may be that governance levels are more difficult to implement in practice than economic liberalization, as government inaction tends to be easier than action (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003; Rodrik, 2006). With these discussions in mind, we will now dive into the Moroccan case for analysis.

3. Moroccan Events: A conceptual overview

One of the most seminal political events of this century may be the Arab Spring, which began when a frustrated Tunisian entrepreneur, street vendor, Ṭāriq aṭ-Ṭayib Muḥammad al-Būʿazīzī set **himself** on fire on 17 December 2010 because of frustration from legal obstacles that prevented him from making a living (Touzani *et al,* 2015). Thus, while a vast army of entrepreneurship promotors continue to argue for the growth of entrepreneurship at the base of the pyramid (Hall et al 2012), clearly, the outcomes may not always correspond to the intent. In short, while entrepreneurship may be a solution for those with sufficient cultural and social capital, it may be a constraint for the necessary entrepreneurs attempting to carve out a living (Light and Dana, 2013). Examining under what conditions entrepreneurship facilitates economic growth and mobility is an essential yet often overlooked aspect of entrepreneurship promotion. Who succeeds, why, and how may have more to do with who you know than how you perform. This is particularly acute in autocratic regimes, such as that of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Kadaffi's Libya. However, obstacles to access and institutional corruption are a feature of many developing countries and must be considered within the entrepreneurship framework (Khyareh, 2017). Therefore, it is understandable why it is argued that:

> *"The future of the Arab Spring depends on the capacity of the new democratically elected governments to implement measures to prevent crony capitalism, restore the rule of law and promote economic freedom in order to ensure general prosperity" (Martin, 2012: p.94)*

Although the Arab Spring of 2011 did reach Morocco, with events from Tunisia and Egypt impacting Moroccan public opinion, the country remained stable. Demonstrations took place in more than 50

cities. These were large, but nowhere near the scale of the protests that were taking place in Tunisia, for example. The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior counted fewer than 37,000 participants, although estimates from other sources were between 240,000 and 300,000 (Molina, 2011). There are several explanations for the relative stability of the country during this period. Firstly, the Moroccan monarchy had taken pre-emptive actions to reduce social discontent. Salaries were raised for civil servants, jobs were provided for unemployed graduates, benefits were granted to the unemployed, and free health care was expanded and became available to more citizens (Molina, 2011). The Palace had traditionally paid off its subjects by providing substantial subsidies for essential goods such as bread, gas and electricity, but these were reduced in 2009 following the recommendation of the IMF. Amid the uprising, however, the authorities decided to reinstate them (Zaid *et al.,* 2014). Most importantly, the monarchy had cleverly relinquished some of its powers to the parliament over the years, which had the effect of deflecting people's ire away from the king, so that demands were for legislative change rather than abdication (Goldstone, 2011). Another reason was that there were various social groups ranging from uneducated rural Moroccans to students, professionals and religious groups who had unrelated interests, and it was therefore problematic for them to organize (Goldstone, 2011). Yet the main reason for the continued stability of the country during this period was that, unlike other regimes in the region, the King and his government had already undertaken a series of political and economic reforms over the preceding ten years (Gause and Gregory, 2011). The goals of these reforms were to decentralize and pluralize the decision centres of the regime, encouraging the development and proliferation of associations on a level of technocracy that favored neutral expertise and an apolitical approach to governance. Associations were perceived by the public as taking the relay of the government and gave the impression of a certain level of democratization of the country's political life. Sensitive matters such as corruption, public goods, local governance, and the Amazigh question were taken over by associations and technocrats, allowing public debate to take place and lessening some of the country's tensions (Hibou, 2011). Yet such an initiative did little to lessen Moroccan citizen mistrust toward the government. In one particular event, mirroring the Tunisian street vendor incident, a street vendor from Kenitra named Umm Fatiha became the symbol of governmental brutality. Her stall had been confiscated because she refused to move it, and in response, she self-immolated herself (Groisman, 2016, Bawaba.com, 2016).

4. Entrepreneurship in Morocco

Entrepreneurship has for the last few years in Morocco been presented as a way toward economic and social stability. Every year numerous conferences on Entrepreneurship take place all over the country with the following notable examples relating to the past couple of years:

- Nov 2014: 5th global entrepreneurship submits in Marrakesh which took place on Nov 2014 with the US vice president
- Nov 2014: First White House Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Nov 2014th Marrakesh. Morocco by the Bekeley program on entrepreneurship and development.
- Sept 2015: Conference dedicated to Entrepreneurs by CEED, which is a US aid-funded organization
- May 2016: "Peace Through Entrepreneurship" World Conference Morocco Marrakesh
- March 2016: Crowdfunding Conference hosted by the US Embassy in Morocco where Ambassador Dwight Bush introductory remarked stated that "Entrepreneurship not only serves as an engine for innovation, economic growth, and job creation but also as an indispensable building block for a peaceful, prosperous, and stable world". (Crowdfunding: entrepreneurship and innovation catalyst – MEF – Kingdom of Morocco.,2020).

5. Starting a business in Morocco

Although the government has made the creation of business a lot easier, corruption in administration continues to be a major impediment to entrepreneurship. Joe Biden at the 5th Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Marrakesh stated that "Corruption is a threat not only to economic growth but to security and sovereignty not just good governance. Fighting corruption is self-defence, it is patriotism," (Morocco World News, 2014).

Although the government claims it has now streamlined the system, old habits die hard. A central office "Centre Regional des Investissement" – Regional Center for Investment (CRI), is the office that provides would-be entrepreneurs with the "numero de patente" or your official business registration number that each business needs to operate in Morocco. Unfortunately, all the procedures are not centralized in a single office, and one has to deal with various administrations. This process involves a relatively important sum of money in a country where the GDP per capita per year is around $3000. Money is only one aspect, time and dealing with various administrations constitute the biggest hurdle as well as the lack of clarity in the process. There is no clear information online on how to start a

business and often civil servants at the CRI will make the procedure appear overly complicated so that one can end up paying extra for them to "ease" the process. Going through online forums such as Yabiladi one can realize the confusion that reigns (Yabiladi, 2016).

6. Corruption and Clientelism in Morocco

Clientelism, defined as buying the vote of constituencies with gifts and favors (Fujiwara, and Wantchekon, 2013), is not a recent issue in Morocco. The French Protectorate stability was mostly secured by maintaining a clientelistic relationship with the rural elites (Hissouf, 2016). Later the political parties that were instrumental in liberating the country from the French did not promote change but remained entrenched in their old patron-client modus operandi (Liddle, 2010). The clientelistic system persisted under Hassan II, as his ambition was to strengthen his political and economic domination of the country. Hassan II's reign has often been described as an "authoritarian, patrimonial, violent and repressive, clientelistic and subjecting society" (Catusse and Zaki, 2009, p. 76). For Michael and Nouaydi (2009, p. 356) corruption in Morocco is the result of this clientelistic system: "the most likely systemic cause of corruption in Morocco stems from the exercise of clientelistic and patronistic relationships — exercised by the Moroccan monarch — leading to the monopolistic division of rents". Allegedly, King Mohammed VI and his entourage (the Makhzen) sit at the centre of a large nexus of people who give favours and opportunities for corruption in order to maintain political power and accumulate wealth (Michael and Nouaydi, 2009). In a recent article, Ahmed Raïssouni — a Moroccan theologian and vice-president of the Unicité et réforme Mouvement (Uniqueness and Reform Movement), the ideological foundation of the PJD (the Islamist Justice and Development Party) currently in power — declared that the separation of powers in Morocco is only theoretical: "Corruption and the hidden state are the power in Morocco". (Telquel.ma, 2015a).

Until 1995, addressing the subject of corruption was considered taboo in Moroccan society. It was only in 1996 that "Maroc 2020", a Moroccan advocacy group, broke the public reserve about the subject by organizing several public seminars on corruption. Since then, several notable actions and reforms have been made. In December 1998, a Dahir (royal decree) enforcing rules on public procurement was passed. Then in 1999, the World Bank worked alongside the Moroccan government to organize a high-profile conference on corruption (Denoeux, 2000). In 2003 the UN Convention on the fight against corruption was signed and eventually ratified in May 2007. A money laundering law was also passed in 2007 while the draft law on wealth declaration was formally adopted by the Governing Council in

February 2007. In November 2006, the Government adopted a decree establishing the Central Body for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC or L'Instance Centrale de Prévention de la Corruption) which had first been discussed in 2005 (Michael and Nouaydi, 2009). Meanwhile, a further element of the administrative reforms — initially launched in the early 2000s specifically to fight against "petty corruption" — came into effect to avoid uncontrolled contact between officials and members of the public: A single window policy was adopted to replace the existing multi-service windows; some types of permit for small businesses were abolished; some public services were privatised; and, accompanied by great publicity, many known corrupt agents (such as police officers and judges) were fired. Eventually, to combat larger forms of corruption, regional investment centres were created and extra powers were given to the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) and the Court of Auditors (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). However, the efficiency of such measures remained limited and corruption scandals continued to surface regularly.

Moroccan citizens felt there was a void between the rhetoric and the action, and Moroccans gradually lost faith in their government's ability or genuine willingness to fight corruption (Denoeux, 2000). In 2010, a two-year government anti-corruption plan was launched. The plan included 40 anti-graft measures to keep corruption in check. It also set up hotlines for the public to report acts of extortion by government officials. Yet despite all these actions and public announcements Moroccan citizens remained unconvinced, and the kingdom's ranking on global governance indicators declined steadily. For instance, the Transparency International Corruption Index ranks countries based on how corrupt a country's public sector is perceived to be by experts and business executives. Morocco's Corruption Perception Index declined steeply from a score of 4.7 in 2000, or 37th place, to a score of 3.4 in 2011, or 80th position (Transparency International, 2012). In 2019 53% of Moroccan people thought that corruption increased in the previous 12 months (Transparency International, 2020). By comparison, New Zealand, one of the least corrupt countries on the Corruption Perception Index, had a score of 9.5, and Algeria ranked 113th. The year 2012 was not a good one for Morocco: its ranking declined even further, from 80th to 88th in the global corruption ranking (Le Monde, 2012). At the same time, TI's Global Corruption Barometer in 2010/2011 showed that barely 19 per cent of Moroccans believed that the kingdom's fight against corruption was effective.

7. Data and methods – how the survey was constructed, independent and dependent variables

Over 2000 questionnaires were printed. The total number of respondents was 1746 (including those who completed the questionnaire partially). One of the pollsters was wearing a hijab while the other a headscarf however, no significant difference was recorded in the data collected by the two pollsters. The Non-Probability Intercept Quota Sampling Method was used. The pollsters were given directives to gather answers from an equal proportion of men and women living in urban and rural locations. The questionnaires were distributed in the large cities of Meknes and Fes, as well as in rural areas of the Middle Atlas around small towns such as Aïn Leuh, Ifrane and Azrou, so that the number of respondents in rural areas matches the number of respondents in urban areas. The Data were collected between Dec 2015 and Jan 2016. The Middle Atlas region is one of the poorest regions of Morocco (Kalpakian *et al,* 2014). The survey in this study tackles two objectives. The first objective is to measure Moroccan citizens' intention to start a business. The second objective is to measure factors that may motivate or deter respondents from engaging in violent protests. The first part questioned the respondents about their profession, if he/she is an independent worker, if he/she is about to start a business (yes/no) answer, if he/she is considering starting a business (not at all, maybe, yes, certainly). We also tested the respondent's parents' employment status if they were or were not entrepreneurs. The second part of the questionnaire was tested on 5 5-point Likert scale. Respondents' indignation towards various issues such as world events (wars), corruption, poverty / high cost of living, access to education, unemployment, as well as the respondent's trust in the government. Religiosity was also tested using the Allport and Ross (1967) religious orientation scale. A follow-up question tested the respondent's willingness to act against the above factors, a choice was given between doing nothing, peaceful protest, or armed resistance. The last part measured some demographic variables of the respondents: level of education, age, monthly income, family status, household size, occupation, gender, marital status, and work sector.

8. Analysis and findings: Descriptive Stats

From the 2000 questionnaire distributed, an 87.3 percent response rate was recorded. 57.3 percent of the sample were male 42.7 percent were female. The respondents' ages ranged from 18-68, although the sample is biased toward younger respondents. Of the total, 16.2 percent were under 20 years old;

47.9 percent were between 21 and 30 years old; 27.1 percent were 31- 40; 8.3 percent were between 41 and 50 years old; and 0.5 percent were over 50. Regarding education level, 2.2 percent of the sample reportedly had no education; 5.9 percent had primary education level; 18.9 percent had secondary education level; 38 percent had completed high school education level, and 26.2% percent had a bachelor's degree, 6.9 a master's degree and 1.8 percent declared to have gained a doctorate degree. The sample seems slightly more educated than the Moroccan population, given the estimate of the US Agency for International Development that only 53 percent of Moroccan middle school students continue to high school, and less than 15 percent of first-grade students graduate from high school (USAID, 2019). Regarding the sample's monthly income level, 24.5 percent of respondents earned less than 150 USD per month; 39.9 percent earned between 151 USD and 300 USD; 20.1 percent earned between 301 USD and 500 USD; 8.9 percent earned between 501 USD and 700 USD 2.6 percent between 701 USD and 900 USD, 2.0 percent between 901 USD and 1100 USD, 1 percent between 1101 USD and 1300 USD and 0.6 percent earned 1,300 USD or more per month. When asked about the number of individuals in the household, 62 percent reported living in a household of 3 to 5 people and 24 percent in a household of more than 6 people. When asked to compare their household level of income, 24 percent said their households were better off than most households; 60 percent said their households were slightly better off than most households; and none said their households were much worse off than their neighbours.

Respondent choice when facing societal issues

In this question, respondents were asked what form of protest they would be willing to adopt when faced with various societal issues they are facing. 42.1 percent reported that they chose to do nothing against 57.9 who stated that they would take some form of action such as peaceful resistance or armed resistance (Table 1). 42.9 percent declared that they choose peaceful resistance -Table 2 - (57.2 percent were against it) and a staggering 243 out of 1746 respondents (Table 3) or, 13.9 percent affirmed they would be willing to take arms as a form of protest, with a ratio 19.45% of the male and 12.6% of the female (Table 4).

Do-nothing	Freq.	Percent
No	1,010	57.85
Yes	736	42.15
Total	1,746	100

Table 1. Do-nothing as a form of protest

Peaceful	Freq.	Percent
No	998	57.16
Yes	748	42.84
Total	1,746	100

Table 2. Peaceful resistance as a form of protest

Armed Freq.	Frequency	Percent
No	1,503	86.08
Yes	243	13.92
Total	1,746	100

Table 3. Armed Resistance as a form of protest

Armed	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
no	429	347	776
yes	104	50	154
Percent Yes	19.5%	12.6%	
Total	533	397	930

Table 4. Armed resistance choice per gender

Radicalization and business creation: ANOVA Test

The correlation between armed resistance as a form of protest and the willingness to start a business shows a strong statistical significance (Table 5). Those about to start a business (value varying between 1 and 2, with 1corresponding to a yes to the question on their willingness to start a business and 2 to a negative answer), are also more likely to consider armed resistance (average of 1.755) that those who do not (average of 1.820). $F(1,1419) = 5.16$, $p = 0.0233$

Armed	About to start a Business Alone or with another person (1 = yes, 2 = no)		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
No	1.820	.3841	1196
Yes	1.755	.4307	225
Total	1.809	.3924	1421

Table 5. ANOVA Armed Resistance vs Entrepreneurship Intention

This is also confirmed by the following ANOVA testing Radicalization intention vs. wish to create an independent business (Table 6) which shows that those considering armed resistance are also more

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likely to consider starting an independent business. F(1,1056) = 7.62, p = 0.0059

Armed	Mean of Entrepreneurship wish (1 not at all, 2 maybe, 3 certainly).	
	Mean	Std. Dev. Freq.
No	1.2827	.6337
Yes	1.4309	.7615
Total	1.3081	.6593

Table 6. Radicalization intention vs. wish to create an independent business

Factors linking Radicalization intention to societal factors were investigated. Once the multicollinearity test was performed a Binary logistic regression tested the correlation between armed resistance as a form of protest and various societal ills. It was found prob>chi2=0.0048, Pseudo R2 =0.0174 confirming a significant link between armed resistance and at least the societal factor. (Table 7). The data showed that the lower the trust in the government, the more likely to be radicalized. Trust in the government is the main factor correlated to the intention to take arms. (A one-unit increase in distrust in gov. leads to a 38.8% higher intention to consider armed resistance).

Armed	b	Z	P>z	%	%StdX
World event	-0.03894	-0.264	0.791	-3.8	-3.2
Corruption	0.0634	0.394	0.693	6.5	5.1
Poverty	0.08437	0.619	0.536	8.8	7.2
Access to education	0.04042	0.379	0.705	4.1	5.4
unemployment	-0.19952	-1.719	0.086	-18.1	-24.1
Trust in the gov.	0.32755	3.506	0	38.8	60.8

Table 7. Radicalization intention vs. wish to create an independent business

Socio-demographic factors & Radicalization:

Once the multicollinearity test was performed, a Binary logistic regression tested the correlation between armed resistance as a form of protest and respondents' socio-demographics. It was found prob>chi2 = 0 Pseudo R2 = 0.0421 confirming a significant link between armed resistance and at least one demographic factor. More specifically, it was found that higher income and women are less likely to consider armed resistance by 28.7% and 44.9%, respectively. (Table 9)

Armed	b	Z	P>z	%	%StdX
Education	-0.07232	-0.803	0.422	-7	-7.9
age	-0.08901	-0.603	0.546	-8.5	-6.6
Income	-0.33813	-3.779	0	-28.7	-37.1
Family Status	-0.27219	-1.394	0.163	-23.8	-15.4
Household Number	-0.05965	-0.363	0.717	-5.8	-3.3
Gender	-0.59633	-3.049	0.002	-44.9	-25.5

Table 8. Binary logistic regression: Armed resistance vs. Socio-Demographic factors

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Religiosity:

Factors linking Radicalization intention to religiosity. Allport (1950) defines both intrinsic religiosity and extrinsic religiosity, with *intrinsic* religiosity measuring the importance of religion in one's everyday life while *extrinsic* religiosity measures the degree to which an individual uses religiosity for external uses. An ANOVA test was performed to test the correlation between armed resistance as a form of protest and respondents' religiosity. It was found that respondents with deeper personal convictions have a lesser propensity toward armed resistance. $F(1,1744) = 9.36$, $p = 0.0023$. Similar findings were confirmed with inter-religiosity (Social aspect of religion) with the following result from an ANOVA test: $F(1,1744) = 9.27$, $p = 0.0024$. (Table 9).

Armed	**Summary of**	**Intra_religiosity**
	Mean	**Std. Dev. Freq.**
No	22.3666	5.0460597 1503
Yes	21.304527	4.8665943 243
Total	22.218786	5.0335507 1746

Table 9. Binary logistic regression: Armed resistance vs. Religiosity

Discussions

Entrepreneurship has been widely acknowledged as a catalyst for economic growth and national development over the years (Ebner, 2005; Cervelló-Royo *et al.,* 2019; Gbadamosi, 2019). One of the routes to achieving this laudable objective is through employment (Morris, 2020). Evidence shows that small and medium size (SME) businesses contribute significantly to employment. In fact, in most nations, this contribution is around 90% of the total employment in proportion to what is offered by large corporations ((Comrie and Adeluwoye-Adams, 2008)). This study examines the nexus of entrepreneurship, radicalization, and corruption, among youths, with reference to Morocco as the contextual platform.

The findings are quite telling. The study shows that the higher the desire of these youths to become entrepreneurs, the more likely they are to consider armed resistance. This is a valuable and interesting finding in that it shows that these youths perceive corruption as inimical to their life aspirations of contributing meaningfully to society and are keen to enforce the change desired for actualizing this. Hence, even though entrepreneurship is widely lauded as contributing to the economy, achieving this will be affected by corruption. Hence, the various purported efforts to promote entrepreneurship will be overshadowed by radicalization, which implies that overcoming the latter is a necessary condition for boosting the former. If presented in a different form, the study shows that those who are about to start a business have a higher likelihood of considering armed resistance than those who do not. Hence, it would be misleading to conclude that radicalization is embraced by people with no future aspirations.

From a different perspective, these findings show another interesting link between radicalization and corruption. As shown in this study, when citizens do not trust the government, they are more likely to be radicalized. There is a significant degree of logic to this reasoning in that trust is fundamental to ensuring harmonious relationships in relationships. As emphasized in the literature, trust is a generalized expectancy held by an individual that the word of another individual can be relied upon (Rotter, 1967). So, trust has elements of mutual value and confidence between the parties involved (Sako, 1992; Miyamoto and Rexha, 2004). In the context of this study, when the citizens note that there is an imbalance in their expectations from the government and the actual experience, the tendency to be radicalized becomes strengthened. Hence, high indignation toward the government plays a crucial role as a major factor in relation to people's intention to take arms. Meanwhile, it could be argued that radicalization and corruption are inimical to entrepreneurship as they cause disruption to creativity and the smooth functioning of businesses toward wealth creation.

As shown in the study, demographical data notably relate to the intention to take arms. More specifically, the roles of income, gender, and religiosity are specifically examined in this study. High-income earners and women are less likely to contemplate armed resistance. This is consistent with the claim that radicalization is linked to poverty, as indicated concerning the case in Nigeria in which it is reported that many belonging to the Boko Haram sect were involuntarily introduced into it due to poverty, joblessness, or in pursuit of greater religious knowledge (Corps, 2016; Clubb and Tapley, 2018). However, the findings regarding the lower likelihood of women being involved in armed resistance are at variance from some of the existing claims in the literature where women's radicalism

and involvement in terrorism are noted (Huey & Witmer, 2016 Shapiro & Maras, 2019). Similarly, being more intra-religious and interreligious shows less propensity towards armed resistance. By and large, this is an interesting finding from this study as it further pinpoints the role of religion as a moderator of behavioural patterns allowing for more tolerance in society. So, radicalization is multifaceted and could be linked to several other phenomena, including entrepreneurship. Hence, curbing and managing it will also require commensurate measures.

9. Conclusion and Implications of the study

In Morocco, as in all countries, there seems to be a strong correlation between corruption and the key factors of low educational level, low career expectations and low sense of general security (Hamelin, Nwankwo and Gbadamosi, 2020). All of this leads to discouragement. Distrust of the state, of business, of one's neighbour to lessen the discouragement often leads people to care for themselves in any way possible, legally or illegally. This study is an initial attempt to answer some of Morocco's development challenges. Our findings suggest that low trust in the government and perceived corruption are major deterrents to development in a country plagued by social ailments. Entrepreneurial spirit is foremostly a mindset that embraces critical thinking and innovation. It cannot thrive in a country where the status quo is always sought by those profiteering from an antiquated bureaucratic government system favourable to corruption. The findings of the research show that Morocco's high level of perceived corruption is impeding governmental efforts to promote entrepreneurship.

It shows entrepreneurship and corruption in opposing directions in terms of their impacts on youths concerning radicalisation. Essentially, while entrepreneurship tends to save youths from radicalization, corruption in the system contributes to getting them radicalized. Meanwhile, their craving for a perfect system amenable to entrepreneurship prompts them to engage in armed resistance toward facilitating independent business ownership and management. Besides, it can be concluded that people's income, gender, and religiosity also influence their decision to be involved in armed resistance. High-income earners in society are less likely to be involved in radicalisation which also emphasises the notion that poverty, as caused by corruption in society, makes radicalisation an attractive issue to the youth. Moreover, as shown by this study, women are not inclined to be involved in armed resistance so are those with either intra-religious involvement or interreligious engrossment.

This study has a good number of implications which could be categorised as theoretical and managerial. Theoretically, the study unpacks the link of entrepreneurship to curbing radicalization and offers insight into the negative role of corruption in this. Similarly, it enhances the extant understanding of how the betrayal of people's trust as engrained in corrupt practices at various levels of societal establishments is perceived by the youth and how this prompts their interest in armed resistance. The study also raises awareness of the weight of the relevance of demographic factors such as gender and religiosity to a robust understanding of radicalization and measures to control it. The managerial implications of this study are valuable and topical. The study provides strategic directions not only on how to boost entrepreneurship but also on how to curb radicalization. It becomes imperative for the government to examine its various public policy issues to ensure that they are genuinely focussed on poverty alleviation that will touch all the segments of the societal system. This will put radicalization under check and boost entrepreneurship which will ultimately result in economic growth of the country. Moreover, as the teaching of moral values is known to be contributing to orderly behaviour, encouraging this at various opportunities such as it is provided in religious circles and charity organisations could sensitise people against corruption, and corroborate government policies geared towards the same objective. Doing so would also encourage the people to explore other peaceful means of voicing concerns against irregularities in the establishments. Hence this should be reinvigorated and incentivised in that it has the potential to deeply address corruption in a way that is beneficial to virtually all the stakeholders. So, apart from the value of this research to the local contexts, international establishments such as GEM, and USAID will find the study very beneficial for strategy formulation and implementation in many ramifications. The Arab Spring was initiated when a young entrepreneur set himself on fire to protest against corrupt policemen. Radicalization is born from the same desperation. Before promoting entrepreneurship Morocco needs to curb corruption. Only then will entrepreneurship become a way out of youth despair and radicalization. The prize is significant – the transformation of society, vastly for the better for all.

Footnotes

[1] For the case of Pakistan, a nuclear power but yet facing chain of terrorist attacks where so many police officers were killed https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/17/armed-militants-storm-police-headquarters-karachi-pakistan

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