Review of: "[Commentary] Biology as a postmodern science: Universals, historicity, and context"

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If I am reading the paper correctly, the author suggests that some important epistemic features of biology as a science help establish a link to the general philosophical view of postmodernity. I dont find that thesis very compelling and what the author does in this article has not persuaded me otherwise. First, postmodernity is an extremely variegated family of views and they all dont need to share the exact same assumtpions although there might well be a certain degree of family resemblance that they all share with one another. Perhaps the paper should start off by providing a more detailed characterization of what the notion of postmodernity is taken here to mean precisely (the article does not do this and the notion of postmodern philosphy that it refers to is kept vague and too generic). Maybe that would help to ciment a more compelling case to the effect that biology has anything at all to do with it. This would be easily amendable, but there is still a second a more significant problem. The authors seem to believe that biology is special and what makes it unique is among other things its historicity and lack of universal mathematical laws. That is mistaken. First, I agree that the sense in which biology deals with historical processes is interesting on its own right (as it seems to be support a process-based ontology of the world of life as J. Dupré and other have argued) but there is hardly anything very unique about biology in that : would the author suggest that cosmology, many branches of geology and geophysics among other disciplines are equally akin to postmodern thinking? Second, the observation that there are no mathematical laws in biology is a misunderstading of old coinance : there are myriads of mathematized parts of biology and the fact that biologists primarily (but by no means exclusively) resort to probabilistic calculus instead of, say, differential equations has no bearing on whether research in population genetics is inhrenently postmodern. Also, what does the author make of principles such as the Hardy Weinberg equilibrium , the Price´s equation, Lotka-Volterra´s model and a number of others. If they are not mathematized laws I dont know what is. Nota bene: philosophers of science of different persuasions typically say that there are many laws in physics and chemistry that are not exactly exceptionless as their nomic necessity is contingent on loads of boundary conditions, the picture of other natural sciences that the authors argue for is rossy and unrealistic and really lends no support for the sort of biological exceptionalism that the article tries to establish.