

Review of: "[Research Note] A note on Hempel's paradox"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

First comment

The author writes: 'An assumption of the previous argument is that the observation of an individual a , that is a black raven, allows us to say " a is not white and a is not a swan". In the case in hypothesis, this description is certainly correct, but it is not a correct description of the whole set of what we know if we see a black raven.'

Question/Comment: What is the whole set of what we know when we see a black raven? What is missing from this whole set if I were to report the observation by the sentence "that non-white thing is not a swan"? Why is the first observation report ("that is a black raven") to be preferred over the second?

Second comment

The author writes: 'It is to be considered that in whatever inductive inference, it is an obvious requirement that the set of premises must remain the same.'

Question/Comment: What does this mean? Clarification is needed.

Third comment

The author writes: 'A fortiori, if a previous inductive inference brings some outcome, if afterwards we cut the set of the premises and we use only a part of the precedent set (namely we do not add new premises, but we give away some of the old ones), we cannot be granted that the previous conclusion will still be admissible. For this reason we should say that the inductive inference taking as its premise " $\text{black}(a) \wedge \text{raven}(a)$ " is exactly a different inference from the one taking as its premise " $\text{non-white}(a) \wedge \text{non-swan}(a)$ " [...]. In other terms, we are dealing with two different inferences, and it is not required that both of them lead to the same outcomes.'

Question/Comment: I don't see how the proposed explanation applies to the example. In the example, there is a single observation reported in two non-equivalent ways, "this is a black raven" and "this is a non-white non-swan". How does the notion of "cutting the set of premises" apply here? What's the role of non-monotonicity in the solution of Hempel's paradox? This appears to be the key to the present author's dissolution of the paradox, but a rather more detailed explanation should, I think, be given, to make the solution intelligible, even if the author wishes to provide an outline of his solution.

