

## Review of: "A Priori Arguments for Determinism/Universal Necessity – and the Leibnizian Theodicy"

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Uwe Meixner"s (UM) discussion of Leibniz idea's on moral necessity are very interesting and he demonstrates how important discussions within modal logic are relevant for the discussion he opens up for concerning determinism. I think it is very interesting that he develops a reason, based on Leibniz, for accepting □(@ = w0). It is however such a flat out acceptance of determinism that it works as a moduls tollens on the Leibneizean argument. And this is where UM article is really interesting as an investigation into the various ways out of this problem. My perspective on the matter would be to reject the whole notion of "a best possible world" and also Lewis perspective on actualism, for Plantinga's (See Plantiga, A: 'Actualism and possible worlds', *Theoria* 42 (1-3):139-160 (1976)). UM has indeed given us a reason for accepting that we must distinguish between truth-simpliciter and truth-at-a-world. Putting these fundamental notions aside however, what is interesting is the fact that moral necessity was a notion that has had quite an influence on the history of ideas and here i find UM a good contribution. A few suggestions to improve the article:

- 1. Watch out for long convoluted sentences that makes for a difficult read, such as:
  - "And these premises are, indeed, attackable in a high degree –*not*, however, all of them; *not* those which do not speak of God at all: the premises of the World-Argument (*minus* the now necessitated and deduced "premise" (2)) and premises (III) and (V) (and also *not* the manifestly true auxiliary premise that *this world*, w<sub>0</sub>, is an actual possible world)."
  - Why the double negation in "not those, which do not speak of God"? and why one long sentence of this kind. The strenght in the first part is the tight logical format which the article should stick more to.
- 2. Why have the first arguments at all? They seem to serve no function to the overall argument structure.
- 3. Finally, I think the discussion in the end of Leibniz would be strengthened by some references to places where he says the claimed things.

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