

Review of: "A Philosophical Analysis of Sartre's Critique of Freud's Depth-psychological Account of Self-Deception"

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This dense article resumes the philosophical debate between rationalism and irrationalism using insights from contemporary science. I would have emphasised more Nietzsche's influence on Freud as a potential criticism of Sartre's naive (and consequently deceptive) rationalism. For instance, see *Gay Science* (#333): "For the longest time, conscious thought was considered thought itself; only now does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our mind's activity proceeds unconscious and unfelt ... Conscious thought, especially that of the philosopher, is the least vigorous and therefore also the relatively mildest and calmest type of thought; and thus precisely philosophers are most easily led astray about the nature of knowledge." Sartre may have been himself in bad faith about Freud's theory of the unconscious which remains a valid classical explanation of the fact why "Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point" (Pascal). As the author argues, according to Damasio, we can no longer separate reason and feeling in Klages's fashion, for instance ("Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele"). Sartre's critique of psychoanalysis ("Thus psychoanalysis substitutes for the notion of bad faith, the idea of a lie without a liar; it allows me to understand how *it* is possible for me to be lied to without lying to myself since it places me in the same relation to myself that the Other is in respect to me; it replaces the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, the essential condition of the lie, by that of the "id" and the "ego." It introduces into my subjectivity the deepest intersubjective structure of the *Mit-sein*." –BN, p. 51) is simply wrong, because it seeks in a rationalistic fashion to preserve the hegemony of a Ego, modelled on the "ego sum qui sum" of the divine subject, which was shattered and split in the 19th century Romantic and Postromantic destruction of subjectivity (for instance Rimbaud, Nietzsche, Stevenson, Ernst Mach and so on). This phenomenological attempt to resuscitate the Ego and the contempt of "dirty" psychoanalysis is, in my opinion, only a symptom of one's inability to accept his or her dark side or inferiority and may lead to dissociation. If "radical freedom" really exists, it may only be in the realm of psychosis – but unfortunately this is the same thing as "radical imprisonment": as the Ego inflates, the id grows accordingly.