

# Review of: "[Essay] Not Quite Like Us? — Can Cyborgs and Intelligent Machines Be Natural Persons as a Matter of Law?"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

Thank you for inviting me to review this article.

I have just come to submit this review, and am informed that the article has been revised; thus, my review pertains to the article as it was when I read it.

This essay is a good early draft of an article, with the potential to contribute something really useful to the AI ethics literature. The author poses a lot of interesting questions (over fifty!); however, although there is value in posing a question, I feel it would have been more useful to philosophical discourse if far fewer questions had been posed and left hanging, and more answers had been offered to the questions which were posed.

Some areas seem under-explored - for example, the paragraph beginning "Can we not use instead quantitative tests" makes a really interesting point about cyborgs and where our definition of a human ought to end; I would have liked to have seen this idea discussed further.

## MINOR ISSUES:

The article is awash with typos ("Lert us also explain..."); peculiar capitalisation (why is 'Essay' capitalised?); incorrect or absent punctuation ("...suggests that both humans and machines thinking..."); subject-verb disagreement ("the way on which humans and machine operates is identical"); and parts which simply do not make sense ("this Essay does can neither").

I'd have liked to see a reference for the claim that goddesses, rivers, and corporations are legal persons.

## MODERATE ISSUES:

Blake Lemoine did not claim his \*computer\* was sentient – I believe he suggested that the chatbot running on it was showing signs of sentience (a minor distinction for some, but a more substantial distinction for dualists, perhaps).

In the paragraph beginning "Lert us also explain" [sic], the author writes "this again begs the question". This is an incorrect (colloquial and non-philosophical) use of the term 'begging the question'. To a philosopher, question-begging involves a particular form of circular reasoning where the conclusion and premises rely on one another, or each assumes the truth of

the other. It does not mean provoking or inviting further questions.

The author makes claims such as “This Essay is thus motivated...” and “it is this Essay’s belief...” These claims do not seem inaccurate. The essay (presumably) does not have any motivations or beliefs at all. Or is the author ascribing some sort of agency or sapience to the essay?

The author seems to be using a non-standard definition of ‘cobot’, where a cobot is something like a cyborg. Standardly, as far as I am aware, cobots are robots (which can be fully inorganic entities) intended to work alongside or in close proximity to humans: colleague-bots or collaborative-bots.

In sections IV and V, the author talks around some interesting issues, but I do not see any real thesis or argument being offered.

#### MAJOR ISSUES:

For me, the most substantive issue is that the essay does not achieve what it aims to do. As I understand it, the aim of the essay is to set out a legal demarcation which courts could use to distinguish between AI and humans. It does not do that. Many ideas are tossed around, but it is not clear to me, after reading the paper, whether the lines are really all that clear. I do not believe that a court could use this essay to set legal demarcations regarding humans and AI, nor even to recognise the ways in which humans and AI are similar.

I wish the author good luck with his revisions :-)