

# Review of: "Do Androids Dread an Electric Sting?"

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The topic of legal and moral rights of sentient artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the most challenging and controversial issues in the field of AI ethics and law. In this article, the authors provide a comprehensive overview of how and why current legislation on animal rights could be used as a model for future legislation on the rights of sentient artificial intelligences. The article is well-written, well-researched, and well-structured, and I recommend publishing it after a few minor adjustments.

What I feel like could be polished further are minor matters of consistency of terminology, one seeming contradiction in the core argumentation, and possibly the IMHO over-optimistic tone of the first paragraph.

- The terms pain, suffering, anguish etc are used throughout the text - occasionally pain is meant to mean only physical pain and at other times as a broader term. Unifying this (possibly so that suffering would be used as the main term and pain only for physical pain) would avoid some confusion.
- In chapter 4 embodiment is mentioned as a key element, while elsewhere in the article non-physical anguish is considered to be relevant enough.
- While for the most part the article does explain the abbreviations used, towards the end of chapter 5 we do enter an alphabet soup.
- The first paragraph makes it clear that the authors are sure about sentience being programmable. While there are many theories about what consciousness is and how it arises, there is no consensus on whether it can be artificially created at all or programmed on a digital substrate. I believe the article would be better received if the argument for the urgency of the topic would be based on the possibility, not the surety of sentient artificial entities, but that is just my personal opinion.