

# Review of: "Either you know or you've gotta believe"

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The article presents a case against the entailment thesis (that to know  $p$  entails believing  $p$ ). It first goes through some empirical work casting doubt on the thesis and then makes a more analytical argument based on a purported link between belief and action that is missing in the case of knowledge.

I must admit the article did not convince me. Regarding the empirical arguments; it seems quite plausible to me that there are several different notions of belief and knowledge operative in ordinary English language; a point gestured towards in the paper by Turri et al. as well. In ordinary contexts, we may very well say "I know!" without much evidence or conviction. That does not mean that evidence or conviction is not required for the technical concept of knowledge that epistemologists (at least sometimes) are interested in.

Regarding the conceptual argument: it does not seem to be clear to me that there is a relevant difference between belief and knowledge in terms of the complexities of action associated with them. True, we may sometimes unthinkingly act on our knowledge, but I think the same holds for belief. Prejudice may be an example here. Since these beliefs are often untrue, they often fail to constitute knowledge. Yet, we may unconsciously act on them. The author uses Ramsey in support of the distinction here, but I think this does not work very well. For Ramsey, beliefs are not mental states but dispositions to act. This does not sit very well with the talk in the paper about the conviction associated with and complexity of belief-states. I may not be convinced of my dispositions, and such dispositions are not complex mental states like supporters of the JTB analysis think knowledge is. So at least more clarification is needed here.

Another point I want to mention is that there is quite some literature on the voluntariness of belief that seems relevant here. The author at several points in the paper assumes that there is an intimate connection between belief and 'free will'. But people like Williams (who is cited in this paper), Scott-Kakures and Curley, among others would deny this. To be convincing, more support is needed here.

Ultimately, I think the paper could be improved by making more fine-grained distinctions about beliefs/knowledge and putting more emphasis on the original synthesis of positions already out there. As it stands, it reads a bit too much like a (sometimes incomplete/incoherent) summary of the literature already out there on this topic.