

Review of: "On the ongoing need for naturalistic philosophy to interpret what occupational science is doing"

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Potential competing interests: I have no potential competing interests to declare.

Thank you for sharing the article I have been asked to review for Qeios, on the ongoing need for naturalistic philosophy to interpret what occupational science is doing. This is my first review for Qeios, and my first exposure to literature connected to either occupational science (OS) or occupational therapy (OT), so apologies if my analysis exposes my ignorance instead of providing constructive feedback for you both. I have five main queries with sub-questions often nestled together with them. (Please also note that at this stage I am ambivalent about the constructive value of Qeios' star rating system, and so I just went to the more positive of the parameters provided.)

Firstly, it would be good to establish, for me, if the temporal elements suggested in phrases in the article's title "on the ongoing need" and Frank's (2022) contention that OS' *revolution* has *stalled* are critical components of your argument? If so, would a chronological structuring of the article's body aid in the development of your argument? At this point, my understanding of the "ongoing need" dimension is clouded by foreshadowing devices in your writing that signal an upcoming article on complementarity perspective.

The educated reader may have a clear timeline in mind in dating OS' revolution and what may have contributed to the lack of progress noted by Frank but I am not aware of any specific reasons for not making explicit reference to these. From my very superficial reading of the literature of OS and OT, a discussion with the following sections may better aid the reader in understanding the "ongoing need" dimension of your argument:

1. Generational change within qualitative research on occupational therapy 2. Emergence of occupational science from occupational therapy 3. Yerxa and the first origin of occupational science 4. Wilcock and the second origin of occupational science 5. Pierce and the four types of knowledge in the construction of occupational science (descriptive, relational, predictive and relational) 6. Colonialities of occupation and being: The ongoing role of naturalistic philosophy in interpreting knowledge construction in occupational science (Frank & Polkinghorne, 2010; Pierce, 2014a)

Personally, such an approach may help me better appreciate the role of naturalistic philosophy in interpreting what occupational science does, and where the OS revolution commenced and stalled. (For example, wider contextual information peculiar to OS and OT that illuminate the changes in the implicit or explicit ideas connected to definitions of occupation such as the following: **Before OT:** Focus on what people do for work **Yerxa (1990) and the inception of OS:** Focus on what people do **Between 1990 and 2006:** Focus on what people do for work, for selfcare and leisure (or is it self, care and leisure?) **Dickie, Cutchin & Humphry (2006):** Focus on Organism-in-the environment-as-a-whole **Wilcock (2007)** occupation as the synthesis of doing, being, becoming and belonging **Frank (2022):** Focus on experience and

agency of patient to achieve “greater health, function, and life satisfaction through mindful doing”).

Again, some of the issues I raise probably only alert you to my ignorance rather than provide you with any constructive criticism; for example, I do not know if the OS revolution refers to the beginnings of the science or the legacy of Anne Wilcock?

Secondly, how important is the real or perceived attempts to separate OS from OT to understand the need for naturalistic philosophy to interpret what OS is doing? There is a claim in Pierce (2014a) that the editorial stance in the Journal of Occupational Science (JOS) “has exerted strong pressures against occupational science’s intent to develop knowledge that will actively support the profession of occupational therapy” (Pierce, 2014a, p.3). This issue has probably been addressed elsewhere in the OS literature and may not be an issue for those learned in OS lore. As an outsider, and based on the points you highlight in your abstract, introduction and conclusion, I think this is an issue worthy of consideration. This is why I earlier suggested inclusion of sections addressing OS and OT literature (sections one and five) that might deal with issues that the editors of JOS choose to exclude. Do such editorial stances, advance or stall the OS revolution?

Thirdly, how crucial is your substantial discussion of Arendt’s (1958) conception of the coloniality of being in the context of colonialities of occupation and being? Can it be integrated with other literature such as Maldonado-Torres (2004; 2011; 2012; 2016)?

I note that both of you have an affiliation with the same Australian University, so I am sure that there are good reasons why you chose to use Arendt’s conception of the coloniality of being rather than those more readily at hand. I suspect that it might be that her work is critical in bridging the discussions of Heidegger’s Dasein and Wilcock’s occupational perspective of health (OPH) in your synthesis of the literature. Fortunately, the work of Arendt appears to have been cited in the literature of occupational science (For example, Hasselkus, 2014). Also, Gordon (2012) makes passing reference to Arendt, namely, “where persuasion matters, as a long, unusual line of thinkers from Aristotle to Machiavelli to Arendt to Biko knew so well, politics exists” (p. 282). (However, I am not sure to what extent in his overall writings that Gordon engages with the concept of the coloniality of being.)

The point I am trying clumsily to make is that you discern a “romantic nostalgia” in the work of Wilcock when it comes to her attempts to link ancient and modern human behaviour, and I am just asking that you just check that the same accusation cannot be made against Arendt (1958). Namely, in narrating a persistence to phenomena associated with “world-alienation” as identified in Ancient Greece and Rome to phenomena in the 20th century that can also linked with that same concept. Are Arendt’s contribution to the concepts central to your argument less important (or less recognised) in the more recent literature on the coloniality of being? If so, should the following quote also include reference to writers in disciplines other than OS?: “Wilcock had clearly never read Arendt; it seems neither have those who have followed in her footsteps” (article reviewed, p. 11/17).

I have not read the Maldonado-Torres’ (2007) article that you cite, so I don’t know if he discusses Arendt or Heidegger there. Maldonado-Torres 2004 article, *The topology of being and the geopolitics of knowledge: Modernity, empire,*

coloniality, contains an extensive critique of Heidegger's use of the literature and lore of Ancient Greece and Rome. Some of his criticisms of Heidegger there may have implications for a fuller understanding of the contributions of Arendt's work on the coloniality of being.

I do encourage you to make your audience aware of Heidegger's affiliations to the Nationalist Socialist German Workers' party (NSDAP), even in a footnote if it would disrupt the flow of your discussion. (Rorty's 1999 article, *On Heidegger's Nazism*, helped me understand the complexity of the issue.) I also think that it is important to make reference to Heidegger's complicated relationship with Hannah Arendt but I fully understand if you believe it is irrelevant for the central concerns of your article.

Fourthly, is it really necessary to have sections devoted specifically to the epistemological and ontological meanings of occupation in order to justify the need for naturalistic philosophy to interpret what occupational science is doing? I am unable to understand the utility of these sections for your overall discussion. Maybe you could integrate the sections with some of the others. At the very least, I think you could include reference to the disputes within philosophy about whether epistemology needs to be replaced, rehabilitated or forgotten (For example: Guignon (1991), Maldonado-Torres (2011) and Rorty (1979)).

Finally, is it possible to provide the reader with an explicit relationship between the "preliminary but fairly representative survey of literature" you made and the literature cited in the article? I would have thought that Pierce's (2014a; 2014b) articles, *Occupational science: A powerful disciplinary knowledge base for occupational therapy* and, *Occupational science research describing occupation*, might have been cited in your article. Personally, I would like to have known if they were included in your preliminary survey of the literature. It would help me understand the types of criteria that differentiate analysis in OS from fields of study that I am familiar with. Are these Pierce articles examples of works in OS that indicate "no real *depth* (your italics) of engagement with philosophy *asan ongoing naturalistic project* (your italics)" (reviewed article, p. 3/17)?

These are the five major queries that I think can act as a constructive aid in relation to your submitted article. I hope have not appended too many extraneous questions to them. You have put much effort in this article and I hope my opinions help in the finishing stages of its publication.

I have selfishly avoided reading not only yours but any article or review on the Qeios platform. This is because I considered the brief from Qeios to be so liberating that I didn't want to read them and speculate on what might be self-imposed conventions in their reviews and what are conventions they were asked to adopt once the review goes live on the Qeios website. If others think that my review can be improved with revision then I will gladly consider such feedback and adhere to any conventions that are appropriate for a Qeios reviewer to follow. I know of no potential conflicts of interest that exist in myself fulfilling this role. I knew of a Clare Hocking at AUT University but recall no specific interactions between ourselves.

References

(Please note that these are sources cited in my review that are not in the article's reference list)

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