

## Research Article

# György Márkus 75% Mensch: On the occasion of the Publication of the English version of *How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?*

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Introducing the world media to the Budapest School in *The Times Literary Supplement* on Feb 15<sup>th</sup> 1971, Lukács described Márkus as ‘75 % Mensch’. When Lukács first met him, George already had his own philosophical interests which he would bring with him when he became a key figure in “The Budapest School”.

In this lecture I intend to give an overall interpretation of the development of the Budapest School in Australia as political emigres, who initially worked and wrote in Melbourne and Sydney until the final years when Heller and Feher moved on to New York in the mid 1980s and then back to Budapest in 1993. The translation of *How is Critical Economic Theory Possible?* has allowed us to better grasp the motivations and theoretical innovations of the Budapest School, to appreciate their internal disputes, and to recognise fundamental continuities and difference in these two key thinkers. This book was a gallant retrieval of democratic potentials in Marx. It excavated Marx’s own appreciation of needs produced by and critical of the alienations of the capitalist system. Ultimately, this early work was unable to realise its ambition to educate the diverse progressive movements of the times. I will show later in my lecture that the retrieval of progressive potentials took a more social democratic form in the work of Maria Markus on needs as she encountered them in the Labour Hawke government of Australia from 1983.

A word of explanation of my title: Márkus had studied in Moscow where he wrote his dissertation on the topic *History and Consciousness* and met his Polish wife, Maria. George used to modestly say that he was an expert only on the works of Karl Marx. That was despite that he had taught the history of modern philosophy at Eotvös Loránd University to Hungary’s most promising philosophers for a decade and later to philosophy students at Sydney University for the next twenty years. In the early

1970s, George invited Janos Kis and György Bence to work on his next project that would become the Hungarian version of *Überhaupt* which was to become *How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?*, The new English translation published by Brill this year opens this important rethinking of the work of Marx to an international readership.

## **György Márkus 75% Mensch: On the occasion of the Publication of the English version of *How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?***

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### *Part 1: Kis's Reflections on the Contemporary Significance of the Original "How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?"*

In his Preface to the translation, Janos Kis explains that its original critical intentions were a response to a combination of the political and cultural aspiration of the New Left in the West in the late sixties and the Prague Spring in Eastern Europe. The authors believed that the aspirations of both movements could be reconciled. Kis states ruefully that these hopes were refuted by the following years. Despite such disappointments, Kis maintains that the book transcends its immediate historical origins and has some current economic and political interest.<sup>2</sup>

From the 1960s critical Marxists began to challenge the idea of historical necessity and the idea that each society must follow the same path of historical evolution. Inspired by the philosophical works of the young Marx, history was now seen as a socially mediated human biological process where symbolic culture was finally given due acknowledgement. On this account, humans made themselves and this implied that the "good life" was now considered as "all are equally free" certainly this norm had never yet been fully realised in previous history.<sup>3</sup> The historically produced capitalist society was one of "alienation" and "reification". On such an account, Communism becomes the goal of history, the "working class" understood as its practical agent and its engine.<sup>4</sup>

Since Lukács's groundbreaking *History and Class Consciousness* in 1923<sup>5</sup>, a critical Marxist tradition had rejected some of the mature Marx's unilinear, evolutionist views in favour of a richer contemporary

social and cultural anthropology. For the authors, this could also be found in the early *Economic and Philosophical Writings* of the Young Marx<sup>6</sup> that had not been published until the late 1930s and also in the late Marx's so-called "anthropological" writings, written after *Kapital*. On this account, Marx's economic writings are not an alternative "bourgeois" economic theory, rather communist thought transcends the purely economic point of view. Márkus, Kis and Bence were seeking a shift from this earlier philosophical criticism of economics to a philosophically guided economic theory, the authors were unwilling to ignore the specific economic content of *Kapital*. Unlike the "unorthodox" Marxists, they wanted to recognise the philosophical aspects of the critique of political economy, however, they wanted to acknowledge the significance of the specific economic content of *Kapital*. The critical dimension of *Kapital* was that it went beyond the internal perspective of the capitalist or the worker and its inexorable laws of the capitalist economy. It suggests that a critical economic theory cannot simply dismiss the capitalist market but must also excavate its complex potentialities.

Whether there is a pathway to a fully communal life under the control of the proletariat is not given by the philosophy of history, it is an argument to be made based on the social sciences. There are many hints in *Kapital* about the path from Capitalism to Communism. However, the idea of siding with the interests of universal principles is not sufficient to guarantee scientific objectivity. The practical commitment to the economic lacks truth aptness in respect to the objective facts.

Marx's critical economic theory possesses some attractive and fruitful insights into the fundamental dynamics of modern capitalism. However, for these authors there was also some major shortcomings that seemed to threaten the adequacy of the critical economic theory as a whole. Márkus found a fundamental ambiguity in Marx's account of use-value as developed in *Kapital* Volume Two.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand, Marx's use-value is a socially loaded concept. For a thing to be a use-value, it must be an object of technical and cultural norms that define its point of use and its ways of use. Often these are relativised to different social statuses of various people and groups. On the other hand, Marx's insistence that the use-value represents a direct, natural relation between a thing and a human individual in need played a systemic role in his theoretical conception. Marx views the economy as a social system described in purely naturalistic terms. On the one hand, it was expected to cater for the human needs of subjects that have particular use-values. He attributed a further function to the economy: distributing the available resources across the sectors of production to enable society to produce a fixed set of goods at the least cost or the largest set of goods at a given cost. In Marx's view, the goods to be produced by the economy and the costs of production can be determined in purely

naturalistic terms. He believed that the social systems whose economic subsystems is properly separated from the other subsystems would draw a sharp<sup>8</sup> dividing line, between purely naturalistic relations of human individuals and things characteristic of the economy, and social relations linking human individuals to each other that were regulated by the non-economic subsystems. However, Marx was clear that that no social system in human history carried through this separation fully and consistently. In the pre-capitalist epoch, the economy remained embedded in other social systems serving non-economic purposes. Capitalism was the first system, according to Marx, that achieved some sort of divorce between economy and society but did not carry out the separation without alienating consequences. It is left to the market to control production and to allocate subjective and social needs. Consequently, the workers do not identify human needs directly, distribution relies on the proxy of effective demand.<sup>9</sup> One major conclusion of the analysis was that no socialist economy can do without a market. For Marx, the market is the only mechanism that can allocate use-values to social subjects.

While the general Marxian project was attractive and fruitful, the authors found that Marx's substantive critical economic theory was deeply problematic. Their critique centred on an assessment of its failure to break with capitalism's abstract fiction of the labour theory of value. After all, the diagnosis of systematic exploitation as the expropriation of surplus labour time rested on the supposition that all labour could be reduced to a universal equivalent. This fiction remained a crucial axiom of the centrally planned economies. To challenge it was to contest the Communist orthodoxy at that time. Unlike the Frankfurt School's preservation of Marx's critique of capitalism while abandoning his revolutionary goal, the authors sought new manifestations of radical needs embedded in capitalist society that could sustain deeply critical practices and attempted to address new social agents moved by them. In this fashion, they could uphold the continuity of Marx's thinking with a critical theory which rejected those abstract Marxist theses that proved untenable in the present.<sup>10</sup>

Kis concludes his Introduction to the English translation by acknowledging that their early hopes had proven to be naïve. The New Left fell into demise and the idea of democratic market Socialism in Eastern Europe collapsed. The authors' position was sympathetic to the new feminism, sexual revolution and the early ecological movements but its enthusiastic support of economic growth proved to be deeply problematic and in need of refinement.<sup>11</sup>

Márkus reiterates the conclusions of the Book in Chapter 8 'Association of Free Producers' stressing that this idea is incompatible with the elimination of the market. He goes on to say that he agrees with

Marx, that technological and economic optimisation can increase humanisation and the reduction of alienation but argues that Marx's version of this reconciliation was unacceptable.<sup>12</sup> The essential historical dynamism of the "Association of the Free Producers" requires the need for constant praxis.<sup>13</sup> The limitations of the idea of the "Free Association of the Producers" must have the capacity to confront and constrain the tendencies of alienation growing out of the same society. The new answer is a regulated market economy.<sup>14</sup> Márkus critiques the clear division between technique and social interests at the level of the business "Plan" or collective.<sup>15</sup> The struggle must also continue in the changing patterns of everyday life and democratic debate.<sup>16</sup> Obviously such changing patterns of everyday life will spill beyond the borders of Europe to the rest of the world.<sup>17</sup>

## *Part 2: The History of European and Post World War Integration*

Márkus, Kis and Bence were interested in challenging the parochial ideologies wound into Marx's own evolutionism. They thought the "anthropological" works of the later Marx went beyond the circumscribed historical choices given to the "associated producers" in *Kapital*. At this point it is instructive and sobering to introduce some of Johann P. Arnason's reflections on the historical evolution of the European Union. Here I show that Arnason, sharing Markus's sociological perspective and methods, arrives at a much more pessimistic view that rates the chances of a project invested in critical needs very low. These potentials have been assimilated into the project of contemporary Eastern European integration that is too constraining of other European nations for whom they appear even anti-democratic. However, Márkus and Heller hold firm and their later political perspectives are aligned with the current policies of the European Union which they viewed as the bearer of progressive politics in contemporary Europe.

Let us briefly consider Arnason's view of the historical options available to the future of the Economic Union and Europe. This history suggests that the current head government "imposed integration" has yielded 'intertwined counter-trends' that do not necessarily yield a raft of progressive potentials.<sup>18</sup> The imposed historical integration emerged from two divergent, but interconnected histories, West Christian and Byzantine. The dominance of the former was a long drawn out one.<sup>19</sup> The historical frame of reference is the European experience of and interpretative patterns of modernity. However, the origins of these processes appeared in various parts of Eurasia. The "longue durée" of the European historical path is connected to global civilisation and to the plurality of cultural worlds and historical trajectories. Clearly this narrative also involves a critique of Eurocentrism.<sup>20</sup>

Eurocentrism is not to be understood though merely as Europe against the rest but lies coiled within the European Union's own self-understanding. Two centuries of war and conflict had problematised the unifying philosophical principle of autonomy that equates modernity with emphatic Kantian precepts. Arnason insists that autonomy as a civilisatory horizon is not reducible to a higher degree of rationality nor to the aspiration to self-determination. This image is entangled with the exclusions of new and inherently expanding ways of accumulating wealth and power. Ideological elaborations of autonomy have inevitably become conflict prone.<sup>21</sup>

European versions of modernity are too multifarious and their paths too diverse to be adequately grasped by polar grids or schemas of class and nation.<sup>22</sup> The relationship between modern capitalism and modern democracy is best understood as a troubled co-habitation rather than as a perfectible harmony or fundamental conflict.<sup>23</sup> The Soviet collapse in 1989 built a case for the superiority of the Western version of modernity and this paved the way to the neo-liberal hubris that culminated in the great recession and financial crash in 2010.<sup>24</sup>

The powerful and influential theories of European integration were clearly inspired by an imposed concept of social progress. Nevertheless, the complexity of the task has meant that institutional structures have been left deliberately open-ended and, Arnason observes, can make themselves available to inputs from all manner of local concerns.<sup>25</sup>

Acknowledging that the terms of integration might still admit excluded histories, Arnason's assessment of contemporary sociological evidences makes him profoundly sceptical. By contrast, Agnes Heller at the time of the US response to 9/11 was seduced by the image of ineluctable historical progress that clung to her early theory of radical needs. In some of her formulations, radical needs appeared more as a philosophical commitment and less as a line of sociological enquiry into the critical potentials of our frustrated hopes. Heller was the first to popularise the revolutionary democratic hopes that invested in needs that transcended the subjective structures of individuals in existing capitalist society<sup>26</sup>. For her, the idea of radical needs provided necessary orientation to the critical politics in the contemporary New Left cultural explosion in Western societies. In the case of Heller at least, the investment in radical needs was charged with faith in the idea of contemporary progress and it turned out that this could bunker down with some strange allies. Teaching at the New School for Social Research in New York at the time of 9/11, like many of her friends and colleagues, Heller supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq. She upheld the ideology behind the critique of the idea of "Old Europe" and its U.S. vision of a "democratized world" in the Middle East

Heller did not believe that she had betrayed the radical democratic orientation of her critical theory when she fully supported Republican U.S. foreign policy that led to the invasion of Afghanistan. The idea of radical needs, however, did not provide the necessary self-critique against her long held “hawkish” support for the efforts of the U.S. policy. It appeared, to her, that historical progress had a definite shape and an unexpected champion.

Márkus and Kis were much more sceptical. Márkus never had any lingering faith in progressive trajectories, opting instead for the idea of our rational ‘wager’ that the best potentials of the present might guide the future. Unlike Agnes, he had no real emotional attachment to Israel and had a more forensic analysis of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Arnason too repudiated mere faith in progressive trajectories and shared Markus’s scepticism about U.S. foreign policy. He was more dubious about the tensions in the integrative hopes of the European Union. To the end of his life, Markus continued to invest in the progressive tendencies of the European Union. Like Habermas, he remained within the camp of “Old Europe” and opposed to U.S. military adventurism.

Arnason’s conviction that the European Union has expunged Europe’s own diverse and rich histories rests on a nuanced portrait of reform attempts in the Ottoman Empire and their outcomes in terms of a historical sociology of entangled civilizations. He adds a second layer of observations on Western ‘interventionist and exploitative’ strategies in the Middle East, which have ‘lasting effect... on historical processes that are still unfolding’<sup>27</sup>. This can be seen as a normative argument for collective self-determination, as Arnason further emphasizes that it was the U.S. that ‘put an end to the Iranian experiments with constitutional democracy’<sup>28</sup> and, in general, was not usually ‘in the business of exporting democracy’. While Arnason does see a combination of the quest for knowledge, state building, and institutionalization of technological progress as the ‘infrastructure of modernity’,<sup>29</sup> he underlines the openness of this combination to interpretation and rejects the imperial U.S. model as a ‘paradigm of modernity’. Arnason’s critique of the ‘informal empire’ of the U.S. is that it has taken a ‘regressive turn’<sup>30</sup> and he views the U.S. as the core promoter of neoliberal capitalism. For him, it is crucial to develop a ‘civilizational perspectives on capitalism’ as a total socio historical phenomenon<sup>31</sup>.

As Arnason has underlined, there is an ‘elective affinity of absolutized individual freedom and the promise of absolute wealth’, which is underpinned by the interpretation of the supposedly self-evident commitment of modernity<sup>32</sup> to autonomy as a pledge to individual freedom. In contrast, the necessary ‘turn away from neoliberalism’ is more fruitfully supported by a ‘rehabilitation of collective

autonomy'.<sup>33</sup> These observations on Arnason's normative commitments may suffice. They situate him clearly on the 'left', in proximity to most of the scholars who contributed to the critique and/or reconstruction of historical materialism. Even more precisely, they identify him as someone who aims at institutional reconstruction through shifts in the interpretation of key political concepts. We may call this leftist reformism and find confirmation in at least one statement in which Arnason distinguishes forms of politically leftist commitments today. For him, 'It is difficult to come up with any positive perspectives'. The reformist left is everywhere on the defensive, if it exists at all; the global left is a fantasy; the "revolutionary" left is irrelevant and sometimes off the planet'<sup>34</sup>

As we have foreshadowed, towards the end of their lives, Heller did finally move closer to Márkus. She later supported social democratic reformism in the light of resurgent rising contemporary authoritarianism. Márkus shared Arnason's scepticism regarding the project of European integration and his anxieties at its parochial counter tendencies. However, Márkus and Heller still felt that the project might be radically democratised and must be championed to regain its stature as a great opponent of current right-wing populism, the Brexit spirit and 20<sup>th</sup> century totalitarianism.

### 3. Maria Márkus's Version of "Radical Needs".<sup>35</sup>

Ever since *How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?* (1971-2) the topic of needs was a sort of signature concept for the Budapest "School", underscoring Heller's 1976 book and informing the critical relation to the politics of "really existing" socialism in the jointly authored *Dictatorship Over Needs* (1983). Agnes never explicitly repudiated her 1976 book, however, *How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?* was able to articulate another version of critical needs that uncoupled itself from philosophical faith in progress and was more in keeping with open-ended social democratic ambitions. In the mid 1990s Maria Márkus published 'Civil Society and the Politicisation of Needs', in my view, still the best and most enduring of the Budapest School's reflections upon critical needs (Márkus, M, 1995).

One of the most impressive aspects of Maria's contribution is the finesse with which she adapts the previous readings of the concept "radical needs" is to fit the social democratic political climate of her new home in Australia. In Heller's early reading "radical needs" were immanent to capitalism and their satisfaction would signify the transcendence of this society (Heller, 1976). For Heller, the real political potential of radical needs lay in the fact they put in jeopardy capitalism's essentially quantitative structure of needs. This quantitative structure tied to market and exchange values had



emancipated the bourgeois individual, leading to a proliferation of new needs for freedom, free time, artistic work and personal development that could not be satisfied within the existing quantitative structure and pointed beyond it to an entirely new structure of needs. By the mid 1990s, the enthusiasms and hopes of New Left politics had subsided and Maria turned her attention to the democratisation of social democratic institutions by processes she termed the “politicisation of needs”. This sober, domesticated version was more in keeping with the guarded investment in the critical potentials of working-class needs outlined in *How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible?*

While Maria does not dispute Heller’s distinction between quantitative wants and the need for qualitative autonomy, the focus of her own analysis was on the repudiation of all objectivist and paternalist efforts to manipulate and hijack what must ultimately always be a normatively conceived symbolic structure of democratic need interpretation. From the outset, Maria understands the critical potential of the concept of needs in respect not just to “really existing socialism” but also to the welfare states of Western liberal democracies<sup>36</sup>. However, to fully operationalise this potential in the new environment, the project of democratisation had to be reconfigured by linking the self-interpretation of needs, existing civil society, and the new social movements which, at that time, were being registered by Western sociologists. Maria believed that the crisis of the welfare state diagnosed by Habermas and others signalled the need for a paradigm change. The previously hegemonic framework of rights and obligations had to give way to a discourse on the interpretation and politicisation of needs.<sup>37</sup> To contest the monopoly of need interpretation exercised by market and welfare bureaucrats, a new structure of social self-organisation based in horizontal dialogue and new structures of solidarity was required. In this configuration, the theoretical emphasis drifts away from the question of the existence or otherwise of transcending radical needs to fall on the issue of politicising existing needs, of making them the subject of public discourse and contestation. The division between needs catered for privately and those under the provision of the state must be open to constant contestation and revision. This involves not just questioning which needs are to be allocated to each side of the division but the very mode of such a subdivision and hierarchisation of needs.<sup>38</sup> This can only be ensured when mechanisms are in place to allow need interpretation to become a continuous process of self-reflection in which the autonomy of both particular and collective subjects is expressed through their participation.

#### 4. The “Bird of Paradise” Heller and Márkus

Some final words now on the contrasting orientations and personalities of Heller and György Márkus in the period before their deaths. This will illuminate the various ways of thinking about our historical possibilities embraced by these two old friends. Even when the very idea of a “School” of thought had long collapsed, and they had been separated by distance and places, they kept in contact and continued to share their work. Heller’s final critique of George’s work is an interesting assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. The difference between Heller and Márkus underlines that philosophy is not the “Owl of Minerva” in a Hegelian sense but a “Bird of Paradise”: not just the cumulative wisdom of the wise old Owl, but permanently in movement and constantly producing novel options and new possibilities.

Like his older mentor Lukacs, Márkus followed Schleiermacher’s dictum that all significant thinkers have one simple driving idea or theme. Márkus’s own guiding idea was to be “culture”: it initially emerged in the early Budapest years through his studies on epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. Heller underlines that these early preoccupations and ideas were not lost but transformed in his later work in Sydney. This constancy of purpose is evident in the essays that were collected in his final major publication: *Culture, Science and Society*.<sup>39</sup>

Márkus’s late lectures and papers were always going to be much more than the work of a “musicologist”. His great learning, analytic rigor and attention to detail would be mobilised in pursuit of a single vision focused on the question: ‘what is culture?’ This modern notion of “high culture” is future orientated and continually produces the novel and the unexpected. These are narratives or stories written from the standpoint of the “end of history” or from the perspective of an ultimate wisdom that remains in a permanent flight: this is the “bird of paradise, this constantly moving and historical itinerant”. Márkus does not provide a single answer to the question but provides a historical story of the various social and historical forms of the understanding of the concept of culture. This methodological approach is also an interpretation, and theory, of modernity that rests upon an intricate genealogy. Márkus locates the first modern articulation of the notion of culture in its plural understanding as a dichotomy between a generalised “second nature”, that is found as a universal anthropological way of life, and a concept of “high culture” that is expressed in terms of a cultural pragmatics the triad of “author, work and reception” as the axis of a pragmatics of High Culture.

Heller believed that Márkus's richly genealogical narratives about the strained self-understandings of modern culture provides us with both great insights and pleasures. At the same time, her own theory of modernity allows us to appreciate the alleged inconsistencies in Márkus's account and to illustrate the philosophical differences between them. Heller suggests that Markus has an almost universally negative relation to his contemporaries and to modern art. Even though Markus's diagnosis of modernity is grounded in the opposition between the two great cultural movements of Enlightenment and Romanticism that continually inch modernity forward, his conception is missing a positive outcome for modernity. She is convinced that in Márkus's account the dichotomous engine room of modernity is about to finally peter out and disappear. Despite his acknowledgement that hermeneutics has complicated the polarity between the various spheres of science and philosophical speculation, Markus is reluctant to delve into the fundamental everyday questions of life and the good life.

Heller's constitutional optimism made her much more open to the "now", to modern cultural industries and consumer societies; despite claiming the critical theory tradition for the Enlightenment. Márkus has sympathies with Habermas, who he sees as an exception to the more radical romantic critics of modernity, he also shared Habermas's post-metaphysical thinking and his resistance to philosophical systems.

The contrast between Heller and Markus in the last stretch finally encompasses their distinctive views on the role of the hard sciences and philosophy in guiding our retrieval of present possibilities as the best chance for the future. Heller agrees with Márkus that the "hard sciences" cannot inform the general public about the question of "the good". However, she maintains that philosophy has a creative role to play in translating the "truths" and consequences circulated in the hard sciences into the "truths" of an everyday debate about what was "good" or "evil" and what was permitted or not. Against Markus's claim that the hard sciences are only really understood by experts with sufficient technical knowledge and capacity, Heller counters that in many areas of the hard sciences, like biology and climate change, there is now a spectrum of scientific journals with a wide readership and genuinely popular interest. Heller, the moral philosopher, is keen to preserve philosophy's role as the wise counsellor, guiding scientific knowledges to the terrain of public discussion about what we should do.

By contrast, Markus thinks that there are blockages and dangers if we try to overcome the tension between the various arms of high culture. Other objectifications of high culture like literature and art belong to high culture and still produce "new knowledge". In the hard sciences the new means of the

accumulation of knowledge, however, are not the same as in philosophy or art. Heller argues that if we take Markus's negative attitude towards contemporary philosophy, this signifies the end of metaphysics and philosophy no longer belongs to high culture. However, it is not clear to me that Markus wants to go as far as to eliminate philosophy from the domain of high culture. While there can be no doubt that Markus is concerned with the communicability of the contemporary hard sciences, he does not want to completely excise it from philosophical discussion at the point of its greatest vulnerability.

Towards the end of their lives, Heller did finally move closer to Márkus politically in support of social democratic reformism as she became more aware of rising contemporary authoritarianism. For his part, Márkus's late essays on mass culture and the cultural industries also revealed a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the tensions in the domain of mass culture, never unbending even as he confronted the blockages of his own cultural tastes. In the end, Markus was finally not as generally negative about the future as supposed by Heller and insisted that the rational wager had not been entirely sunk.<sup>40</sup> However, by temperament Márkus remained more cautious and sceptical and this remained the key difference between the two old friends. These final differences reveal both the different personalities and their remaining intellectual virtues and prejudices. Márkus is the great historicist who also learnt real rigor from his interest in analytical philosophy. This combination gave his works an almost incomparable richness of philosophical vision. After he died Maria Márkus said to me that George will never be forgotten. The great historicist could not have agreed to this opinion. However, it remains remarkable that his philosophical works still remain vitally contemporary after almost a decade after his death.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>. György, Márkus., Janos, Kis., György, Bence *How is Critical Economic Theory Possible?* (Ed by John Grumley and Janos Kis) Brill, Leiden, Boston, Netherland, 2022, My final pre publication reader is always Pauline Johnson and she has suggested my useful changes, most which I finally agree with.

<sup>2</sup>. Márkus. G., Kis, J& Bence, G. 'How is a Critical Economic Theory Possible? Brill, Netherlands, August,2022.

<sup>3</sup>. Op cit, Px11

<sup>4</sup>. Op cit, Px111

- <sup>5</sup>. Lukács, G. *History and Class Consciousness*, Merlin, London, 1967
- <sup>6</sup>. Marx, K. *Marx Early Writings* Penguin Books, London, 1975, P279-400
- <sup>7</sup>. *ibid*, Pix.
- <sup>8</sup>. *ibid*, PXX
- <sup>9</sup>. *ibid*, Pxx
- <sup>10</sup>. *ibid*, Pxvi
- <sup>11</sup>. *ibid*, Pxxvi
- <sup>12</sup>. P189
- <sup>13</sup>. *ibid*, 190
- <sup>14</sup>. *ibid*, 190
- <sup>15</sup>. *ibid*, 217
- <sup>16</sup>. *ibid*, P200
- <sup>17</sup>. *ibid*, P334
- <sup>18</sup>. Ed Johann, P, Arnason European Integration Historical Trajectories, Geopolitical Contexts  
Edinburgh University Press, 2019
- <sup>19</sup>. *ibid*, P2
- <sup>20</sup>. *ibid*
- <sup>21</sup>. *ibid*, P40
- <sup>22</sup>. *ibid*, P43
- <sup>23</sup>. *ibid*, P47
- <sup>24</sup>. *ibid*, P57
- <sup>25</sup>. *ibid*, P53
- <sup>26</sup>. Heller, A. *The Theory of Need in Marx* (1976)
- <sup>27</sup>. *op cit*, P120.
- <sup>28</sup>. *op cit*, P110

- <sup>29</sup>. op cit, p112
- <sup>30</sup>. ibid
- <sup>31</sup>. Arnason JP (2005b) Varieties of accumulation: Civilizational perspectives on capitalism. In: Joerges C, Straoth B and Wagner P (eds) *The Economy as a Polity*. London: UCL Press.
- <sup>32</sup>. ibid, P 186
- <sup>33</sup>. Arnason, J.P. (2018a) Selbstaufhebungen der kritischen Theorie: Aufkla"rungsbilanzen, Fortschrittskonstruktionen, Relativierungen. Unpublished paper
- <sup>34</sup>. Adams & Arnason, J.P. op cit
- <sup>35</sup>. Márkus. M. *Thesis Eleven* 1995: 162
- <sup>36</sup>. ibid
- <sup>37</sup>. ibid: 161
- <sup>38</sup>. Márkus, M. 1995: 162
- <sup>39</sup>. Márkus, G. *Culture, Science and Society* Brill, Netherlands and Boston, 2013
- <sup>40</sup>. See Markus, Gyorgy. 'The Path of Culture: From the Refined to the High, From Popular to Mass Culture' *Critical Horizon*, (2013) (14 (2): 127-185) Here again, Markus disclaims any substantive competence in respect to the content of mass culture or the culture industries but only to provide a "topographic" conceptual model of this terrain.

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