

Review of: "A Philosophical Analysis of Sartre's Critique of Freud's Depth-psychological Account of Self-Deception"

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The article discusses a very pertinent issue that lies at the intersection of philosophy and psychology. It presents two influential accounts of self-deception, arguably one of the most interesting psychological phenomena. However, there are some areas in which the essay can be improved.

Firstly, the abstract of the paper is neutral while the body of the paper argues in favor of Freud. I think the abstract should include the author's conclusion.

Secondly, the structure of the paper can be improved. The delineation between abstract and introduction is not clear.

Sartre's bad faith concept is introduced but not defined in the introduction and hence there is a lack of clarity in the naive reader mind. The author assumes a certain degree of expertise from reader's side.

Thirdly, Freud's and Sartre's theories on self-deception flow from their theories of mind. Hence, structurally, their theories of the mind should be put first followed by their theories of self-deception. This would help the readers in better understanding the author's arguments.

Fourthly, there is a lack of clarity about what is conscious and what is unconscious in the overall psychological literature..

Modern psychology has focused on static unconscious processes arising from evolution while Freud focused on dynamic unconscious processes rising from one's life history. Hence, is it accurate to use the views of modern psychologists to substantiate Freud's thesis of self-deception?

Fifthly, the author suggests that Sartre's notion of self-deception undercuts his notion of radical freedom. This is problematic as, in my opinion, Sartre does not intend to negate intentionality but only negate the supposed transcendence behind an act of intentionality. Self-negation arises when one believes that our intention is aligned to a transcendental moral framework and this belief negates the ontic independence of our intention.

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