

Review of: "Categories of Wrong Beliefs—A Preliminary Proposal"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

The Author invites us to consider that the distinctions she presents “could have positive policy implications.” I think the work feels incomplete without articulating those critical implications. Help us see them clearly and distinctly?

The distinction between misinformation and disinformation is already well known, so it is not clear how the categories here deepen our understanding. Merely using a biological term, ‘Stigmergy’, does not seem to provide any new insights--although it might if the Author were (again) to articulate how distinctions from another field could be imported fruitfully here.

I also think the Author may reflect on the relation of epistemology (the idealized norms for grounding knowledge), epistemics (the practices used towards crafting and validating new knowledge), and other cognitive dimensions, which may obscure the philosophical dimensions of beliefs (not all of which will count as knowledge).

Concrete examples are never out of place.

It's an important topic, and we all benefit from continued reflection on it.