

Review of: "Neuropsychanalysis and Dual-Aspect Monism"

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This article attempted to apply a clear definition of Dual-Aspect Monism to Neuropsychanalysis, concluding that this metaphysical model can't be applied on various usual claims as they always provide physicalist reductionnist views, incompatible with DAM.

The article is somewhat convincing with its tautological loop: a strict interpretation of DAM and examples that don't apply it strictly. It evens conclude that DAM is not providing the good framework for Neuropsychanalysis. (Ignoring that some recognized neuropsychanalysts, like Ariane Bazan, are overtly dualist.)

What is questioning in this article is three folds:

- Do we really have a clear and operative definition of DAM using only some selective quotes by Solms?
- Why not discussing other sophisticated versions of DAM, like Atmanspacher & Rickles (2022), where notions such as "complementarity" and "entanglement correlations", are clearly defined? This may provide genuine ways of analyzing neuropsychanalytic claims.
- Why using such "logical levels mistakes" as evidence against DAM? Several researchers, in many fields, made reductionnistic interpretations of the mind-body problem, taking correlations (analogies) as causal determinisms (explanations). But even with these local mistakes (well illustrated in the article), the whole model can be valid and fecund.