Alienation, Values and the Destruction of the Subject

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Abstract

The article concerns issues of destruction with respect to a subject in alienation conditions. Alienation is considered a definite way of being, chosen by a human, which violates a human's ontological freedom, thereby leading to a decline in his subjectivity. An alienated consciousness generates the invertedness of subject-object relations, leading to a bifurcation of the personality and to the loss of an individual's subjectivity and inner freedom. Unlike viewpoints that believe the objective grounds of alienation represented in external forces, such as society, the state, etc., determine the internal world of a subject, I claim that: first of all, in his mind, a subject creates alienated values that are opposite to the concept of ontological freedom as a general foundation of humans, thus generating his self-estrangement and the irrational actions that can be expressions of the personal and impersonal mental conflict. The methods of philosophical reflection and logical analysis of psychoanalytic materials are applied. S. Freud's notion of splitting ego is explained first by the mental character of alienation.

Keywords: alienation, self-estrangement, bifurcation of personality, pseudo value, personal - impersonal.

The problem of alienation is one of the main central and discussable issues in philosophy. Social alienation is a specific reality of human life and a way of being that represents the rejection of one's own subjectivity and also reflects the individual's supposition of his condition as the consequence of a world of objects, socii or inexorable natural law. Understanding alienation depends on our understanding of the subject, his freedom and values, and his meaning of a human life that is worth living. In this article, we attempt to undertake a philosophical analysis of two oppositions: ontological freedom as a general foundation of a human being and an individual's primary value and alienation that as a form of distortion of human subjectivity, is expressed in a loss of its wholeness and the bifurcation of the personality. As alienation is considered the self-estrangement of a human in his own mind and thinking, the ultimate subject of alienation may be only the human himself. From such a position, I propose that self-estrangement underlies the phenomenon of neuroses explored and explained naturalistically by Sigmund Freud.

To establish my reasoning on this issue, I divide this article into three sections. In the first section, I substantiate that freedom is the general foundation of human beings on the basis of which the ego-subject arises, with capabilities of

creation and free choice for the multitude of spiritual meanings that can compose a human's meaning of life or the value with which an individual is identified. Such an identification has a reflective character. Herewith, I show that this reflection embraces the whole subject, namely, its conscious and unconscious sphere. Insofar as the ego-subject functions freely, it cannot disappear when an individual rejects a chosen value. The nature of value is as follows: while the content of value represents an ideal, that is, a form based on an individual's own self-conception, it is realized by turning it into an existing, definite form of being. Human beings can choose pseudo-values, the content of which is contradictory to their basic freedom, thereby originating alienation and self-estrangement because the individual's first identification with freedom does not disappear, as, if it did, the subject would disappear. By this way of self-estrangement, the subject is divided and his ego is split into two or more parts representing conflicting values.

In the second section, while considering social alienation in an objective-historical context, I argue that, first, the subject himself creates alienation in his thinking by choosing and establishing false pseudo-values that are in opposition to and that deny his essential values, such as ontological freedom and self-determination. However, his essential forces cannot disappear, as they represent his underlying roots that are personally manifested in him, even though these essential forces are often supplanted by the opposing, alienating pseudo-values that are presented to the individual in an impersonal manner. For the subject, the conflict between the accepted impersonal values that are incompatible with his own personal values causes an ego split and a bifurcated personality. Here, I assert that with respect to internal mental splitting and bifurcation, this self-estrangement is a primary process that generates alienation in an individual's external life and social relations. Alienation generates the destruction of the subject, as the duality of the human himself and his other self develops into his bifurcation. Second, alienation generates reification of the subject and vice versa: an object acquires the status of a subject so that an illusory visibility with an irrational logic is viewed as something that is quite real. However, ultimately, a human being does not completely lose his subjectivity, although he creates this type of reality.

In the third section, instead of sharing his naturalistic approach, I propose that the phenomena of bifurcation of personality and splitting ego opened and described by S. Freud in his theory of neurosis have social roots in alienation. However, agreeing with his notion of the ego striving to reconcile its instances or its incompatible motives in order to keep its wholeness, I assume that under conditions of alienation, many individuals, depending on the level of subjectivity, apparently find two ways of satisfying their personal aspirations and thereby a certain degree of resolution of their internal conflict: first, by identifying their personal interests with the interests of the impersonal institutions and norms and second, by recognizing them in different degrees and separating them from the interests of the external dominant sphere. Only in extreme cases when an individual fails to find an exit from the labyrinth that allows alienated impersonal values to prevail over his personality can he lose his internal freedom and the quality of the subject, and I posit that this phenomenon sufficiently corresponds to Freud's description of cases of neuroses, especially the cases of compulsion neurosis. In my opinion, Freud discovered the phenomenon of intrapsychic self-estrangement, although he interpreted it naturalistically.

The problem of alienation concerns human existence, an individual's values and wholeness of subjectivity, and interrelations of consciousness and unconscious. Many aspects of alienation need to be studied because they are multifaceted and their underlying causes will not lose relevance while mankind exists.

Freedom as a Primary Value and the Reflective Foundation of Ego

In our understanding, a human ego, unlike an animal, functions freely, with an openness to a variety of ways of being: it is not pre-determined by an individual's biological foundation because a human is a subject with the ability to create multiple new spiritual meanings (not taken from nature, including one's own physical meaning), from which he can freely choose one or the other as his meaning of life. This meaning, most appreciated by certain human beings as the ideal with which they identify themselves as being precisely human or as the representation of their understanding of what kind of human they ought to be according to their conception, is something we can call value. Such value and its sense have individual characteristics and cannot coincide in content with the value sense of another human's ego because of freedom and individual free choice.

For a human being, freedom implies manifold ways of being, including false ones; an individual can create and choose different values, some of which may have negative or antihuman meanings, which deny freedom. No matter how paradoxically it may sound, thanks to freedom, humans (even the whole of society) can choose those pseudo-values of which the contents and internal logic can lead to wrong motives, actions and deeds that block the development of the human essence, creating a false way of being. For a long time, mankind has been experiencing clashes with values, such as the striving for power, domination, superiority, etc., which do not lead to a harmony of relationships with nature, other people, entire communities, and civilizations.

Thus, regardless of whether the value sense is false or true, composing the internal spiritual content in the soul of a certain individual, it becomes the meaning of his life, that is, the kernel of his ego that seems true for this individual. Value is such an ideal, representing what a human ought to be according to his or her conception, different from that of one or another person. Defining the way of thinking and being of a subject and directing its aspirations, motives and purposes, the spiritual content of value organizes the structural architectonic of a subject and its ego.

The identification with a certain value sense has a reflective characteristic. Reflection is a process where the subject and its ego make their own subjectivity an object for their consideration, evaluation, and for improvement and change itself. Freedom is a reflection, which embraces the whole subject and his ego, both the conscious and the unconscious, and has different levels of maturity. As is often believed by many authors, the reflection process is not only confined by consciousness. In line with this insight, Dan Zahavi argues, 'Reflection (or higher-order representation) is the process whereby consciousness directs its intentional aim at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object' (Zahavi, 2011, p. 324). However, he relates this process ultimately with consciousness. Certainly, reflection is the condition of the rise of consciousness; however, a more thorough base of human subjectivity, as was shown in the late Sigmund Freud's investigations, is situated in the unconscious (Freud, 1989a [1960]), and according to Jacques Lacan, unlike superficial consciousness as a system of images of our perception system, only unconscious subject functions reflectively. (Lacan, 2013[1975]). In contrast to this characterization, Paul Ricoeur (1996, p. 74) maintains that reflection is possible only in the sphere of consciousness. He considered reflection as *Cogito* implemented by the interpretation of symbols and motion from symbols to meanings and by this method, a way of obtaining self-understanding of the ego. Ricoeur is considered to have correctly connected ego with reflection, but his assertion that reflection can only be conscious or lead to

consciousness is likely to be a mistake. Lacan's consideration of reflection confined only by an unconscious sphere is also unacceptable.

From my perspective, while giving a more significant place and role to consciousness than to unconsciousness, I argue that both consciousness and unconsciousness represent the whole reflective process, as for the majority of individuals, a subject's reflection over its value sense occurs not only by a conscious way but also often at an unconscious level. Considering the individuals' own inclinations and preferences, their regulation with respect to life circumstances may be implemented behind conscious processes. However, on my account, for these processes to rise, they need to have some channels to withdraw them into the conscious sphere. Otherwise, the subject would not be connected with its object; even in a distorted form, the processes must receive some type of withdrawal into the external sphere. Freud (Freud, Breuer, 2004; Freud, 2010[1955], 2002, 1989b[1960]), for his part, discovered mechanisms, such as resistance of consciousness, repression, replacement, etc., as connections between consciousness and the unconscious that, I think, characterize reflection that took a distorted form due to the internal contradictions of oppositely directed values (according to Freud—motives) within the human ego. A value sense returns to itself, that is, to its internal soulful place, only through considering something relative to oneself in this external sphere—images, symbolic forms, deeds or actions of him/her or others, without knowing and without suspecting that he or she had referred something composed in one's self to something external. In this case, this external sphere is one's own external sphere, that is, one's existence with respect to something else. Apparently, this is not a logical reflection; it is accomplished on a sensitive-emotional level. In different circumstances, this reflection may be non-conscious, half-conscious and in some cases fully conscious. The latter, perhaps, is a type of self-identity of the ego, that is, a self-identity that exists and acts on the basis of reflectivity, a concept that was formulated as *I am I* in the high philosophy of reflection by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (2010[1970]).

Such a reflective process, unlike natural processes, is not predetermined by the laws of necessity because the human ego is a subject unlike an animal; the latter can behave only in the way given it by nature, while a human being can reproduce any way of being (Marx, 1974a, p. 93).

Ontological freedom is the most general foundation of a human being and the reflection of his ego, while value sense is a concrete-general foundation of the human ego. Addressing its spiritual organization to itself, the human ego ontologically emerges as a functioning freedom, a reflection of oneself. In addition, I denote *the primary identification of the ego* as the situation in which this level of the ego in its fusion with freedom has not yet accepted a certain value as the meaning of all life.

The choice of a particular value or meaning of his being by a human and his ego as what he sees as his destiny and his truth should be regarded as *a secondary identification of ego*.

The wholeness of the ego would be based on a created or chosen uniform single value sense and its appropriate motives and aims. However, according to his ontological freedom and non-predetermination, a human being can choose not one but two or more values with different meanings, and in some cases, if these values can turn out to be both mutually opposite in their meanings and even mutually denying, this could possibly lead to the emergence of a phenomenon of a

splitting of the ego into parts and instances that conflict with each other. This happens because both opposite values were chosen by the subject as being meaningful for him and his life; he can be deeply rooted in them so that they both are equally valuable and significant for him. The phenomenon of the dividing and splitting of the ego represents the paradoxical picture where in the same individual, two or more personalities—each of them with their own values and motives, vital orientations and contradictions, that is, a few different egos—can coexist.

Ronald Laing considers the phenomenon of ego splitting from an ontological viewpoint. The coincidence of one's own internal psychical world with one's own actions in the external world makes an individual confident in his own being, his identity and his autonomy, removing his doubts: Laing called this *an ontological security.* In contrast, the splitting Self acts in an imaginary world, generating phantoms, creating an illusory identification with freedom and creativity and having the inability to implement itself in reality. Such individuals with divided real and imaginary egos are not ontologically protected (Laing, 1960). We will consider this issue from an alienation and a self-estrangement point of view.

Alienation, Self-estrangement and the Bifurcation of Personality

In our opinion, the destruction of a subject expressed in the internal mental splitting of his ego is based on the alienation phenomenon. Instead of defining it as a predetermining condition, we define alienation as rather a certain personal attitude of a human with respect to the world and the understanding of one's place and role in the world. For Jaeggi alienation is 'disturbed appropriation' or disruption of the subject: "being accessible rather than alien to oneself or being able to understand oneself as the author of one's own action presupposes certain features of personhood" (Jaeggi 2014: 49), consequently, violation of this state is "alienation from something the self has made" (Jaeggi 2014, p. 12).

People develop this attitude on their own, build it in relationships with others and express it externally. However, alienation is a type of human development, which eventually distorts the human essence and limits its freedom and subjectivity. Therefore, overcoming alienation depends on the individual because individuals are subjects of these types of relationships that are constructed in the course of their choices and which can be comprehended and changed by the individual. Most likely, this situation developed from a choice of a certain value, which turns out to be alien to the freedom and essence of a human. The internal mental conflicts can arise as a divergence between the values erected by aloof socii, values that were created by the individuals, and the personal values accepted by separate individuals. The interrelation of these values in specific individuals can be infinitely various, but in alienated living conditions, they quite often take on incompatible characteristics. As the characteristics of a problem depend on the individuals and their level of subjectivity and autonomy, as a social reality created by people, alienation is a historical phenomenon and has various forms and developmental stages.

Gavin Rae maintains that there is a 'constitutive link between authenticity and alienation' and that the conception of the authentic Self itself represents a definite form or mode of alienation. Relying on Jean-Paul Sartre's (2003, p. 9) distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness as impure and pure forms of reflection, respectively, he argues that if these two levels of self-understanding differ, 'consciousness is alienated because it fails to properly reflectively understand

itself and/or its pre-reflective experience.' (Rae, 2010, p. 29). Herewith, Rae does not give a detailed explanation of the concept of authenticity or its structure but refers to the freedom and creativity of the Self. In our understanding, regardless of whether the choice of negative alienated values is conscious or not, these values can be approved by the subject as true and can be perceived as his truth and as being authentic. Whatever a value is false or true, it functions as a self-reflection when it is approved; otherwise, consciousness, though failing at the beginning to understand whether this value is true or false, would not be capable of discerning this when encountering the existential results of a value's intention. Further, Rae finds confirmation of his thoughts about the presence of alienation when there is an absence of the self-reflection of the subject, in Hegel's statement about the unity of the subjective and objective in self-reflection and the discrepancy of the subject's consciousness with its true meaning in the case of the misunderstanding of the Self:

> 'Put differently, while estrangement is immediately negative in so far as the actual consciousness does not properly understand itself, it is the experience of being estranged from its true self that drives consciousness to alter its self-understanding until it does properly understand itself in Absolute Knowing.' (Rae, 2010, p. 32).

However, in our opinion, the connection between the unconscious subject and the external world exists: the subject learns through external forms, that is, through things, objects, cultural forms and their symbols, in which he expresses himself and something of his own, that is, values that he externalizes and embodies but is not always clearly aware of their meaning. The person can feel and experience them as emotionally related to him but he does not understand their meaning, and this experience, the emotional commitment to their meaning, can also be a reflection on the unconscious level. When we like or dislike a certain social environment, person, music or work of art, we make a certain type of reflection but not on a logical level: it happens more likely on the sensually emotional registers; however, the essence remains the same. According to J. Lacan (Lacan, 1991[1978]), we know the inner subject, in contrast to an individual's own Ego, is often unconscious: the former has a function of reflection and therefore a certain way of self-understanding. Lacan did not define one's own Ego as the true subject: it is rather a superficial system of images on the surface of consciousness.

Proceeding from the understanding of the ontological freedom of man, existentialism makes the correct conclusion about the absence of a given specific essence of a human in advance and, as a result, the inability for him to be predetermined, or, to be enclosed and explained within the framework of his existence.

However, often in this correct understanding of freedom as an essential definition of man, in existentialism, in particular, in Jean-Paul Sartre's vision, one can see the point of view that everything a person has created is the result of his freedom of choice and all that he has not yet done and that has not yet been manifested in the existential features of his life is not and could not be in his projection of himself (Sartre, 1989, p. 323; 2007). In our understanding, ontological freedom means the freedom of choice made by a human primarily for himself and the choices made of his values within his Self before their incarnation and before their transition from the due (ideal, that ought to be) into the existing. A human is not restricted by the space of objective activity. In imagination, ideal, and creativity, he goes even beyond his capabilities.

Sartre recognizes the value of the meanings of only positive-moral content, such as, for example, good (Sartre, 1989, p.

324; 2007). However, as it has already been pointed out, certain human values that reveal their negative content in their historical results may at first seem to people as a blessing and an undoubted good. This, of course, does not justify their choice because independently, whether the choice was conscious or unconscious, in any case, the person is responsible for his choice since freedom is connected with responsibility. Undoubtedly, a boon for humanity, the true content of human values can only be good, not evil, but their true destiny is revealed in the necessary results reflecting historically their characteristics.

The task of philosophy, it seems, is to reveal the true or false content of value meanings, their logic, potential and possible forms of realization, without denying their creative diversity as the basis of human development. Unlike Hegel who, considering philosophy as the quintessence of the epoch, asserted, 'The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk' (Hegel, 1990, p. 56), Heidegger (1993) and some other philosophers have held that philosophy, being its metaphysical basis, precedes every historical epoch.

For instance, as Herbert Marcuse correctly notes, the metaphysical systems and Logos are historical. Modern instrumentalism and operationalism originated in Aristotle's formal logic, which, unlike Plato's dialectic, has lost the tension between "is" and "ought to be" in the issues of the ratio of the universal and the individual and the growing tendency of formalizing cause-effect relationships in the consideration of the world-object as a result of the activity of the subject. Actually, truth, its authenticity began to be determined by the way human activity, including public activity, as a manifestation of completed data, became equivalent to reality. Value meanings were supplanted of truth. According to Marcuse, this means that thinking loses its ability to transcend and that there is an absence of opposition in it: humans and an individual's thinking have become one-dimensional. Regarding thinking, the formalization and the mathematization of nature have left in it only the characteristics that can be measured and the possibility of using it within the framework of cause-effect categories. Marcuse characterizes the modern industrial society as alien and one that does not promote creative registers inherent to a human being (Marcuse, 2002).

According to Karl Marx (1974b), raised historically in the period of the division of labour, alienation is an objectively developed contradiction in society; as a result, the subjectivity of the human loses its holistic character because the activity of humans is divided into mutually conditioned spheres and loses its integrity.

As Kalekin-Fishman and Langman (2015, p. 6) noted "Research in the Marxist tradition views alienation as a general human condition shaped by material relations". For example, Lordon understands capitalism as a private restructuring of desire. He examines the nature of motives, desires and affects through the prism of the development of working conditions, economic growth, and their transformation under capitalism from alienated forms expressed in the suffering of primary physical survival up to motivated desired labor under neoliberalism (Lordon, 2010). Lordon's view represents the model of determinism of human aspirations and values by social and economic circumstances and their conditionality by these circumstances. Values, motives and desires in Lordon's viewpoint do not appear as due within the subject, they are the result of an external causal chain of economic circumstances. Lordon's representation of the transformation of human values, desires, and aspirations in the course of capitalism looks schematic as noted by Jason Read (Read, 2014). In our understanding, values are primary, being the result of the subject's mental creativity instead of external milieu, as we

indicated above.

Crinson and Yuill proposed an analysis of health inequalities on the basis of Marxian alienation theory considering four forms of alienation with respect to creative inceptions of humans and its impact on the deterioration of mental or emotional health. They conclude on the limitations of a purely empirical understanding of the processes of alienation. Though disenchantment, stress, and feelings of powerlessness as operationalized parameters empirically prove they lead to poor health, however Crinson and Yuill note the limits of such causal method: 'The complexity of human agency and social structural interaction within an open society is generally missing from such linear causal models.' They conclude that 'the nature of oppression and alienation in late modern societies goes beyond the directly material' (Crinson, Yuill, 2008, p. 467, 468).

Alienation overturns all essential relations. Although the contraposition by a human to himself, an activity in which a duality exists between one's own self and one's own other self, is a condition of an individual's development, in an alienation condition and a division of the fields of human activity, this opposition accepts an antagonistic character: this human duality turns into the bifurcation of one's self and one's own other self. The subject in a way becomes an object and vice versa: an object acquires the status of a subject. Ollman noted on alienation next: "In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality" (Ollman, 1976, p. 144).

Building on Marx, Sen, and Nussbaum's concepts of how capital inverts the character of human creative activity and generates a kind of false consciousness, Gangas supports Sen and Nussbaum's viewpoint that human capabilities are 'thus a kind of freedom', or, its potentialities and alienation initiates inversion or deprivation of these capabilities leading to 'serious injuries and deformations of the socially capable self, that is, of species-being' (Gangas, 2014, p.p. 59, 63). I prefer to use the term 'duality' for non-alienated social structures instead of the term 'bifurcation' as Gangas uses (Gangas, 2014, p. 61), and vice versa, I use the term 'bifurcation' for alienated conditions.

The world created by a human, that is, the world and its meaningfulness are viewed now to him not as his own but as alien to him. Since the human world is one consistent with his own expression, then in case of alienation the person is not only estranged from this world but is also estranged from himself and other people. Therefore, the alienation of the human from himself represents his self-estrangement. As a result, the general subject—society created by the diverse efforts and relations of individuals with their personal purposes, interests, creative features and requirements—confronts as having authority over the individual and as sort of a generative inception that dictates its purposes and various directions to an individual.

Many philosophers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, G.W.F. Hegel and other thinkers, devoted their works to the investigation of this phenomenon, but the problem of alienation was particularly developed in K. Marx's doctrine.

Social alienation takes place when the general relations of people that involve linking their activities together, start standing apart, acquiring the character of over-individualistic inceptions, in which norms, values and bans gain a preponderant position, while the activity of each individual and his or her life becomes the private moment of a cumulative general process. Then, the life of everyone, in turn, becomes special, being focused on purely individual motives.

According to Marx, such isolation at this historical stage signifies a certain level of freedom of a man, that is, the appearance on the historical arena of a personality with independent acts, capable of using developed social relations for his own private purposes. The other side of isolation is alienation, which, according to Marx, can be overcome in the course of natural-historical processes, under objective law.

However, despite some determinism in his doctrine, Marx especially emphasized that his concept differs from other concepts, as the development of his doctrine proceeds from active, initiative individuals actively creating social relations and transforming society and their activity according to their purposes, instead of being just the products and consequences of circumstances and education (Marx, 1955). In this sense active individuals with their individual consciousness are primary. This means that instead of just some abstraction, society is composed by individuals themselves and their public relations. Otherwise, it would have been meant that society, an aggregate of all relations of individuals, is abstracted from their subjects and turns into a certain special being, independent from individuals, as if it precedes them and generates them. This would be, indeed, the logic of alienation, irrational logic or, the logic of making senselessness.

According to Marx and other researchers, such logic is not simply a mental invention or a consciousness distortion: it has an objective ground. Alienation is a certain social reality. Its reality is based on the fact that it is all created by people—the totality of their social relations (that is society), object wealth, their productive forces, forms of their social consciousness, cultural norms and traditions, and mainly, their own activity as a depersonalized public process, in which all spiritual and materially existent worlds act not as one's own world, own result and own being but as something initially alien. Wherein, the ability of a person to consciously transform not only nature, but also themselves as the ability of 'species-being' is also alienated from it and is perceived as an external force (Groff, 2021). Alienation implies that a human being's own essential forces, taking objectified forms, which would seem to be intended to serve a human for his or her development and growth as personality, acquire an independent existence that does not coincide and does not serve the purpose of a person because these forces have the objective of their own development and growth, resulting in a person becoming a means of their self-development. In this sense, alienation is the self-estrangement of a man, that is, an alienation from himself and the contraposition of oneself to oneself. Seeman (1959) defined the term 'self-estrangement' as one of the social psychological consequences of alienation.

In alienation conditions, public relations assume characteristics of reification. The process of reification, according to Marx, reaches its classical character in the definite stages of capitalism, when commodity-money relations appear. Thus, an illusory visibility seen as a very real relation is created but with perverse character, that is, with some kind of fetishism. Relations created by people and expressed through a commodity-money exchange start looking like a relation between things—commodities and money—in all their evident and sensual representation and people—start to resemble only representatives of these operating parties. Marx exposes this false visibility, analyzing commodity fetishism as follows:

> *"The mysterious character of a commodity-form consists therefore simply in fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of man's own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves, as the*

> *social-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relations of the producers to the sum total as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers." (Marx, 1960: 82).*

Marxist-researcher Genrikh S. Batishchev analyzed the gnoseological aspects of alienation. He maintains that the process of reification in alienation conditions that are expressed in the 'depersonification of subject and personification of things' (Batishchev, 1983, p. 254) is also accompanied by an 'existing of perversive forms of the cognitive process, as well as the forms of reflection over it', which in turn lead to 'the naturalization and technicalization of knowledge and to formal sign fetishism and value nihilism' (Batishchev, 1983, p. 272). It is most likely possible to agree with his assertions that reification in science has led to the formalization of a scientific language that has lost its dialectic character of creative search and turning its cultural symbols that are full of various values into simple formal signs. Thompson (2013) shows how alienation can restrict cognition.

Issues of dehumanization in the modern administered production system with its rational principles of calculability which penetrate public relations making them formal and impersonal were raised by Weber (1958). How new forms of antagonism between labour and man and omnipotence of control networks of communication and control becoming prevalent in postindustrial forms of production can influent on human being Hardt and Negri describe in their book *Empire* (Hardt, Negri, 2000). Based on theoretical points about identity and language, Westin (2021) reflects on the narratives and rhetoric in economic discourses that can displace people and generate alienation and associated loss of identity of man. Fuchs (2020, 345) examines alienated forms of communication and the dominance of the instrumental mind over the cooperative in class and capitalist societies, where the instrumental mind supports authoritarianism and reification, transforming people into simple things and tools in such a way that 'Human subjects thereby become the objects of control, domination, and exploitation'.

Thus, alienation bears in itself the following important consequences: a) the result of a full overturning is that the subject turns into an object and impersonal anonymous social forms acquire all functions and characteristics of the subject inherent to humans; and b) the relations acquire an irrational character of the logic of alienation, according to which the person is not the creator of meanings and values and not the one providing meanings and values to the world of objects; on the contrary, objects and external social forces are initially provided with meanings and senses and, therefore, defining his vital orientations and purposes, they dictate these certain values to the person. This logic is real but can represent deceptive illusory visibility because individuals often perceive these meanings and values as originating from society and fixed in social norms and requirements, i.e., as properties of external things instead of their own.

In this sense, according to K. Abishev, alienation has an irrational logic. Abishev asserts that logic is not necessarily connected only with reason and rationality; it can also be inherent to the irrational. Although rational and irrational are often erroneously identified with reasonable and unreasonable respectively, these processes may act in accordance with certain laws inherent to them. What makes them reasonable or unreasonable is their underlying meaning as organizing center. Abishev argues that a human can renounce freedom by choosing slavery as an easier way of being. 'If freedom, as the fundamental basis of human existence, was an initial necessity and inevitability, then it would be already un-freedom.'

(Abishev, 1996, p. 16). Therefore, the sense of life and its internal underlying value sense can be various—reasonable or unreasonable, true or false. In this sense, freedom and slavery should be understood as ontological oppositions. Accepting values whose content includes understanding oneself as one of the consequences of objective inexorable natural-historical law or confining oneself by the limited meanings of things of the objectified world can lead to slavery in the ontological sense and ultimately to an alienation of freedom. However, slavery as a definite way of being can cause dissatisfaction with life, a sensation of the meaninglessness of life and its emptiness, that is, 'the existential vacuum', as Victor Frankl (2006) had expressed. Many authors tie alienation with the feeling of losing the meaning of life and a lack of identity that raises global questions on the meaning of being and the existential self-realization of man (Schmitt, 2009; Warren, 2002).

The reason for all of this is the estranged consciousness of people, that is, an interpretation of themselves as the result and a consequence of the object world, which is viewed as a definite structure that is externally resistant to and independent of them: their worship of the omnipotence of things of wealth, money, and capital becomes transformed into a passion, that is, a supreme value that gives power by an identification with it. Irrational logic corresponds to this, according to which, the sense and meaning of the objects created by people, are initially inherent to them, people are endowed with a sense and meaning similar to that initially inherent to the objects created by people. As a result, capital does not serve the person and his development and enrichment; on the contrary, a man serves capital, devoting himself and all his abilities to its growth and multiplication. Wealth multiplication for the sake of multiplication instead of for consumption becomes the purpose. A person, according to Marx, is becoming a 'personification' of capital, that is, its form vested in his personality. (Marx, 1960, p. 163). As a result, wealth consumes a person as a means of its self-movement, instead of a person consuming wealth.

Thus, individuals in real life and in real affairs are bifurcated, resulting in the creation of two individuals: the public or official individual and the personal individual. In each of these real spheres, the individual behaves and feels and worries differently. His life, status, behaviour and thoughts can have different vectors of orientation and can sometimes be opposite. In extreme cases, he or she can profess even opposite world views, quite often resulting in one of his parties obtaining domination over his other party, trying to suppress and absorb it: however, it cannot completely destroy the other party. Alienation promotes the supremacy of the official part of an individual over his personal part.

Note also that the personal part of an individual can be suppressed and forced out to the unconscious spheres of the soul, but it can never disappear because personal aspirations to his freedom, choice identification with supreme values, growth, elevation and development are his subject bases, providing his autonomy, creative activity, and responsibility. Nevertheless, opposite values as bases of official life directives of an individual occupy the same status as that of his own values and are accepted by him as life orientations, becoming his internal intentions. Otherwise, if the latter were external, irrespective of the subject, the problem of interior psychical alienation would not exist. In addition, the alienation problem as the self-estrangement of a man would have disappeared.

Intra-mental Alienation and Freud's Theory of Neuroses

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, investigating the phenomenon of neuroses and developing the theory of ego, discovered the splitting of an individual's psychical activity, a phenomenon that can lead to disharmony and mental disorders, of which by internal reasons, a person can be aware in various extents or not be aware in general. The explanation of the special role of the unconscious by Freud as the considerable sphere of the psyche that could sometimes contradict the soul's motives in a way that could result in an irreconcilable confrontation became an epochal discovery in psychology (Freud, 2010[1920]). It has considerably changed the conception regarding the structure of the personality's psyche.

In our opinion, Freud introduced and described a phenomenon of internal social alienation and, therefore, the destruction of the subject from a mental bifurcation viewpoint; however, Freud could not see the social roots of such a phenomenon because of his naturalistic preferences in his explanation of the psyche, an explanation that was dominant in psychology at the time. On this last point, Mark Bevir noted that Freud tried to explain social behaviour 'in terms of the sort of causal mechanisms found in natural science rather than relying on the processes of rationalisation and contextualisation' (Bevir, 2004). Freud's theory of motivations and the concept of repression reduced mentality to a service function and in fact—to the service requirements of primary vital desires. His first followers, Alfred Adler (2011[1925]) and Carl Gustav Jung (1961, 1966[1954]), began to overthrow his conclusions. Behind all of this, Freud was not inclined to discern a clinical picture of the contradictions underlying human beings and the real bifurcation of the social life of individuals.

Moreover, his doctrine underwent especially strong transformation by Neo-Freudians Karen Horney and Erich Fromm. They tried to show that social contradictions reside at the heart of mental neuroses. Thus, K. Horney states that a certain type of culture and its specific contradictions, in which individuals were formed and live, play a crucial role in the features and content of their mental disorders (Horney, 1994). E. Fromm, on whom, along with Freud's, K. Marx's philosophical concept had impacted, tried to explain the phenomena of neuroses with respect to the social alienation of a man in modern society. Although not always sequentially adhered to this position, Fromm often explained the essence of a human being from biosocial positions. (Fromm, 1993, 1980).

Mental ego is presented in S. Freud's concept as the unfortunate ego, aspiring to keep unity between variously oriented instances, such as the ego, id and super-ego. (Freud, 1989a[1960]). Each instance tries to seize power, to reach supremacy over others and even to absorb them, punching a way for its interests, but it is resisted by other tendencies. Such struggle, where then one side or the other prevails over the other, can infinitely continue, tormenting the soul, carrying into it various phobias, anxiety and other symptoms. Attempts to resolve this contradiction, to find a compromise between the resisting parties of mentality on the individual, can lead to one or another successful outcome, but it often happens that a solution or a compromise is illusory.

In our understanding, the social basis of internal mental contradictions and conflicts that Freud considered as an inescapable contradiction between ego and id, consciousness and unconscious, is social alienation.

In our opinion, the presence of unconscious repressed motives in the psyche of individuals is due to the existence of estranged values accepted by the individual but separated and hostile to his personal individual motives and values. The

former then takes the character of the domination of the alienated from the individual in his own forces.

Since individuals create all this in their life and activities in mutual relations, they build all these structures, first, in their own psyche, in thinking. In consequence, creating forces, norms, and orders detached from themselves, individuals also create motives corresponding to them, norms and bans for themselves in their soul while at the same time, in opposition to this, keeping personal vital aspirations to freedom, to development, to independence and originality. To put it differently, they ideally and truly are splitting themselves into halves through all these processes, and as a whole person, they are not aware of them. This is not a result of a consciously conducted purpose. For many individuals, such situations can promote the development of an internal soul discord that in certain cases leads to what Freud calls an internal conflict. On the basis of such conflicts, depending on individual features, some cases of pathological diseases and neuroses develop. It may express that individual is possessed by a certain thought, idea, passion, etc., i.e., he does not own or control them; on the contrary, these passions entirely control him.

According to the definition of all psychoanalysts, neurosis is a condition of a person when he either completely or partially loses the ability to think objectively, that is, make decisions and act in compliance with the circumstances. This occurs because a person no longer owns himself and does not define or direct the course of his thoughts and actions; instead of owning them, he remains under the control of some thoughts and passion related to them. Therefore, he cannot adequately react to external circumstances and their logic but proceeds only from the sense of passions and motives that control and prevail over him. An individual loses the characteristics of a subject. First, he loses his internal freedom.

When alienation and the self-estrangement of an individual limit him in his realization of himself as a subject and in extreme expressions paralyze a personality in such a way that a person ceases to be the owner of his thoughts and mental states, he cannot manage to regulate and direct their course; on the contrary, they—certain thoughts and feelings —manage his soul, a phenomenon that can be observed in the neuroses of obsessive actions described by Freud:

> "The chief manifestations of compulsion neurosis are these: the patient is occupied by thoughts that in reality do not interest him, is moved by impulses that appear alien to him, and is impelled to actions which, to be sure, afford him no pleasure, but the performance of which he cannot possibly resist. Against his will he is forced to brood and speculate as though it were a matter of life or death to him. The impulses, which the patient feels within himself, may also give a childish or ridiculous impression, but for the most part they bear the terrifying aspect of temptations to fearful crimes, so that the patient not only denies them, but flees from them in horror and protects himself from actual execution of his desires through inhibitory renunciations and restrictions upon his personal liberty." (Freud, 1989c, p. 164; 2010[1920).

The obsessive states described by Freud show us a picture of the internal psychical self-alienation of a man when his own forces oppose him, have separated from him, and have become hostile and alien so that he perceives them not as a part of his ego but as an external unclear force that has settled in him. Despite his will and desires, an individual is compelled to obey the thoughts and ideas that have seized his soul, and he cannot get rid of them.

Some of the most difficult cases to understand are the neuroses of delirium observation and, covering a wide range—persecution. These cases especially represent a broad picture of the acute bifurcation of personality. These are the cases in which a person constantly feels the presence in his soul of an extraneous observer who notes, estimates, and often condemns each of his steps, acts, thoughts, moods, etc.; moreover, this presence is not felt by the individuals as a type of internal control over him but as the control of some stranger who has settled in him and can brusquely make judgements about him. Usually, this condition normally happens with people, but as this phenomenon is transient, a person can report that he has completely controlled this instance and realizes that this is a situation of his own doing. In the neurotic's case, a judgement regarding this instance is constantly made: there is a distance and hostility between what his ego does and what this instance does. The issue is that the neurotic tries to get rid of a watching eye and to hide out from it, but he cannot. Its presence is agonizing for him, especially since he constantly and obsessively recounts this observing or judgement-making instance (here the variations are also manifold) with tiresome repeatability and monotony.

> *"They complain to us that perpetually, and down to their most intimate actions, they are being molested by the observation of unknown powers - presumably persons - and that in hallucinations they hear these persons reporting the outcome of their observation: 'now he's going to say this, now he's dressing to go out' and so on. Observation of this sort is not yet the same thing as persecution, but it is not far from it; it presupposes that people distrust them, and expect to catch them carrying out forbidden actions for which they would be punished. How would it be if these insane people were right, if in each of us there is present in his ego an agency like this which observes and threatens to punish, and which in them has merely become sharply divided from their ego and mistakenly displaced into external reality?" (Freud, 1989c, p. 338; 1990).*

The existence in a person of an observing, judgement-making and punishing instance, which is perceived as external and extramundane by the patient, has the characteristics of the mirror reproduction of an alienation situation: the hostility of the ego to these instances and the fear of it; its incomprehensible power, which paralyzes the will of the ego, its anonymity and its impersonality.

In the conditions of alienation, most of the people will probably find two ways to satisfy their personal values and aspirations, thereby reaching a certain degree of resolution of the internal conflict.

The first way represents cases denoting the identification by individuals of their personal interests with the interests of impersonal institutes and norms. Their personal value's space is occupied with the values and corresponding motives of the impersonal sphere, its affirmation and its prosperity. Those can be interests of the state, corporation, morality or, a socium, as a whole. The individual perceives the strengthening and affirmation of this higher principle as the strengthening of his personal self-affirmation and development. The next case that exemplifies this way is the situation in which personal aspirations are identified with the aim of the multiplication of wealth and capital. In this case, the individual is wholly devoted to the service of wealth, making himself a means of its self-development instead of affirming himself as a personality and strengthening his subjectivity and autonomy. The individual is becoming the moment of movement of the capital or as expressed by Marx, the 'personification' of the capital, that is, its form vested in personality. Here, the

personal values of the individual remain unknown to him, as these values are unconscious and repressed.

The satisfaction of many personal needs represents the maintenance in good condition of the means of self-development of the state or capital, that is, the state or the capital satisfies the needs in his person. In a certain sense, an individual is satisfied by such kind of solution of a contradiction. His personal motives for life do not disappear; they may be dislodged into the unconscious areas of the psyche or realized in their alienated-distorted form when he views his motives not as his own but as a form of existence of the motives of an alienated power standing over him. In this case, the supplanted motive still gets satisfaction under the guise of the opposite motive that does not lead to a pathological outcome.

The second way to satisfy personal values is exemplified by cases in which many individuals realize, approve and try to separate their personal values from the interests of the external dominating sphere. In such cases, there is no identification of personal interests with the interests of impersonal institutes or their replacement by them. In contrast, individuals are eager to assert and protect their values and interests from the influence of suppression and the domination of opposing forces. Therefore, personal values are not suppressed; they are recognized and supported by individuals. In these cases, the conflict of mutually exclusive values does not reach the degree of full insolvability.

Additionally, in cases where mutually exclusive character values do not find any real (at least partial) satisfaction and exit, even in the mask of its opposite, these values do not have a state of open confrontation, as neurotics, according to analysts, often do not realize their ulterior motives, as well as the content of their conflict itself. Building certain external actions, objects or even persons in the relations with which he finds a certain apparent satisfaction or solution to his own problem, an individual, often, not finding a valid exit, finds an imaginary exit. However, these 'decisions' have a partially or completely symbolical character.

Conclusion

Social alienation is an objective process where spheres of human activity and productivity split into multidirectional and hostilely incompatible forces. However, this process of bifurcation first occurs in thinking. That means that internal mental self-estrangement is not only the reflection of external splitting. Primarily, the subject creates certain values, norms and bans in his thinking that are opposite to his essential grounds of freedom and autonomy, and only after that, the subject exteriorizes them in the external world: in relationships with other individuals, the subject builds norms and orders corresponding to estranged values, endowing the external social forms and public forces with their value meanings. Only then do the social forms become truly alien to the person because they bear anti-human meanings. At the same time, corresponding to their level of subjectivity, individuals preserve their aspirations to autonomy, values, needs of freedom and the free choice of their own way of being, all of which do not coincide in content and purposes with their accepted estranged values.

Thus, alienation can be understood as the self-estrangement of a human being. The conflict between the personal and the impersonal can lead to the bifurcation of the personality, a splitting of a subject's ego and can violate the wholeness of the subject, resulting in its destruction that to some extent is expressed in a loss of internal freedom.

However, people are subjects and active agents of alienated relations; therefore, alienation cannot get full totality. Consequently, human beings cannot completely lose their subjectivity. Left in a distorted, transformed form, however, ultimately, a human being remains the subject in the condition of alienation.

We come to the conclusion that from the self-estrangement of the human being, it is possible to explain the phenomena of the internal mental bifurcation of the personality and its extreme painful forms, such as neuroses. The phenomenon of neuroses described by S. Freud represents for us extreme cases of the splitting of the ego and the partial or even the full loss of subjectivity by a human. The last cases, of course, represent serious diseases. However, in most cases, the ego as a deep subject tries to reconcile conflicting sides because its function is an integration and preservation of its wholeness.

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