Review of: "A Priori Arguments for Determinism/Universal Necessity – and the Leibnizian Theodicy"

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Declarations:

The author(s) declared that no potential competing interests exist.

Reviewer's rating: 5/5.

It is a very deep and penetrating study. However, I have a suggestion that the author should explain, which modal logic is used or is proper for particular arguments. Explanations stemming from the premises are not sufficient. For instance. Leibniz's logic seems very strong. Jerzy Perzanowski (Jerzy Perzanowski, Art of Philosophy, de Gruyter 2012 calls is the logic of rationalism (every truth is necessary).

The analysis of the argument from the divine omniscience is somehow problematic. The divine omniscience can be defines as (a) everything what God knows is true, or (b) everything what God knows is necessary true. Now, (a) does not entail that God's propositions are contingent. Assume, by Lindenbaum's Lemma, that God's omniscient knowledge constitutes the maximally consistent set of true sentences (or propositions, if someone prefers this way of speaking). Consequently, this set cannot contain any false sentences. By definition, God actually (not only potentially) knows the entire related Lindenbaum extension. Thus, it is a question whether the unique God's knowledge contains contingent sentences. Furthermore, we can ask whether can be defended even without assumption that God's knowledge is necessary.