Peer Review

Review of: "Pareto-Nash Allocations Under Incomplete Information: A Model of Stable Optima"

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While the author raises an important and original question, the current version of the manuscript lacks the formal structure typically expected in theoretical economic modeling. Specifically, the absence of a clearly defined game—stating the players, strategy sets, information structure, and payoff functions—makes it difficult to assess the internal consistency of the model or interpret the results in a game-theoretic framework.

There are numerous issues to be addressed, including the missing derivation of equilibrium conditions, inconsistent notation, and the unclear relationship between control and state variables, which are not merely matters of exposition. They are structural problems that should ideally be addressed at the supervision stage, prior to submission.

To support further development, I would strongly recommend that the author consult established references on how to structure and write theoretical papers. In particular:

William Thomson's *A Guide for the Young Economist* (MIT Press)

Simon Board's "*Advice for Graduate Students*"

John Cochrane's "Writing Tips for Ph.D. Students"

These resources emphasize the importance of fully specifying models, including equilibrium concepts, and writing for the reader rather than the author. They may also help the author better align theory and empirical analysis in future revisions.

At its core, the idea is promising; however, the submission requires substantial structural revision to meet the standards expected for publication in this field.

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Declarations

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.