

Review of: "Brain Patterns Shaping Embodied Activities of Their Bodily Limbs in Perception and Cognition"

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Regarding the general criticisms and the assertions (some of them quite strong) made in the conclusions, I would like to offer my general impressions that invite a tempering of some of these assertions:

I am not sure that the example of the pianist Martins demonstrates that practical knowledge is propositional, especially because the learning processes under his new bodily conditions were challenging and time-consuming. I don't believe enactivists say that knowledge resides in the muscles or the nervous system without a connection to the brain. For instance, Thomas Fuchs (2011) suggests that the brain is somewhat like a "relational organ". The body engages in several sensorimotor loops with the world, which it must modulate, select, and sometimes inhibit. DiPaolo mentions that Varela et al. (2001) describe experiments where the temporal synchronization of these neuronal structures is measured at the moment an observer recognizes an ambiguous figure. According to these and other studies, the role of the brain would not be to construct a perceptual world from disjointed elements but to "resonate" appropriately in recognition of perceptual meaning. In this case, know-how would be a form of knowledge distributed throughout the body in which the brain's function would be to resonate with practical activity. In this sense, if someone has damage to a part of their body, they could retrain because cognition is distributed.

Indeed, according to the formulations of O'Regan and Noë (2001), perception is constituted by the skill with which an agent manages the sensorimotor regularities of their body-environment relationship. Such skill is interpreted as know-how, that is, as something that accompanies the agent's effective action in the world (Hutto 2005). You assert that know-how is not a form of practical knowledge without propositional meaning.

According to DiPaolo (2016), this argument is based on a fallacy because it assigns to a part of the sense-making process (the agent-world coupling) the value of its entirety, leading to the thought of an equivalence meaning = coupling-. This is not what enactivism says. Following DiPaolo, the search for meaning always involves the agent as a whole, necessarily including their history, sensitivities, norms, and goals. It also involves their relationship with their world. Cognition is the adaptive modulation that the agent produces on this relational totality, and while it always involves some concrete manifestation in this totality and particularly in the relationship between agent and world, it does not limit itself to expressing only what happens in the coupling between these systems. (DiPaolo, 2016)

