

v1: 21 June 2023

Review Article

Neoliberalism, Strong State and Democracy

Peer-approved: 21 June 2023

© The Author(s) 2023. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license.

Qeios, Vol. 5 (2023)
ISSN: 2632-3834

Hubert Gabrisch¹

1. Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Vienna, Austria

The article serves to clarify the concept of the "strong state" in neoliberal thinking and its relationship to democracy. It is argued that the move away from neoclassical market theory has paved the way for the specifically neoliberal conception of the state and democracy. As a result, neoliberalism has at least a strained, sometimes even hostile, relationship with democracy when it comes to ensuring the efficiency and stability of the capitalist system. The article analyses Carl Schmitt's "authoritarian liberalism" and Friedrich A. Hayek's "dethronement of politics", the latter leading to various concepts of governance by "experts" at national, regional, and global levels who act as non-political "well-meaning dictators". The practical implications of this idea are then illustrated by the architecture of the European Union and its central bank. Finally, the neoliberal position on the state and democracy is confronted by Keynesianism, which is considered the archenemy of neoliberals.

Correspondence: papers@team.qeios.com — Qeios will forward to the authors

1. Introduction

The aim of this article is to clarify the understanding of the state and democracy in neoliberal ideology, a topic I believe has been underestimated so far. Often used as a commonplace, the term neoliberalism is understood to mean deregulation, privatisation, and restriction of government (the restricted or *minimal state*) that is supposed to implement *market fundamentalism*. But both terms are imprecise and possibly misleadingly used. The combination of market fundamentalism with the minimal state does not establish a decisive difference from the *laissez-faire* liberalism and the prefix "neo" would be unnecessary. I will argue that the neoliberal conception of market fundamentalism entails a minimal democracy, not a minimal state. The neoliberal project by no means sees the self-regulation of free markets as assured if only government action is restricted. Rather, success must be *constructed politically*. And this construction is being worked on by a coordinated and influential thought collective represented worldwide by the Mont Pèlerin Society. Obviously, this is not a conclusion unknown in the vast critical literature, and it can be found in collected editions (Filho and Johnston

2005, Mirowski and Plehwe 2009, Springer et al., 2016; Saad- Cahill et al. 2018) that make clear that neoliberalism is characterised by *non-minimal* state and quasi-state rule penetrating almost all subsystems of society, including the economy. Monographs such as Crouch (2011, 2017), Mirowski (2014) and Slobodian (2018) also focus on the latter, while the books by Biebricher (2021) and by Streeck (2021) deal with the political theory of neoliberalism, including the state and democracy. But we find little in the way of explanation of what that "strong" state means – an aim, which has driven the neoliberal thought collective from its beginning. Even in Foucault's insight-driven work *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008)² the political challenges to the creation of the neoliberal project – focused on German ordoliberalism and American neoliberalism – are central, while the question of what a strong state is is not addressed. I think that this clarification also includes the clarification of the neoliberal understanding of democracy.

I will argue in this article as follows: *First*, neoliberalism emerged through its critique of neoclassical economics and has developed its own theory of the market. *Second*, neoliberalism is characterised by a *non-minimal* state encapsulating the economy. An evident example is the so-called Washington Consensus. Its 'ten commandments', which Williamson (2004) crystallised

from the policy recommendations of Washington-based international organisations (IMF, World Bank), private think tanks and the U.S. Treasury for Latin American crisis countries, go far beyond the concept of the minimal state. Another example is the concept of *public-private partnerships*, which aims at close cooperation between the private sector and the state. And finally, the programme of *New Public Management* should be mentioned, which subjects the actions of state institutions, including universities and the health sector, to the principles of big business management. Privatisation of state services is then no longer necessary. And *third*, I argue that the key to understanding neoliberalism lies in the interconnectedness of economic theory and the theory of the state. The specific neoliberal theory of the market opens the way to the specific neoliberal view of the state and democracy, which I will further specify as 'authoritarian liberalism' and the 'dethronement of politics' respectively.

This article is structured as follows: In the *second* section, I trace how neoliberalism emerged from the demarcation from neoclassic economics and led to the programme based on a 'strong state' and constitutional law to safeguard free trade, freedom of contract and the protection of private property. The following sections three and four provide a discussion of what neoliberals understand by a 'strong state' and how this understanding relates to democratic forms of government. The *third* section describes the concept of 'authoritarian liberalism', for which the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt made important contributions to the neoliberal understanding of a 'strong state'. This concept is confronted in the *fourth* section with Friedrich A. von Hayek's dictum of a 'dethronement of politics' – as a modern version of the neoliberal understanding of the state independent of societal interests. This concept is discussed in the *fifth* section based on an interstate federation with a brief look at the European Union (EU). The *sixth* section deals with J. M. Keynes' alternative understanding of the state and democracy. This section is justified by the role, Keynes played as the archenemy of the neoliberal thought collective from the 1930s until our times. Section *seven* concludes with my definition of neoliberalism and observations on the renaissance of authoritarian liberalism in the present.

2. Origins: Departure from Neoclassic Economics

The first step on the way to a market theory of its own becomes visible with a brief look at the origins of neoliberalism: Contrary to a widespread impression,

neoliberalism is by no means an "invention" of British (Margaret Thatcher) and American (Ronald Reagan) conservative politicians, who followed their influential counsels from the London School of Economics or the Chicago School. Rather, these politicians were influenced by their neoliberal *über-father*, F. A. Hayek. It is an Austrian "invention", or more precisely, of the Austrian school of economics, and even more precisely: of its third generation in the interwar period. The first and second generations were shaped by Carl Menger's marginalist revolution, which, together with the work of Léon Walras and William S. Jevons, founded neoclassical economics (Neck 2014), in which the artificial figure of the utility-maximising *homo economicus* made it possible to mathematically determine stable equilibria between supply and demand. The third generation had gathered in various private seminars in Vienna during the interwar period (1918-1939), i.e., after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and classical liberalism, among which Ludwig von Mises's was the most important, because virtually all the young post-war economists took part there including Friedrich A. von Hayek, Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Lionel Robbins, and Frank H. Knight. What they all had in common was to reconstruct the economic liberal freedoms of classical liberalism after its collapse in the First World War, and to defend it against the rise of socialism in Europe but under changed conditions, which prominently included a different role for the state.³

Paradoxically, the defensiveness of the young generation of the Austrian School against socialism started with a critique of the then-dominant neoclassical theory. This debate is known as the "economic calculation debate" in the 1920s and 1930s, with von Mises and Hayek on one side and Oskar Lange and Abba P. Lerner as "Walrasian socialists" on the other. The question was whether efficient market equilibria with full employment were possible in a socialist economy just as in a capitalist competitive economy, which Lange and Lerner claimed, but von Mises and Hayek denied. The impression prevails that the former could successfully prove their claim by replacing the auctioneer in Walras with the state. However, it should not be overlooked that this supposedly lost controversy helped the early neoliberals to sharpen their own position, thus initiating the division between neoclassical theory and neoliberalism (Madra and Adaman 2018: 116). The argument that Hayek, Röpke and others subsequently put forward, and which was no longer primarily addressed to socialists, was that the economy was unfathomable and could not be discerned even with formalised models. The state could only set the framework conditions (the 'economic order') for efficiency, full employment, and the solution to the

social question. The efforts of Lange and Lerner appeared factually irrelevant. The framework to be created no longer excluded state intervention, for example in competition or social policy (and later in rescuing transnational corporations with ‘tax money’ in case of crises), as was still the case in classical liberalism. It was no longer a matter of “dis-embedding” the private economy out of society and a minimal state, as Karl Polanyi (1944 [2001]) still saw it for classical liberalism, but of ‘encapsulating’ it (Slobodian 2018) in suitable institutions created and controlled by the state and used for interventions. The search for these institutions became the dominant theme of the various neoliberal schools of thought, behind which the mathematical determination of equilibria takes a back seat (Hayek 1945: 530): ‘Any approach, such as that of much of mathematical economics with its simultaneous equations, which in effect starts from the assumption that people’s *knowledge* corresponds with the objective facts of the situation, systematically leaves out what is our main task to explain.’

The central idea from the early days of neoliberalism, according to which one cannot do economics like physics (Hayek 1945), was emphasised once again by Hayek in his Nobel Prize speech in 1974 (Hayek 1974): “Unlike the position that exists in the physical sciences, in economics and other disciplines that deal with essentially complex phenomena, the aspects of the events to be accounted for about which we can get quantitative data are necessarily limited and may not include the important ones. While in the physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with good reason, that any important factor which determines the observed events will itself be directly observable and measurable, in the study of such complex phenomena as the market, which depend on the actions of many individuals, all the circumstances which will determine the outcome of a *process*, for reasons which ... will hardly ever be fully known or measurable” (my accentuation). For him, everything else was ‘scientism’ that threatened the freedom of the market and man.

A milestone in the formation of the neoliberalism thought collective was the Lippmann Colloquium in 1938, which brought together several later leading neoliberals in Paris and is reported on in a book edited by Audier and Reinhoudt (2019). Both the minutes of the participants’ contributions and their interpretation by the editors of the book and the preface by Louis Rougier, one of the participants, show that the discussion was not about economic theory, but about the failure of the liberal state and its recasting. According to the participants, classical liberalism had failed because of its ‘weak state’, which had become the prey of social interests (mainly the

labour movement and industrial associations), leading to growing public debt, market intervention and protectionism. The conceptual renewal of liberalism, therefore, had to begin with the role of the state.

The Lippmann Colloquium morphed into the Mont-Pèlerin Society, the neoliberal network founded by Hayek and Chicago economists in Switzerland in 1947 and still the most influential (for a history of the Society, see Butler, 2022). After the Second World War, the neoliberal thought collective fanned out globally, not at least facilitated by the emigration of leading neoliberals after Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany in 1933 and the occupation of Austria in 1938, mostly to the United States, Great Britain, and Switzerland (Neck, 2014). The spread of neoliberal ideas encompassed universities, organisations and think tanks in a way that Mirowski (2014) not inaccurately calls the “Russian Doll”: If you lift an upper figure, a smaller figure of the same sort inside is released, which has, in turn, another figure inside of it, and so on.

Foucault (2008: 78) distinguishes between two interacting, main forms of neoliberalism: the German ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School (somewhat underplaying the role of the Austrians and Hayek) and the American neoliberalism. As for German ordoliberalism, Plehwe (2009:1) does note: “In Germany....most scholars will raise their eyebrows if ordoliberal inspirations of the social market economy are vilified as neoliberal.” Internationally, however, this is seen differently, and German ordoliberals also saw and see themselves as part of the neoliberal thought collective. In the 1970s and 1980s, German ordoliberals investigated the extent of a possible congruence with the public choice theory of Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan to achieve a renaissance of ordoliberalism (see, among other authors: Krieger and Nientiedt 2022). According to Foucault, the German ordoliberals were concerned with how to construct a federal state from previous non-sovereignty through the economy. The answer: through economisation – an idea we will encounter again in Hayek’s “dethronement of politics” further on in section four.

The emergence of American neoliberalism took place in an already given federal state with a libertarian, or better: anarcho-capitalistic founding history. From the point of view of some American economists, lawyers, and politicians, and with the help of Austrian (Hayek) and German (Röpke) neoliberals, however, the New Deal Keynesianism threatened to expand its sovereignty too much. The starting point was the Chicago School of Economics, which pursued a synthesis of neoliberal, neoclassical and legal approaches. The point of attack was first US competition policy, followed later by fiscal and monetary policy. Crouch (2011) makes clear that in

contrast to German ordoliberalism, which wanted to align state competition policy with the ideal of perfect competition among many firms, in American neoliberalism this is not an indispensable precondition for the efficient market process. The market is judged in terms of its results. This establishes a link with Hayek's famous concept of the "competition as a discovery procedure" or the "process" mentioned in the quotation above. He claimed that "Nothing more could be discovered in markets' equilibrium states" (Hayek 1969 [2000]). Behind competition as a discovery procedure is the conception, more realistic than perfect competition, of markets that are characterised by constant changes on the supply and demand side, but especially by the tendency towards large firms because small firms are constantly eliminated in the competition. The impetus for this paradigm shift from the neoclassical to the neoliberal understanding of markets was the theory of the firm developed by Ronald Coase (1937), which is seen as an organisation that enters long-term contracts and can act strategically: it is able to influence the development of its markets to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs arising from imperfect competition, imperfect contracts, and moral hazard. The equilibrium models formulated and tested by the Chicago School showed that sufficient competition is possible with only three suppliers, so that up to this point intervention by competition policy should be considered unnecessary.

. The economists and legal theorists in Chicago replaced the notion of maximum consumer choice in the neoclassical model with the notion of 'welfare' (Crouch 2011): If fewer but more efficient firms increase welfare, then the consumer also has a greater choice. To put it another way: Neoliberal market fundamentalism differs from neoclassical fundamentalism in its acceptance and support of mergers and acquisitions, thus, in the words of Wren-Lewis (2017) serving the profit interests of 'big money' that exploit the idea of a unified global economic order. This creates an immanent contraction of state-centred neoliberalism. Modern corporations are becoming *too big to fail* simply because of their size. Increasing the amount of debt money to rescue asset and estate values ultimately endangers savings and pensions with inflation. Since the crises are almost constant, the public debt is also constantly increasing, which restricts the democratic state's room for manoeuvre.

The evolving agenda of neoliberal government, while constantly changing its objectives, ways, and methods over time, has always revolved around a core salvation narrative: Only an interdependent world economy with a universally applicable set of rules can secure freedom, prosperity, and – through both – peace. This programme applied in the interwar period, when leading neoliberals

sought to attempt a reconstruction of the world economy with the gold standard, but even more so after the Second World War, when decolonisation led to a renewed fragmentation of the global economy; the 'old' adversary – the labour movement and its unions and socialism – got a new bedfellow: nationalist movements in the new nations, while market domination by transnational corporations became a non-issue. Neoliberals saw the need for globally uniform rules on trade, freedom of contract and foreign direct investment. Political and social rules should adapt and converge in each country. The resistance of neoliberals after the Second World War was always directed against a world economic order that allowed exceptions, for example, for capital movements or trade controls for less developed countries. An example of neoliberal globalisation efforts are bilateral investment protection agreements, in which international direct investments are to be removed from national jurisdiction, given special protection and, in the event of a dispute, subject to independent judicial bodies.

3. Authoritarian Liberalism. Carl Schmitt's Contributions

Three lectures, the first delivered in July 1929 by Alexander Rüstow, the other two by Rüstow and Carl Schmitt almost immediately after each other in 1932, i.e., in the early developmental phase of neoliberalism and the height of the Great Depression, throw illuminating light on the role of authoritarian liberalism, which has survived in various manifestations to the present day.⁴ In 1929, Rüstow dealt at length with the position of a 'leader' whose coming he absolutely advocated as many other liberal intellectuals, albeit in close association with the 'masses' (Rüstow, 1929 [1959]). In September 1932, in his lecture devoted to the conceptual renewal of liberalism, Rüstow called, as in 1929, for a strong state as distinct from classical liberalism. A strong state, he said, was independent and sovereign and had to stand 'above' the interests of society (Rüstow, 1932). Just over a month later in November 1932, the conservative legal theorist Carl Schmitt gave a lecture to the then most important German industrialists' association, the *Langnamverein*, with the telling title 'Healthy Economy and Strong State' (Schmitt, 1932). This lecture and his previous work (e.g., his political theology of 1922 (Schmitt, 1922 [1996])) influenced the early neoliberals' understanding of the state and democracy. Factually, Schmitt was liberal with respect to the economy and civil society, and authoritarian with respect to the state order – just like most other early neoliberals.

The coincidence of the two lectures of 1932 was probably not coincidental, because since 1930, with the accession

to power of the German Chancellor Brüning, that authoritarian state had prevailed in Germany which resorted to the emergency decrees by the Reich President made possible by the Constitution. Schmitt welcomed this authoritarian turn in further publications and described the constitutional role of the Reich President as a legal 'temporary dictator'. (Rüstow favoured the Reich Chancellor as a potential leader, to be overthrown only by a constructive vote of no confidence)

Schmitt's contribution to the emerging neoliberalism can be viewed from two theoretical perspectives: One concerns the analytical separation of liberalism and democracy, and the other the opposition of the private to the public. The starting point for the separation of liberalism and democracy in Schmitt's thought is the conviction that the state, and not the electorate, is to be considered the sovereign (Habermas, 2019: 42-46). The state appears as separate from society, and to possess as its "essence" a "secret" (which Foucault, 2008: 78-79 denies), which Schmitt sees as the inheritance of a right of its own historically created by the - divinely legitimised - monarchy. He concludes that this state, if it wanted to be sovereign, had to be strong to be able to act politically independently of society. Schmitt's famous phrase appears here, according to which only the state that rules over the state of exception is sovereign. Similarly, Rüstow argued that the state had become the prey of social interests in 19th-century liberalism, and that its capitulation to the participatory interests of labour had been responsible for the collapse of liberalism, and subsequently also for the collapse of international economic relations and the gold standard.

Schmitt argued in his lecture that the strong state should not intervene in any way in matters that genuinely belong to civil society. His conservatism was combined with the economic liberal view of leaving civil society largely free from state regulation and subjecting it to the spontaneous market mechanism. His affirmation of the duality of the strong and thus politically sovereign state and free economy summed up the goals he had defined earlier through his theory of the state and the constitution.⁵ Liberalism and democracy are principles that cannot be placed on an equal footing constitutionally. If this nevertheless happened, as in the Weimar Constitution, it was the cause of a weak state, because political liberalism 'arms' society with instruments (parties, parliaments, majority voting), which would lead to chaos and violence when the majority represented by the parties tried to enforce their specific interests. In contrast, Schmitt saw no contradiction between liberalism and autocracy. He, therefore, argued for a limitation of political liberalism, which is mainly constituted in parliamentary

institutions of electoral democracy and parties. However, he did not reject certain forms of popular participation such as plebiscites and referendums, which prompted Habermas (1986: 1054) to call it *Führerdemokratie* because the 'Führer' Adolf Hitler also let the people vote from time to time, as did Mussolini in Italy, by the way. Christl (1998: 17) becomes even more metaphorical: 'Schmitt was now able to aim his attack at the democratic populace, which he would attempt to disarm by means of a democratically elected sheriff.' A concept of authoritarian liberalism appears to stabilise free markets and individual property rights, first in those exceptional situations where the appropriation of the state by mass democracy and its parties threatens this stability, and in his later writings as a permanent *Führerstaat*.

Schmitt's conservatism, however, reveals itself from a second perspective, the opposition of the private to the public. Like many of his time and thereafter, he drew a timeline from the Greek polis, where the private - the house economics (*oikonomia*) - was separated from the agora as the public space par excellence, through the Roman Republic to modern times. Both the Greek city republics and the Roman Republic also knew the person of the temporary dictator. In modernity, the private economy has long since left the narrow corset of a domestic economy with women, slaves, and animals and, as a society based on the division of labour, has become a quasi-public space that has necessarily become the object of political action as understood by Hannah Arendt (1958 [1998]).

Until Hitler seized power at the end of January 1933, Schmitt had defined what was meant by a strong state from a constitutional point of view and in his critique of the Weimar 'party state': a state that is independent of social interests, i.e. an autonomous counterpart to society, and which, because of this independence, is strong enough to act in a transitional dictatorial manner, limited to public affairs, i.e. not interfering in private economic ones. But what is also important about Hayek's distance from Schmitt is that while the former saw the apolitical state as strong, the latter explicitly understood the strong state as a political state, because the democratic state leads to a neutralisation of the political (Schmitt 1922 [1996: 82]).

Schmitt's change of sides after the National Socialists came to power, replacing temporary dictatorship with permanent dictatorship, later led Hayek to describe Schmitt as Adolf Hitler's 'crown lawyer' (Hayek (1967: 169). Hayek himself did not see the strong state as a primary theme in his reflections on constitutional law. He was primarily concerned with positioning the constitutional state as the protection of individual economic rights from the state. In contrast, Schmitt -

until Hitler came to power – showed interest in the rule of law only on the condition that the sovereignty of state action was not impaired. As we shall see, Hayek's strong state is founded differently.

4. "Dethronement of Politics". Hayek's Contributions

Despite this considerable difference from Schmitt on questions of the rule of law, Hayek adopted the central ideas of Schmitt. These include the analytical separation of liberalism and democracy and the concept of an authoritarian liberalism that includes a 'liberal' transitional dictatorship, with which Schmitt initially combined the authoritarian state with a free economy, but which was also a theme of Rüstow (1929 [1959]). This led Christi (1998: 22) to conclude 'In truth, Hayek owed much to Schmitt, more than he cared to recognise.' Thus, out of the neoliberal backdrop beckons the figure of thought of the well-meaning and temporary dictator that Hayek and other early neoliberals in Schmitt's spirits may have originally thought Hitler⁶ and more modern bloody dictators to be. Hayek's remark on the occasion of his visit to the Chilean dictator Pinochet on 12 April 1981 in Santiago de Chile points in the same direction: he prefers a liberal dictator to a democratic government that lacks liberalism, whereby the term 'liberalism' could only mean those economic freedoms of the owners of capital that were restored after the coup in Chile under the influence of the so-called Chicago Boys, Chilean economists who have studied in Chicago. The Pinochet dictatorship also proved to be quite long-lived; it only ended in 1989. Milton Friedman expressed his sympathy for the Chilean dictatorship at an audience with Pinochet as early as 1975, when he appeared as his economic advisor, not least via the Chicago Boys. Like Schmitt, Friedman separated liberalism from democracy. In his book "Capitalism and Freedom" (2002), he argued that there was no difference between economic limitation on freedom and political limitation on freedom, whereby he explicitly did not understand political freedom as democracy. He had a deep distrust of democracy, as shown by his abstruse example of 51 per cent of the population deciding to shoot the other 49 per cent.

Under the impression of the Nazi dictatorship, Hayek questioned Schmitt's concept of a politically strong state as a sufficient condition for securing free markets, without, however, ruling out a "transitional dictatorship" in principle (see above). In contrast, he saw something else as necessary, which is expressed in his well-known formulation of the 'dethronement of politics',⁷ or 'depolicitisation through economisation' (Madra and Adaman 2018) respectively. This is at odds with Schmitt's

understanding of 'order' as an authoritarian and exogenously created system, and which called for the sovereign state capable of political action. In contrast, Hayek's understanding is of spontaneous, endogenously self-creating order, which limits the power to control. The state that was not subject to social interests and thus apolitical became, in effect, Hayek's version of the strong state. After all, the main totalitarian powers, Germany and Italy, had just demonstrated the primacy of politics with catastrophic consequences and thus overstepped the boundaries of civil society, which Schmitt originally wanted to defend, among other things in the area of economic freedoms by adopting central administrative economic elements.⁸ What Hayek and the neoliberals sought to roll back was the democratically legitimised expansion of public space into the private sphere.

Hayek's dictum of the strong because apolitical state gained great influence on neoliberal thinking after the Second World War. In the 1960s and 1970s, neoliberals saw their model in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, which did not have majority democracy, but did have free pricing, competition, free movement of capital and the British rule of law. Democracy appeared in the understanding of neoliberalism as 'consumer democracy', i.e., voting with banknotes as ballots. Some neoliberals also repeatedly favoured a political vote weighted according to income and wealth where this appeared to be enforceable, for example in South Africa after the fall of apartheid and in Rhodesia. The British neoliberal William Hutt condemned the apartheid system in South Africa but considered it 'absolutely essential to renounce the principle of universal suffrage on a common roll and accept some form of weighted franchise' (Hutt, 1966: 48).

5. Interstate Federalism

Under the influence of Hayek and Robbins, neoliberals were generally sceptical about the possibility of an apolitical government at the national level, so that at this point the restriction of the nation-state by international arrangements or an order became the focus of their and others (e. g. Luigi Einaudi in Italy) further considerations. Hayek saw the cause of the decline of classical liberalism, unlike Keynes (1926) in his philippic against laissez-faire liberalism, not in its social and economic devastations, but in the fact that liberal movements had allied themselves with the nationalist ones in order to seize the opportunity to implement a liberal economic programme at the national level, which had to entail protectionist interventions against other states and thus also political-military conflicts. Hayek found in 1939: 11): '... in the national state, the submission to the will of a majority will be facilitated by the myth of nationality...' In his book

"The Road to Serfdom" (Hayek 1944), he argued that there was little hope for an international order or lasting peace if each country was free to use any means it saw fit in its own immediate interest.

Hayek, but also von Mises (1943 [1990]) and Robbins (1937) had – quite in the spirit of (re) establishing a global liberal order – already sketched out ideas in the 1930s and 1940s for an interstate arrangement of governing rules and institutions (Foucault's governmentality) with which the nation-state was to be kept in check or perhaps even overcome. Robbins was convinced that only the transfer of sovereign rights – though not all – to an international state would be placemaking and economically progressive. Inspired by the American Constitution and Alexander Hamilton, he demanded (Robbins 1937: 245; author's accentuation): 'There must be neither alliance nor complete unification, but Federation; neither *Staatenbund*, nor *Einheitsstaat*, but *Bundesstaat*.'

The questions of which competencies and which legitimacy the interstate governmentality, to use Foucault's terminology, should be endowed with, however, divided opinions (Masini 2022: 88, 90). For Robbins, federal authorities may decide whether to intervene in economics and to what extent and he did not exclude democratically legitimized decision-making. According to Hayek (1939, 1944), the international authorities would only have the competencies to enforce the rule of law at the level of nation-states to protect individual activity, to abolish interventions of nation-states in the market process and not allow any for the supra-national level, as well as ensuring free trade and protecting the property rights of international investors. As Bonefeld (2015: 873) concludes, for Hayek: 'society is either governed by the liberal rule of law securing individual freedom or it is governed by the democratic principle of majority rule, leading to tyranny and planned chaos.'⁹ Hayek himself (1944: 175): 'Neither an omnipotent super-state, nor a loose association of 'free nations', but a community of nations of free men must be our goal'. For both Robbins and Hayek, the resulting interdependent global order would ultimately be peace-making. Von Mises' thoughts went even further, considering a global customs union and currency necessary, and if this was not possible in the short term, then a federal union made up of a smaller group of states (Mises 1943 [1990: 160ff]). However, Hayek was a consequent opponent of a global currency and favoured the denationalizing of money and competition of private monies.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates with the gold-backed US dollar as an anchor currency and of restrictions on the international movement of capital opened new perspectives for the

neoliberals of a global order in their sense. The initiatives of the GATT Secretariat in Geneva, which was influenced by neoliberal ideas (especially Hayek's theories), played a prominent role in this. The priority was no longer just to expand free trade ever further, but to conclude global agreements on investment protection and to include intellectual property and (financial) services in property rights – in short, to create the world economy, which had already been favoured in the 1920s, according to uniform rules for trade, free price formation, financial markets and capital movements and the international legal order protecting them, which stands above national jurisdictions. The initiative to create an International Trade Organisation (ITO) between 1945 and 1948 (Havana Charter) by the USA and its allies and decisively influenced by Keynes as a further pillar of the Bretton Woods system with its exceptions for developing countries had failed in 1950 due to the resistance of the neoliberal-influenced US Congress. But in 1994, it succeeded in establishing the WTO, which was able to follow the neoliberal dictum of one jacket fits all. The political concept of 'globalism' describes how, in international politics, the competence to solve international problems passes from nation-states to all globally acting institutions, including national governments, internationally acting think tanks and multinational corporations – the World Economic Forum brings them together every year in Davos. Globalization reveals the veritable democratic deficit of neoliberal aspirations for uniform rules at the global level: the more remote the competence to solve problems is from the electorate of parliamentary ballot democracy, the more apolitical, i.e., technocratic, governance as opposed to government can become (this is the main topic of Streeck, 2021).

Hayek saw little chance of a quick realisation of the desired global order. The possibility of first attempting this with a smaller group of nations became, so to speak, Plan B. The extent to which the influence of neoliberal ideas on a global federation from the 1930s and 1940s were reflected in the practice of a regional federation of liberal democracies can be traced in the example of the European unification process. Hayek and others, being members of the *Federal Union*, established in 1938 in the United Kingdom, promoted the unification process in his spirit via the – at least – indirect influence on German politics in the 1950s particularly through the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism. He is likely to have regarded the 1957 Treaty of Rome as a successful project of his work and that of other neoliberals: a Commission that acts technocratically and oversees the enforcement of the Treaties, the principle of subsidiarity,¹⁰ which imposes limits on attempts at "ever closer union" but not on

enlargements of the Union, a single market, and the right of a member state to reclaim sovereignty at any time.

A particularly striking example of depoliticisation is the architecture of the monetary union, although it follows not Hayek, who rejected the idea of a common currency and favoured the competition of denationalized monies even of private character. Competition would stabilise prices and exchange rates. Milton Friedman, however, believed that a central bank that was super-independent in its monetary policy could achieve the same goal. The formal evidence was provided by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Rogoff (1984) under a public choice approach. The magic word was "greater credibility" in financial markets, which a super-independent central bank would have.

Indeed, the European Central Bank (ECB) is constructed as an institution completely detached from governments and parliaments. However, national budgetary policies must be depoliticized equally, otherwise, contradictions between monetary and fiscal policies would emerge. The dethronement of fiscal policy follows Hayek's dictum of long-term rule-binding in place of discretionary policy. Examples are the Stability and Growth Pact and its tightening after the global financial crisis and the euro debt crisis. In this decoupling of high-powered money from social control, Schmitt and Hayek meet: the ECB appears as a well-meaning dictator in European monetary policy. And democracy appears as a 'market-compliant' democracy.

On the other hand, this speaks against a neoliberal showcase project in its pure form. Plan B included democracies, and compromising is essential in democracies. Hence, the EU is a mixed system. As a regional integration community, it is fundamentally separable from the global economy, even if some sectors are excluded from it. The fact of being a regional integration group effectuated a split in the neoliberal movement: The constructivist wing around Hayek, Mises, and the German ordoliberals assumed the Treaties of Rome and the following ones could work as a gateway for imposing a purely neoliberal order inside the group of countries and separating it from the nationalism of new states after decolonisation (von Mises 1943: 169ff [1990]). The fundamentalist wing (among others, Haberler, Röpke, and influential officers in the GATT-secretariat) was against the Treaties of Rome, because in their eyes they impeded the creation of a multi-level global governance order.¹¹

The separation from the global economy entailed and entails further violations of neoliberal principles: structural and regional policies intervene in the market mechanisms of some sectors and their international

competitive position through transfer payments (Common Agricultural Policy) and development support (Structural Funds). This is completely contrary to the basic neoliberal understanding of a free economy committed only to the signal system of free market prices. In an integration community with internal free trade, national and supranational investment promotion comes very close in its effect on infant-industry duties à la Friedrich List. And rigidly maintaining the principle of subsidiarity is no longer realistic, as Europe-wide financial crises cannot be handled by the nation-state alone – as the establishment of extra-budgetary funds at the EU level shows.

6. The Keynesian Understanding of State and Democracy

Neoliberal authors were always in disagreement with Keynes (Montani, 1984; Madra and Adaman, 2018; Guizzo 2019) not only with respect to the explanation of business instabilities, but also with respect to state and democracy. Keynesianism was and is their archenemy, because its policy would assumingly undermine individual freedom and lead to serfdom.

Carl Schmitt's authoritarian liberalism had still been grounded in the combination of two conservative prejudices, according to which only the restriction of party democracy combined with restrictive social programmes and budget surpluses protected free enterprise. This had turned out to be a fundamental misjudgement. Authoritarian policies do not necessarily safeguard the capitalist system. It was not party democracy but the German emergency decree policy in the Great Depression, which Schmitt had so praised, that deepened the economic depression, weakened the state through violence and chaos, led to the handover of power to the National Socialists and ultimately to the total state, which step by step imposed the liberal economic constitution with elements of direct control. Authoritarian liberalism also appeared in Hayek's convictions, who distanced himself from Schmitt's ingratiation with Adolf Hitler, but not from the bloody dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, Keynes concluded in his General Theory that in a monetary economy with fundamental uncertainty, no laissez-faire market system can ensure a stable level of aggregate demand that makes it profitable for firms to provide full employment, because economic agents hoard part of their available but necessary money stocks for full employment. Thus, in Keynesianism, a strong state can avoid major economic crises through expansionary fiscal and monetary policy measures, to stop the flight into promises of salvation and thus pacify

the society. It is not certain that the authoritarian state pursues a better economic policy (the keywords here are corruption and nepotism). However, an active role of the state has been vehemently rejected by most neoliberal authors as proto-socialist, according to Hayek 1944 [2017] as a step on the 'road to serfdom', as it violates the principle of spontaneous order as a limit to exogenous control. Keynes, who was always committed to the liberal democracy, or, as I would call it, *democratic liberalism* of his home country, attempted 'to make the private property system work better.' (Keynes 1939 [2013: 493]), while preserving the functioning of democracy (Waligorski, 1994; Panico and Piccioni, 2016).

Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 23,89 and passim) accused Keynes of carelessness about budget deficits and thus of undermining democracy through permanent public debt. Politicians – a basic thesis of NPE – would always tend to spend more than they could take in in a democracy in their effort to win elections. This criticism appears surprisingly in the light of the *too-big-to-fail phenomenon* – a consequence of the neoliberal market theory mentioned in section two. They continue to argue that the persistent tendency to create budget deficits and national debt through excessive spending would not occur under a government led by an independent elite committed only to the public interest, or alternatively through a deficit ban. Hayek's 'dethronement of politics' shines through in this argument.

Keynes was aware of the importance of experts in policymaking, but without adopting the neoliberal concept of depoliticisation. His attitude towards independent expert governments can be exemplified by the position of a central bank. In a critical review of monetary policy proposals by the English Labour Party (Keynes, 1932), he argued that the central bank should act independently in terms of personnel and administration because it has expert knowledge of which a parliament would understand 'less than nothing'. He concluded (following quotations in Keynes, 1932: 131): "The less direct the democratic control and the more remote the opportunities for parliamentary interference with banking policy the better it will be." But he had also accepted the Labour Party's proposal that "The management of the Bank should be ultimately subject to the Government of the day and the higher appointments should require the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer."

Personal, administrative, and executive independence, but not in objectives and priorities, provides the central bank's experts with a counterweight to an over-expansive fiscal policy, but at the same time forces them to cooperate with the government. This understanding underlay the largest central banks in the Western world

until the late 1970s, when the concept of 'institutional design' entered the economic mainstream, proposing a new framework for choosing between alternative monetary goals. Rogoff introduced new elements in the discussion of the relations that a central bank must have with public institutions (Rogoff 1985). He compared alternative models in which the model he favours has the highest monetary policy effectiveness in reducing the influence of 'dynamic inconsistency' in the behaviour of central bank managers and achieves the highest credibility in the financial sector. His analysis led to proposals of attributing to central banks forms of independence that were previously excluded, like that on goals and priorities (Panico and Piccioni, 2016:191). The institutional design concept has probably exerted great influence on the conceptualisation of the ECB's independence. It produced a kind of 'benevolent dictator in control of government policy' (Bibow 2010: 26), which responds to permanent budget deficits and ever-increasing public debt with lower interest rates and bond-buying programmes like in the euro debt crisis. The 'Whatever it Takes' speech of the ECB's then President Mario Draghi on 26 July 2012 was close to this role.

7. Summary and Concluding Remarks

For neoliberalism, the state is necessarily an active agent in socio-economic affairs in contrast to its passive role in the laissez-faire era. Moreover, neoliberalism is in tension with liberal democracy because of its authoritarian tendency to favour technocratic management of the economy to facilitate sustainable profit accumulation for corporate capital. The guiding principle of neoliberalism is not the *minimal state*, but the *minimal democracy*. As democracy is accepted, then in its market-compliant form. The economic basis of the neoliberal conceptualization of state and democracy is a theory of the market that differs from the classical and neoclassical theories: Companies are perceived as strategically acting organisations that influence the market outcome. This opens the way for transnational (financial) corporations to become too big to fail and to blackmail politics for financial support in case of crises. By sheer size or presence in different states, they are also able to subjugate the policy space of small and medium-sized states to their profit interests – the Google-Ireland case provides a good example. As partners of governments and central banks of large states as well as of international organisations, they can participate in the enforcement of a global legal framework to ensure the efficiency and political stability of the capitalist order.

Thus, a political economy approach can be identified as neoliberal, which aims at transferring formerly sovereign functions at the national level to independent expert bodies either globally ("Plan A") or, if not possible, with only several nation-states ("Plan B"). The envisaged institutional order implies a limitation of majority democracy in favour of expert bodies that, although impersonal, act as 'well-meaning dictators'.

At the global level, Plan A already seemed almost realised once after the collapse of the socialist system, which Francis Fukuyama (1992) expressed with almost Hegelian force in his famous thesis of the "end of history": there are no longer any systemic contradictions in principle, but only implementation deficiencies in the only remaining system - victorious capitalism, which - as in the old Habsburg Empire - also ensures peace among nations. In Hegel's philosophy of history, it is the final synthesis to which there is no longer any antithesis and thus no regression. This, like so much in occidental modernity, is only easily identified as salvation-historical thinking with a secularised theological background. In fact, after many global crises, this idyll has proven to be less robust in the confrontation with other cultural circles and their specific *Weltanschauungen*, which is not only due to implementation deficiencies in the approach to the salvation-historical ideal but provokes regressive responses. An example is the return of the religious not only in the Islamist world but also in the growth of evangelicals in the USA and South America, which aims directly at the heart of liberal modernity committed to rational enlightenment. Similarly, the appeal of authoritarian over democratic liberalism is growing in the core countries of Western capitalism (USA and EU). In the EU ("Plan B"), authoritarian liberalism, coupled with a reluctance to cede sovereignty to EU bodies, is gaining renewed appeal, not only in Poland and Hungary, but also in the national movements of globalisation losers. In already authoritarian states such as Russia (Snyder 2018) and China (Weber 2017; Harvey 2021), it is noticeable that the state and constitutional theory of Carl Schmitt has gained adherents. It should be a warning to us.

Footnotes

¹ The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). For this revised version I thank a total of 28 reviewers at Qeios who provided me with helpful comments and recommendations. I remain responsible for all other weaknesses.

² The book presents lectures from 1978-79.

³ The term 'neoliberalism' then also appeared for the first time in the criticism by prominent Austro-Marxists

of the proposals of von Mises, then advisor to the Austrian government (Foster, 2019).

⁴ Louis Rougier, who had been the namesake of neoliberalism in 1938, became personally involved with the Vichy regime after France's defeat in 1940 and, after 1960, moved closer to far-right French circles (Benoist's *Nouvelle Droite*). Wilhelm Röpke was also initially caught up in illusions about German fascism. Von Mises was economic adviser to the Dollfuss regime when the army was used to crush Red Vienna in February 1934 and the ban of the Austrian social democratic party.

⁵ In this paragraph, I follow Christi, 1998.

⁶ Schmitt as well as the philosopher Martin Heidegger were among those whose intellectual arrogance tempted them to want to lead the "Führer", which they then failed to do. Both were stripped of the functions they had initially been able to secure at about the same time - in the mid-1930s.

⁷ The text appeared in 1982 for the first time in an on-volume edition, which included all three parts, but was written 1978.

⁸ Extensively Walter Eucken, 1950: pp. 122-129 and *passim*.

⁹ Quoted after Masini (2022: 89)

¹⁰ The principle of subsidiarity follows ideas that Rüstow had already formulated in the 1920s in view of the weaknesses of the Weimar constitution (Hegner 2000: 135).

¹¹ The WTO is fundamentally sceptical of regional integration groups, as reflected in the conflict over Article 45 of the WTO treaty on the most-favoured-nation clause.

Literature

- Arendt, H. (1958 [1998]). *The Human Condition*. (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Audier, S. und J. Reinhoudt (2019). *Neoliberalismus. Wie alles anfang: Das Walter Lippmann Kolloquium*. Hamburg: Kursbuch Kulturstiftung.
- Biebricher, T. (2021). *Die politische Theorie des Neoliberalismus*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Bibow, J. (2010). *A Post Keynesian Perspective on the Rise of Central Bank Independence: A Dubious Success Story in Monetary Economics*. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 625.
- Bonefeld, W. (2015). *European economic constitution and the transformation of democracy: On class and*

- the state of law. In: *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(4): 867–88.
- Buchanan, J. M., and R. E. Wagner. (1977). *Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes*. New York: Academic Press.
 - Butler, E., A. (2022). *Short History of the Mont-Pelerin-Society*. <https://www.montpelerin.org/>; accessed 25/09 2022.
 - Cahill, D., Cooper, M., Konings, M. and Primrose D. (2018). *The SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism*. London: SAGE Publications.
 - Coase, F. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. In: *Economica*, 4, 386–405.
 - Christi, R. (1998). *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Strong State, Free Economy*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
 - Crouch, C. (2011). *The Strange Non—Death of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 - Crouch, C. (2017). *Can Neoliberalism Be Saved From Itself?* Social Europe Edition 2017.
 - Eucken, W. (1950). *Foundation of Economics*. London: William Hodge and company limited.
 - Foster, J. B. 2019. Absolute Capitalism. In: *Monthly Review. Independent Socialist Magazine*, Vol. 71, Issue 01. <https://monthlyreview.org/2019/05/01/absolute-capitalism/>; accessed 1/05/2023.
 - Foucault, M. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
 - Friedman, M. (2002). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 40th edition.
 - Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. Free Press.
 - Guizzo D. (2019). Discursive strategies in the Keynes-Hayek debate: building a liberal critique. *Contributions to Political Economy* 38(1), pp. 12–30.
 - Habermas, J. (1986). Sovereignty and the Führerdemokratie. In: *The Times Literary Supplement*, September 26, S. 1053–4.
 - Habermas, J. (2019). *Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. Band 1. Die okzidentale Konstellation von Glauben und Wissen*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
 - Harvey, T. (2021). Xi Jinping, Carl Schmitt & China's New Era. Oxford House Research. <https://www.oxfordhousereseach/>; accessed 17/12 2022.
 - Hayek, F. A. von, (1939). The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, in *New Commonwealth Quarterly*, V, No. 2, pp. 131–49.
 - Hayek, F. A. von. (1944). *The Road to Serfdom*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
 - Hayek, F. A. von (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. In: *The American Economic Review*. Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 519–530.
 - Hayek, F. A. von (1967). *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
 - Hayek, F. A. von (1969 [2000]). „Der Wettbewerb als Ent-deckungsverfahren“ In: *Freiburger Studien* hrsg. v. Hayek. Tübingen, pp. 249–265.
 - Hayek, F. A. von (1974). “The Pretence of Knowledge. Prize Lecture. December 11, 1974. <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1974/hayek/lecture/>; accessed 17/12 2022.
 - Hayek, F. A. von (2022). “The Containment of Power and the Dethronement of Politics”. In: *Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 19*, edited by Jeremy Shearmur, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 484–508.
 - Hegner, J. (2000). *Ordnungspolitische Konzeption und Einfluß auf das wirtschaftspolitische Leitbild der Nachkriegszeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft.
 - Horn, R. van and P. Mirowski 2009. The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism. In: Miroski P. und Plehwe (eds.). *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 139–180.
 - Hutt, W. (1966). Fragile Constitutions. In: *New Individualist Review*, vol. 4(3), pp. 48–51.
 - Keynes, J. M. (1926). *The end of laissez-faire*. In: Hogarth Press. Retrieved from <http://www.panarchy.org/keynes/laissezfaire.1926.html>; accessed 29/04 2019).
 - Keynes, J. M. (1932). The monetary policy of the Labour Party. In: *The New Statesman and Nation*, In: D. Moggridge (ed.). *Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXI*, Cambridge University Press 2013; pp. 128–137.
 - Keynes, J. M. (1939). Democracy and Efficiency. In: *The New Statesman and Nation*. 28 January 1939. In: D. Moggridge (ed.). *Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXI*, Cambridge University Press 2013, pp. 491–500.
 - Krieger, T. and D. Nientiedt D. (2022). The Renaissance of Ordoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, *Diskussionsbeiträge*, No. 2022–05, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg,
 - Kydland F. E. and E. C. Prescott. 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. *Journal of Political Economy*, 85(3): 473–492.
 - Madra, D., and Adaman F. (2018). Neoliberal Turn in the Discipline of Economics: Depoliticization through Economization. In: Cahill, D., Cooper, M., Konings, M. and Primrose D (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism*. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 112–129.

- Masini, F. (2022). Hayek's Federalism and the Making of European Integration. In: *Cosmos+Taxis*, Volume 10, Issue 11 + 12, 85–96.
- Mirowski, P. 2014. *Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste*. New York: Verso.
- Mirowski, P. und D. Plehwe (eds.) 2009. *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mises, L. von (1943 [1990]). Economic nationalism and peaceful economic cooperation. In: ders. *Money, Method, and the Market Process: Essays* hrsg. v. Ebeling, R. M. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990, pp. 155–165.
- Montani, G. (1984). Lionel Robbins. In: *Federalist. Political Review*. Year XXVI, Number 2, pp. 152–156.
- Neck, R. (2014). On Austrian Economics and the Economics of Carl Menger. In: *Atlantic Economic Journal*, Vol. 42, pp. 217–227.
- Panico, C. and M. Piccioni. (2016). Keynes on Central Bank Independence. In: *Studi Economici* n. 1, 2, 3, pp. 190–216.
- Plehwe, D. 2009. Introduction, in: Mirowski, P. and D. Plehwe (eds.) 2009. *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–44).
- Polanyi K. (1944 [2001]). *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.
- Robbins, L. (1937). *Economic Planning and International Order*. Chapter IX. London: Macmillan.
- Rogoff, K. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 100, issue 4, pp. 1169–1189.
- Rüstow, A. (1929 [1959]). Zur Frage der Staatsführung in der Weimarer Republik, Diktatur innerhalb der Grenzen der Demokratie. In *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jahrgang 7, Heft 1, pp. 87–111.
- Rüstow, A. (1932). Freie Wirtschaft, starker Staat. In: Tagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Dresden 1932, in: *Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik*, Bd. 187 München: Duncker & Humblot.
- Saad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (eds.) (2005). *Neoliberalism. A Critical Reader*. London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- Schmitt, C. (1922 [1996]). *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*. Berlin 1996: Duncker & Humblot.
- Schmitt, C. (1932). *Strong State and Sound Economy: An Address to Business Leaders*. In Christi. R. 1998. Appendix: pp. 212–232.
- Slobodian, Q. (2018). *Globalists. The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge, MS/London: Harvard University Press.
- Springer, S.; Birch K. und MacLeavy J. (2016). *The Handbook of Neoliberalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Snyder, T. (2018). *The Road to Unfreedom. Russia-Europe-America*. New York: Penguin Random House.
- Streeck, W. (2021). Zwischen Globalismus und Demokratie. *Politische Ökonomie im ausgehenden Neoliberalismus*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Waligorski, C. P. (1994). Keynes and Democracy. In: *The Social Science Journal*. Volume 31, Number 1, pp. 79–91.
- Weber, I. M. (2018). China and Neoliberalism: Moving Beyond the China is/is not Neoliberal Dichotomy. In: Cahill et al., 219–234.
- Williamson J (2004). The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development. Available at: <https://piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf> (accessed 27 April 2019).
- Wren-Lewis, S. (2017). How Neoliberals weaponise the concept of an ideal market. <https://mainlymacro.blogspot.com/2017/10/how-neoliberals-weaponise-concept-of.html>; accessed 1/06 2022.

Declarations

Funding: No specific funding was received for this work.

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.