

# Review of: "On Mask Wearing in Environments With and Without a Mask Mandate"

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In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, the paper offers a micro-founded theoretical framework to address the issues related to on-the-job mask-wearing in which there are two interacting agents endowed with different preferences. Wearing a mask is optimal for the society as a whole, however, one type of agent does not find profitable to wear it, whereas the other type does. Within this setting the author find the optimal Pigouvian tax to charge to agents that do not wear a mask in order to implement the first-best allocation. In addition, the author discusses the bargaining process in which the two type of agents should be involved in order to achieve the same target of the Pigouvian tax.

As far as I can see, the paper addresses an interesting policy issue. However, there are some critical points that deserve some additional considerations to take seriously the arguments put forward by the author. Specifically,

- the shape of the utility functions of the two types of agents and the values of their parameters should be carefully motivated;
- in economics, the optimal choices of agents are the upshot of the solution of constrained optimization problems. By contrast, in the proposal of the author there are no constraints so that the choices of agents are not fully rationalized;
- the author has in mind a pooled equilibrium in which the two types of agents have to work/live together. In theory, however, there could be a separating equilibrium in which agents that do want to wear a mask and agents that do not live only with their respective peers so that there is not any problem of externality.