

Review of: "Artificial Consciousness: Misconception(s) of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Nobody Wants"

John Bishop¹

1 Goldsmiths College, University of London

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

I very much enjoyed reading this paper and there are only a few issues on which I would like to comment.

Firstly, although the author makes a powerful point, grounded in analysis of the complexity of neural systems, that it is not likely that any machine will ever be able to successfully emulate these neurobiological functions and their interdependency". This notion resonates with Froese' notion of the under-determined aspects of conscious action and I commend the author [and interested readers] to check out Tom's recent paper "Irruption Theory: A Novel Conceptualization of the Enactive Account of Motivated Activity" https://lnkd.in/eG8vW6Zw (alternatively his video https://lnkd.in/exciEV_G), as Tom's thesis is highly relevant to this discussion and compatible with the ideas expressed here.

Secondly, in the concept of consciousness that is addressed, it isn't clear if, or how, the author sees a distinct causal role for the mental over and above the material. I.e., is the concept of consciousness that is addressed fundamentally an eliminative account, epiphenomenal or does it have a distinct 'causal power' over that which is physically entailed (and if the latter, how? Aka the classical mind/body problem); clearly, the latter account is fundamentally problematic for any computational description, as by definition, a computer program's next step is fully determined by its program and current state.

Thirdly, I draw the author's attention to the "Dancing with Pixies" reductio ad absurdum. In a series of papers dating from 2002 to 2021, I argue that any computational account of phenomenal consciousness must entail a vacuous form of panpsychism, whereby any phenomenal state/process can be realised by any open physical system. Cf. "Why computers can't feel pain", https://tinyurl.com/3j28euxx).

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