

Review of: "Carl Friedrich and the Cancellation of Pareto"

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This is an interesting and informative piece. I think the author could strengthen and clarify the argument by elaborating on two related questions:

- (1) How is Friedrich's position reflected in "the self-conception of the present governing elite" and in "conventional social science thinking", and who or what exactly is meant by these phrases? What notion of "elite rule" is at play here, and how does it clash with democracy? It would help the reader understand the author's point (and also avoid distraction from potentially provocative expressions such as "cancellation" or "Grab for World Power") to make the criticism and its targets a bit more explicit, perhaps in a concise summary towards the end.
- (2) In what sense is Friedrich's position "Kantian", especially given that the positions he criticized (Weber, Jellinek, Radbruch, Kelsen) were all to some degree, and more or less explicitly, (Neo-)Kantian? More than just a philological issue, this might help clarify the point of (actual or seeming) disagreement. For instance, Friedrich's claim that "Hitler's rule was legal, but it was not legitimate" does make a lot sense, and it is also what Radbruch had argued more than 10 years before (in his 1946 paper "Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht"). But how does this relate to claims to "rational authority" within a community, or to modern expert elites?

Personally, I would agree that an early Lippmann style call for expert elites stands in a tension with democracy that is echoed, e.g., in recent debates around science, expertise and "post-truth", but it seems to me that a Kantian critique of human knowledge would counter such an emphasis rather than support it.