

Review of: "Consciousness, Neo-Idealism and the Myth of Mental Illness"

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The article "Consciousness, Neo-Idealism and the Myth of Mental Illness" is an ambitious paper, which deals with crucial problems of philosophy of mind, ethics and philosophy of consciousness. It is surprising that whereas a field as "bioethics" has a wide development in philosophy, a "psicoethics" has not yet appear. This paper may be a good, polemic contribution to this new field. The paper includes some polemic affirmations, such as that the difference between "neurosis" and "psicosis" is a matter of self-concern vs others-concern.

The structure of the paper is clear, as well as the scope of authors it deals with. However, it is doubtful that the list of references is enoughly exhaustive for analyzing this problem. I miss specially some references from the phenomenological tradition.

The reading of this paper brought the following questions to me: how would the author explain that, after dissolving the singular consciousness inside the most holistic sense of the spiritual whole (similar to the role of the Self in The Upanishads) we can return to the consideration of the so called "mental illnesses" as problems of adaptation towards the own life of each of us, the own behaviour and, especially, the singular manner of dealing with our personal relationships? What is the role of personal responsibility if the ego is dissolved in an universal Self, or is, at least, an illusory and apparent way of being, compared to the true Self? I am personally very skeptical with this universal Self, and tend to see there a projection and generalization of some singular consciousness (such as God's point of view). It is still not clear neither how the personal consciousness and the universal Self relate to each other, nor how physical reality deals with this universal consciousness.