Review of: "Crossing between Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Text World Theory"

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The paper solves the problem of how metaphors gain meaning through two cognitive processes, viz., text worlds and discourse worlds. I would argue that metaphors operate as mathematical functions possessing a domain (source domain) and a range (target domain) with one (or more elements) in the domain is mapped into a value in the range. For example, consider the function \( y = f(x) \), for each value of \( x \) in the domain there is a value of \( f(x) \) in the range. The separation of one cognitive process from the other implies that there is the function \( f \) corresponding to the text world mapping and another function \( g \) corresponding to the discourse world so that for each \( x \) value (or multiple values) there exists a range value of \( g(x) \).

The problem is the set of infinitely many meanings like text and discourse worlds depending on who is the recipient of the metaphor. In political terms metaphors possess infinitely different meanings depending on the receiver, the recipient of the message. Thus, regardless the type of political goals when a sender uses a metaphor like “life is a journey” in her speech the meaning will vary depending on the cognitive traits of the receiver. However, if this is the case, then the metaphor loses its function quality and turns into a correspondence taking more than one value.

Therefore, the complexity of the problem requires a game-like view displaying whose world is pronounced by a metaphor and who receives the metaphor and constructs her own text world based on the type of the discourse. A metaphor used by a politician addressing to an assembly of voters generates infinitely many meanings in voters’ minds. To illustrate, suppose that the speaker utters the metaphor of “argument is war.” Voters would constitute different meanings and implications of the metaphor in mental terms. The politician should ponder whether a metaphor is conducive to her objective depending on the audience.

Any separation between the two cognitive processes in the context of sender-receiver relations would clarify this complexity. If more complexity is the target, then the author should explore implications of dualism instead of monism (as assumed in the text; mind = brain) in philosophy of mind terms. What are transformations of cognitive processes of text and discourse worlds under, say, functionalism?