

Review of: "Social context of the brain and law: Is consciousness social?"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

The article addresses in an original and complex way the relationship between the brain, consciousness and law. The author proposes a revision of the traditional concepts of consciousness and suggests that consciousness is not an individual phenomenon but rather an intersubjective and social one. In this sense, human action is the realization of a shared consciousness and emphasizes the role of the human being as a whole.

The issue of intersubjective consciousness is of great importance. I am glad to read articles like yours. The relationship between individual consciousness and the group or social community can in itself make positive contributions to law and how law should always be understood from a hegemonic intersubjective consciousness that imposes certain behaviors. The way in which you relate the brain with consciousness and the social environment seems to me an interesting element to think about.

I also think it is worth reflecting on how you think a connection can be established between the brain and ethics or rights. At this point, you seem to propose that the empathy basis of ethics and sociability would be born from the fact that we all have in common the brain as an organ and therefore it would be like a criterion of universality that would be realized through consciousness itself (the fact of being conscious). I'm not sure I understand exactly what you mean, but I don't think consciousness can be reduced to the brain or to the fact of emanating from the brain. Consciousness, as you say, is a changing flow that nevertheless entails a certain unity not coming from something external to it (as would be the brain) but from itself, it is at all times the background of itself, that protean background is the most likely foundation of intersubjectivity, not the brain. Unity should not be sought outside itself but in itself; an intersubjective self-consciousness, which would be what individuals consider to be a human being. The law in this case, as Foucault has shown, would be the one that watches over and controls from the inside that this image of human being is the one that is realized in social conduct.

From the phenomenological perspective, authors such as Merleau-Ponty reflected on how our consciousness is all set in our actions, so that we are consciousness in action (The structure of behavior); perhaps in the study of human action as the realization of an intersubjective or social consciousness, the brain would not have such a significant role, since consciousness is not of the brain but of the whole human being who thinks, feels and acts in a particular way.

The English in which the article is written is readable, but I would recommend a revision before sending it for publication, as there are some sections that are difficult to understand.

