

Review of: "Why naturalists must give up deduction, or return to Hume"

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Joining previous reviews, I'd like to reiterate that fixing the definition of naturalism is the most critical step in improving the paper. The reader may get the impression that this is a personal argument against Devitt, as naturalism is implicitly defined as `what Devitt (and maybe Dennett) says.' Defining naturalism would also enlarge the set of potential readers of the paper.

I come from the perspective of mathematics/computer science, not the philosophy of science, so it is not too clear what is at stake here. What would be the consequences (in philosophy and possibly in the practice of science) if naturalism gets proven to be inconsistent in using deduction?

Two other issues need at least some clarification in the draft.

- 1. Algorithms are mentioned as a "stark example" in the context of logic discovery, but it remains unclear how they contribute to the argument in the paper.
- 2. A strong statement is made about the theories that treat mathematics differently from other scientific fields. This is not obvious, or rather this is precisely the question here. Therefore, at least some references need to be added here.

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