

Research Article

Resentment and Multiculturalism: Kymlicka's Canada, Bonilla Maldonado's Colombia and Modood's UK

Patrick Imbert¹

1. University of Ottawa, Canada

Multiculturalism is linked to theoretical approaches and social policies, which aims to encourage active interaction between groups and individuals in a given society. Multiculturalism has been theorized by the Canadian thinker Will Kymlicka who fosters a liberal democratic approach linked to Human Rights. In this article, Kymlicka's approach is compared with Daniel Bonilla Maldono and Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra, two Colombian researchers who were influenced by Kymlicka and who are analysing the Colombian multicultural Constitution. Kymlicka is also compared with Tariq Modood who contextualizes multiculturalism within Islamic minorities in the UK and considers the impact of resentment in the dynamic of migration. Last but not least, the Canadian Doug Saunders presents the situation of migrants in slums and suburbs and emphasizes the relationship between economic well-being and multiculturalism. This leads us to contextualize these diverging perspectives on multiculturalism within the framework of a Girardian conception of human relations based on conflict and scapegoating. While comparing these different perspectives, the article underscores the fact that, until now, most thinkers did not sufficiently consider the impact of economic integration and the difference in educational credentials on the dynamics of recognition within the contemporary globalized knowledge-based society.

The concept [of culture] is characterized by three elements: by social homogeneization, ethnic consolidation and intercultural delimitation. All three elements of this traditional concept have become untenable today
(Wolfgang Welsch: 1999).

1. Kymlicka's definition of culture

Theories of multiculturalism usually depend on how culture is defined in a particular context. Here is how Will Kymlicka defines this notion in 1995 in *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*: "I am using 'a culture' as synonymous with 'a nation' or 'a people' – that is as an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history." (18). This definition is static and oriented towards the past (complete, homeland, language, history). It presents groups as a homogeneous entity with a distinct origin. It is not based on relationships pertaining to encounters and hybridity. Moreover, this definition does not take into account the possibility of culture as a shared vision of a future.

This example demonstrates how a definition could have a very negative impact on research and theorisation because it tends to restrain innovative thinking. Kymlicka's definition could lead people to produce a dualistic reading of cultural relationships. But it does not. His theory is not dualist. It is the opposite. In his excellent and fluid research, Kymlicka is able to innovate and escape from dualistic perspectives. He is oriented towards the present and the future because he is able to go well beyond established definitions. In effect, Kymlicka constantly insists upon triangulation, for instance on the protection of the minority group from the majority group **and** the protection of the individual from the minority group. He also underscores that cultural relationships do not reside in the belief that life is a zero-sum game (Imbert: 2013), but in the fact that one can live in a context of zero-sum game as well as in one that is open to win-win relationships such as is the case for Canadian multiculturalism. Already in 1995, Will Kymlicka goes beyond traditional knowledge and established definitions. He moves towards redefining a whole field of studies.

2. External protection and internal dissidence

Kymlicka's approach to cultural relationships leads us to consider collective rights and individual rights. In the tradition of post-romantic thought, collective rights would reduce individual rights while individual rights would threaten the group: "It is natural to assume that collective rights are rights exercised by collectives, as opposed to rights exercised by individuals, and that the former conflict with the latter. As we will see, these assumptions do not apply to many forms of group-differentiated citizenships and individual rights are in fact quite complicated, and we need to find a vocabulary that can capture all its nuances" (1995: 35). Kymlicka controls the possible shift towards

the belief in life as a zero-sum game as well as that towards dualism by affirming that we must define the group's actions based on whether the group wants to control *internal dissidence* or to protect himself from *external decisions*¹. "In short, a liberal view requires *freedom within* the minority group, and *equality between* the minority and the majority groups" (1995:152). According to Kymlicka, in the context of contemporary liberalism, individuals can leave the minority group without penalty in order to live in a way that better corresponds to their needs. In this case, certain problems may arise. Let's consider the fact that, among many Aboriginal groups, the ownership of land is collective, limiting the ability of those who live on a reserve to borrow money. This results in economic consequences when they do leave the reserve because they don't have any capital² and cannot become property owners. Those who leave the collective territory almost have to start from square one. Kymlicka suggests that they should be compensated by the community for the work accomplished during the years spent on the collective property. Thus, the right to move around and to choose a place -that is to "vote with one's feet" like many immigrants do- sometimes implies the imposition of values that are preferable for individuals, but unpleasant or worse for the group, especially if it is very small.

As we can see, Kymlicka does not start with dual oppositions. He articulates differing concepts in a sequence of complementarities aiming to clarify the complexity (Finkenthal: 2008) of specificities linked to diverse economic and cultural belongings. In this context, the recognition of otherness can be experienced daily in an experiential democratic pragmatism. Kymlicka explores the complexities of connections. He puts three entities together: the decisions made by majority groups, the position of minority groups, and the situation of dissident individuals in the minority groups. Kymlicka is a liberal thinker who is against the idea that the group can control internal dissidence. He also analyses the legitimacy of protection in view of external decisions threatening minority groups for an individual's assertion happens, in part, through the sharing of inherited collective goods, notably historic and linguistic inheritances: "Granting special representation rights, land claims, or language rights to a minority need not, and often does not, put it in a position to dominate other groups" (1995:36). It only reduces the vulnerability of certain groups in view of decisions made by a majority governing in the name of a democracy founded on the power of the majority, a situation that Alexis de Tocqueville found problematic in *Democracy in America*.

2.1. Specific rights

Will Kymlicka adds another essential element to the discussion on multiculturalism. He affirms that in order to address questions surrounding the relations between equality and difference, we must think in terms of the specific rights of a group. Indeed, for certain groups, it is the linguistic rights that matter the most. For others, it is hunting rights or rights of political representation. And yet, the majority of these rights have nothing to do with the supremacy of the group over the individual or vice versa. They affect the individual with regards to its active participation in the group.

2.2. Kymlicka's perspective is grounded in the belief that life is not a zero-sum game

Today, in order to avoid the conflicts and genocides that marked the 20th century and that persist in the 21st century, it is necessary to disseminate a vision of justice between groups linked to the fact “that group-specific rights can promote equality between the minority and majority” (1995:37). Thanks to Kymlicka, Canada proposes a new discourse that, in avoiding the belief that life is a zero-sum game, offers rational and effective ways to achieve change. Thus, Kymlicka can immediately declare: “We need to supplement traditional human rights principles with a theory of minority rights” (1995: 5). This important sentence emphasizes the fact that multiculturalism is grounded in Human Rights which means that not everything in a cultural tradition can be accepted in a democratic society.

Kymlicka's reasoning makes it possible to control the stereotypical decoding of minority rights by readers who hold the general idea that life is a zero-sum game and to see social relations in a dualistic way: “And when contemporary liberals addressed these problems – often pithily or simply in brackets – they are most often content to recite simplistic expressions about ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘benevolent neutrality,’ so many expressions that do not take into account the complexity of things” (1995: 55). Kymlicka's argument brings something new to the discussion and allows us to criticize the opponents of multiculturalism by demonstrating that they are reading multiculturalism in a way that is dualistic. They claim that multiculturalism leads to segregation and prevents the integration of minorities into the dominant society while those in favour of multiculturalism claim that the preoccupation with integration leads to cultural imperialism (1995: 5-6). The opponents that fear ghettos, like the partisans that are afraid of integration because it would mean the loss of a certain authenticity, all argue according to an a priori based on dualism as they are often portrayed in the media. These two groups believe that both segregation and integration cause a loss for minorities. They value a monological world and reject change: as if being in contact with two (or more) cultures

was impossible, as if capitalizing on knowledge was harmful, as if living in society was about dual spaces and not multiple networks, as if it were about defending a unique identity turned toward the past, pure, and static, and not about developing oneself through exchanges with others and networking in a knowledge-based society (Imbert: 2007).

2.3. Problem

We must note, however, that Will Kymlicka does not always emphasize this shared future sufficiently: “National membership should be open in principle to anyone, regardless of race or colour, who is willing to learn the language and history of the society and participate in its social and political institutions” (1995: 23). We should add: and share the economic present and future! There is no simple assimilation or integration, only active interactions or incorporations and thus modifications to the established culture through the contributions of others and vice versa. This is particularly well demonstrated by Doug Saunders in his world-disseminated book entitled *Arrival City* as we will see later.

3. Illiberal Societies: Daniel Bonilla Maldonado and Colombia’s multicultural Constitution

In Latin America – Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Argentina, etc. – we are witnessing a serious reflection on the topic of multiculturalism. Numerous texts are being published and almost all of them mention, sometimes at length, the Canadian theorists Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. Some authors are being critical of liberalism because they are often influenced by European thinkers who have a different view of multiculturalism (Imbert: 2020). This is partly the case for Pablo Lazo’s *Crítica del multiculturalismo, resemantización de la multiculturalidad* (2010). But in many cases, notably in Colombia, Canadian thinkers are cited abundantly in order to highlight either their contribution, like in Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra, Alejandra Machado Maturana and Adolfo León Rodríguez Sánchez’s *El multiculturalismo en la Constitución de 1991: en el marco del bicentenario* (2010), or their limits, especially with regards to liberalism, as we see in Colombia in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado’s *La Constitución multicultural* (2006). In this country, which changed its Constitution in 1991 for a new one inspired by the perspectives of Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, it is a matter of envisioning how to acknowledge diverse groups. But for Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, the question arises on whether or not Kymlicka’s theories and the new Constitution allow for the recognition of those living in non-liberal

cultures³. This perspective is very different from the works of Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra, which are founded on juridical anthropology and tied in with both a theoretical and practical analysis of multiculturalism, applied to Aboriginal and Afro-Colombian communities and founded on a liberalism that avoids dualism: “*El reconocimiento de la diversidad étnica y cultural busca fortalecer la identidad cultural y la autonomía de los pueblos indígenas, sin embargo la autonomía no significa ni ‘independencia’, ni ‘soberanía’*” (2010: 78). (The recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity aims at strengthening the cultural identity and autonomy of indigenous peoples, but autonomy neither means independence nor sovereignty).

3.1. Multiculturalism cannot recognize illiberal societies

But let's go back to Daniel Bonilla Maldonado. In his critical reading of Kymlicka and Taylor, he highlights, like Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra, several important criteria: 1/ the State must be impartial toward different cultures; 2/ the minorities' right to self-govern must be maximized; 3/ the State's intervention is legitimate when cultural minorities violate moral standards or standards that are culturally accepted, that is, when there is murder, genocide or torture and, 4/ the rules that guide relations between minorities and the majority must be created and transformed by intercultural dialogues. Despite all that, Daniel Bonilla Maldonado's thesis is that Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and James Tully, in their liberal approach to multiculturalism, cannot integrate illiberal societies. For that matter, this is what Kymlicka recognizes in *Multicultural Odysseys* (2007) when he emphasizes that all policies founded on multiculturalism “go beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal-democratic state, to also extend some level of public recognition and support for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices” (2007: 16). Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra agrees with this statement when he emphasizes that the State must simultaneously guarantee the rights of all people as citizens and to recognize the differences of specific groups. In practice, this means that “3/ *las normas legales imperativas de orden público de la república priman sobre los usos y costumbres de las comunidades indígenas, siempre y cuando proyectan directamente un valor superior al principio de diversidad étnica y cultural; y 4/ los usos y costumbres de una comunidad indígena priman sobre las normas legales dispositivas*” (2010: 102) (the normal and imperative legal norms dealing with the public order of the Republic have precedence over the uses and customs of an indigenous community when they are directly linked to a value which is superior to the principle of ethnic and cultural diversity and, 4/ the

uses and customs of an indigenous community have precedence over dispositive legal norms). In other words, special indigenous jurisdiction applies to indigenous territories, allowing for the possession of common land, for example but not for murder, torture, or mutilations. This complies with *The 1993 UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, which specifies in article 33 that: “Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive juridical customs, traditions, procedures and practices, in accordance with internationally recognized human rights standards⁴”. But in the context of liberalism, what concerns Bonilla Maldonado is the potential loss of cultural and economic elements for certain minority groups. In this case, to refer to Kymlicka or Taylor doesn’t seem like a good idea to him for there is, despite everything, a loss for minority Aboriginal groups.

3.2. Multiculturalism applies to Aborigines and Afro-descendants in Colombia and not to immigrants

Bonilla Maldonado hardly ever questions whether or not there are more gains than losses when applying multiculturalism to Colombia. Moreover, he doesn’t give any comparisons from Canadian examples, for it is the practical protection and the addition of national, local, and municipal programs that play a significant role in the functioning of multiculturalism and its effectiveness in Canada. He does not underscore that multiculturalism applies to immigrant communities in Canada and to Aborigines in Colombia and in Latin America. Rather than distinguishing various parameters defining multicultural theory and practice, Daniel Bonilla Maldonado aims to show how impossible it is to accommodate minorities. To prove his point, he concentrates on long established indigenous communities with illiberal customs (a fraction of all the indigenous communities of Colombia which make up 1.75% of the population). He does not devote himself to the strongly marginalized black culture in Colombia (12%)⁵ which is also long established (for as long as French-Canadians in Canada compared to Aborigines) but (like the French-Canadians), share liberal a prioris⁶, as Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra points out in his work. But why this deliberate choice by Daniel Bonilla Maldonado? Maybe because he hopes that the multicultural constitution’s recognition of diversity won’t risk the division of the country’s unity, especially when thinking about the black population concentrated in certain coastal provinces, and risk potentially dangerous regional autonomies in a context where drug cartels and the FARC collaborate and control a part of the country.

3.3. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado and his conception of the State

If Pablo Lazo Briones' work is set within the framework of philosophy and sociology, Daniel Bonilla Maldonado's work involves the study of juridical-sociological applications of multiculturalism to a particular space. However, he doesn't manage to escape a vision of the State that is somewhat centralizing. In fact, if it is legitimate to ask oneself, as Daniel Bonilla Maldonado does, how to protect an illiberal culture in a liberal State and with which form of government and rules, it seems strange to read the following question: "*Qué sucede cuando la cultura hegemonica de un Estado multicultural no es liberal y desea proteger y promover su cultura a través del Estado?*" (2006: 64) (What happens when a hegemonic culture in a multicultural State is not liberal and wishes to protect its culture with the help of the State?). We will respond to that that the culture of a multicultural State is liberal; if not, there is no effective multiculturalism. Indeed, as many Eastern European countries have demonstrated before the fall of the Berlin wall, awareness of diversity was practiced under police or military repression which led a few years later, like in former Yugoslavia for example, to a non-integration of values and practices, as well as exclusion and genocides. Or it may also end up with profound contradictions such as was the case in Egypt where ideas about democracy are very different from North America's. When 1,000 people in Egypt were asked if democracy is preferred to other forms of government, 59% of people answered yes. But simultaneously, among the 1,000, 82% believed that adulterous women should be stoned to death and 84% thought that people who reject Islam deserve the death penalty (*The Globe and Mail*, Thursday, February 3, 2011, p. A13).

Anyway, Daniel Bonilla Maldonado responds to his own idea that substantive liberalism, like procedural liberalism, cannot accommodate illiberal minority cultures unless they accept liberal values and somewhat change their perspectives and way of life. He continues, and wonders why a State wouldn't promote the values of the minorities as they do the majority. We can respond to that with an example like Canada where the Federal State, through the transfer of money to programs in schools, to community centres, to the Canadian Council of the Arts, does in fact promote minority cultures, but that cultural expression is prohibited from promoting the hatred of other groups and must respect Human Rights, as specified in the Canadian Constitution.

3.4. Problem

Daniel Bonilla Maldonado's criticism is interesting because it allows us to explore the possible limits of the application of multicultural theories in a context other than Canada, the United States, and

possibly Europe⁷. It must be noted however, that Kymlicka also recognizes, in *Multicultural Odysseys*, that multiculturalism cannot accommodate illiberal values because multiculturalism is linked to the recognition of Human Rights. But he is talking about immigrants who need to actively participate in a new society. As for Aboriginals, they are no longer nomads in Canada and no longer confronted, for example, with the following choice: to remain nomadic and abandon the sick, or settle down and have access to clinics, as is the case for certain Amazonian groups in Colombia. Moreover, in Canada, Aboriginal groups are not covered by multiculturalist regulations and laws. Their status as the most ancient members of Canada is covered by other laws and regulations.

4. Tariq Modood's multicultural perspective

Tariq Modood's book, *Multiculturalism* (2007) deals with the recognition of alterity in the UK. Modood, himself a Muslim, defines multiculturalism very differently from Will Kymlicka (1995; 2007). For Modood, multiculturalism is "the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration to western countries from outside the prosperous West" (p. 5). Modood examples deal with multicultural citizenship in the context of post-integration and poly-ethnicity in the UK.

4.1. States should go beyond exemptions

Apart from agreeing on the pseudo neutrality of the state, the paths of Kymlicka and Modood widely diverge. Modood emphasizes the fact that the state cannot be neutral towards religion and that state support should go beyond exemptions such as those granted to Sikhs about not wearing motorcycle helmets (replaced by a turban) as underscored by Kymlicka in *Multicultural Citizenship* (p. 26). Modood wants to go beyond exemptions and fosters the idea that the state should be linked (it is not clear what this linkage would entail or how this linkage would work practically) to religion, -Islam in particular-, because certain cultures are centered on religion. He goes as far as to criticize the "secularist bias" (p. 27) inherent in Kymlicka's liberal approach to multiculturalism. The example of State cooperation with religion that Modood mentions is taken from Germany where different religions are recognized through fiscal strategies (it is not specified what these strategies are but it could be linked to a tax that every declared Catholic or Lutheran pays on top of their state tax for helping churches to thrive).

4.2. Modood and the rejection of the right of the individual to disagree with the minority group

Modood does not agree with Kymlicka who highlights the intolerance of Islam to apostasy or atheism (1995:156). Such intolerance, notes Kymlicka, does not comply with liberalism based not only on freedom of religion, but also on freedom of conscience and the right to disagree. Hence, Modood displaces the basis of Kymlicka's multiculturalism which aims to recognize specific rights, linguistic ones for instance, or the right to manifest religious symbols qualified by Modood as exemptions. The recognition of specific rights in Kymlicka's multiculturalism is transformed into a parallel system of rights, laws, and institutions in Modood perspective.

4.3. Modood's dualistic perspective

Modood agrees with Kymlicka's emphasis on the duty to protect minority groups from the majority. However, he criticizes Kymlicka when he says that internal dissent is a right, and that the individual has the right to disagree and to be protected from the minority group and its perspective and traditions. Modood's argument and the rhetoric he uses when commenting Kymlicka's approach are worth quoting: "This means that the state must guarantee the rights of not just those who dissent from the dominant religion⁸ but also those who dissent from their own religion, or from a particular, institutionalized interpretation of it. Maybe so...but it is not an argument for treating groups formed by religion (*millats*) differently from ethno-national groups" (p. 29). His rhetorical dismissal of the protection of the individual from the minority groups through the use of the expression "maybe" demonstrates a refusal to further discuss the matter, and shows that his conception of multiculturalism is intended to reinforce the coherence of minority groups and of the power of its leaders at the expense of individual rights. Modood goes further in criticizing Kymlicka. He states that, "[h]e (Kymlicka) argues that giving the group (or some of its members) the right to restrict the behaviour of its own members can be potentially unjust and so multicultural citizenship should be primarily about giving groups the right to protect themselves from persons or forces external to the group (Kymlicka 1995: 35-8)" (p. 29). His choice of the words "can be potentially unjust" as opposed to Kymlicka's "this raises the danger of individual oppression" (*Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 36) is symptomatic of Modood's rhetoric who is trying to reduce the importance of the individual and his potential as a subject constituted by and for himself. However, the most important bias Modood demonstrates is in the way he completely distorts Kymlicka's clear argument about collective rights

and his distinguishing of internal dissent and external protection. Modood “forgets” individual protection (the idea expressed in the first part of the sentence), and emphasizes the group’s right only. In fact, he links the idea of restricting individual rights criticized by Kymlicka, to the idea that “multicultural citizenship should be primarily about giving groups the right to protect themselves from persons or forces external to the group”. This argument is based on the elimination of one option: internal protection, and on the fact that Modood reduces a triangular perspective into a perspective where one dominates the other; a classical dualistic situation. As is the case with any dualistic opposition, the argument is reduced to the domination of one over the other, similar to how the male/female duality results in the domination of the male, as demonstrated by feminists through deconstruction of traditional male discourse. Moreover, Modood’s argument is flawed when he says, “groups have the right to protect themselves from persons or forces external to the group (Kymlicka 1995: 35-8)” (p.29). Here, his objective is to present persons, a person, the individual in fact, as a threat to the group, which is the exact opposite of Kymlicka’s position that underscores the threat of individual oppression by the group. But who would be these persons, what are these forces? Modood does not give any details. He distorts Kymlicka’s well balanced argument that insists that the goal is not to give all the power to a minority group and nothing to the individual.

4.4. The denial of cores values in the new society: Modood’s UK

Modood recognizes that certain values like “equality between the sexes” embedded in the law as well as in social norms pose certain limits to the kind of recognition that he is hoping to achieve. “Norms and laws and constitutional principles concerning the appropriate place of religion in public life generally and in specific policy areas (such as schools or rehabilitation of criminals) consist of such public values and are reasoned about, justified or criticized by reference to specific values about religion or politics...” (p.80). He suggests then, that these social values and norms (including equality between the sexes) are negotiable (that they can be justified or criticized) and that “they are constantly being reinterpreted, realigned, extended and reformed” (p. 80).

This call for the negotiation of values and norms tries to prepare the reader for the rejection of the claim that in the new society, which is the UK, certain core values are of great importance. This perspective is that national identity is weak in contemporary Britain. He emphasizes that in Canada, in Australia, and Malaysia, multiculturalism has been coincidental with “a nation building project” (p. 147). In the UK, it is the opposite: “But is the goal of wanting to become British, to be accepted as

British and to belong to Britain is not a worthwhile goal for Commonwealth migrants and their progeny, what then are they supposed to integrate into? And if there is nothing strong, purposive and inspiring to integrate into, why bother with integration?" (p. 151). Hence, for him, what is the goal of immigration? Creating a society that is very similar to the one that immigrants left. This is not the goal that Kymlicka wants to achieve through his complex theorization of multiculturalism.

In Modood's book, claiming that British identity is weak helps him argue that there are no core values worthy of attention in the UK and that they cannot be connected to meaningful definitions: "Brown wants to derive a set of core values (liberty, fairness, enterprise and so on)⁹ from a historical narrative yet such values, even if they could singly or in combination be given a distinctive British take, are too complex and their interpretation and priority too contested to be amenable to be set into a series of meaningful definitions". (p. 152)¹⁰. However, managing cultural encounters efficiently is always complex as emphasized by Finkenthal (2008) and by Fontille and Imbert (2012). Even more astonishing, in a display of what could be qualified as a reverse colonialist perspective when Modood acknowledges the use of the dualistic argument of "either...or" to dismiss any basis for sharing core values: "Definitions of core values will either be too bland or too divisive and the idea that there has to be a schedule of value statements to which every citizen is expected to sign up, is not in the spirit of a multilogical citizenship (Brown: 2005)"¹¹. Let's consider the shift from multicultural to multilogical, which is not commented upon, nor explained by Modood. Moreover, we have to note the next argument: "National identity should be woven in debate and discussion, not reduced to a list" (p. 153). Naturally, it is not in the spirit of anybody, and particularly not in the spirit of Gordon Brown to reduce national citizenship to a list.

In Canada, multiculturalism is linked to core values which are recognized and to be respected. Recently, an investigation was conducted in an Islamic school in Toronto where teaching material originating from Iran was inappropriate. This pedagogical material referred to Jews as "treacherous" and "crafty" and encouraged boys "to keep fit for jihad" (Stewart Bell, "Reflect Canadian values school told", *National Post*, Saturday, November 10, 2012, p. A12). Multiculturalism is a Canadian value -among other Canadian values- and its basis is to treat all immigrants and non-immigrant alike respectfully in order to help them enter within the mainstream systems and to participate in centers of power, instead of encouraging children to dream of excluding or killing others, and considering others as inferior or dangerous because they do not follow the same religion.

We can note that in Modood's book, Muslims share core values which are linked to Islam and these values are not open to discussion, although Modood pays lip service to the possibility of change in the future. Modood's perspective is in direct contradiction with the views of Kymlicka and Taylor. Taylor and Kymlicka insist that there are values such as freedom of speech (and *Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie are part of this freedom), gender equality, etc., that are not negotiable in a liberal democracy. Moreover, Taylor also affirms that cultural values are not equal because, in the context of the Nation-States, the culture of each host country, having been around for a long time, has something particular to offer to newcomers. For Taylor, it is not enough that we accept the initial hypothesis claiming that values are equal, which creates the risk of falling into absolute relativism. We must go further and encourage an understanding of different values and of both their importance and their consequences. Thus, what is even more important than the recognition of these values, is to know how to perceive others and how to envision dynamic and efficient relations from constitutional, institutional, and practical points of view in the context of an established society, which has values but which is open to accommodate some difference brought by newcomers. All liberal societies share basic values that are not negotiable such as: the rejection of torture, the refusal of mutilations like clitoridectomy, equality between men and women, non-discrimination against sexual orientations, etc., as said by Taylor and Kymlicka. We can also include the protection of the individual against the group, be it a majority or a minority group.

5. Tariq Modood and Doug Saunders

In his book *Arrival city*, Doug Saunders speaks of the very poor immigrants, the rejected, and the despised, in the context of Asia, Europe, and Canada. However, his perspective is very different from the one presented by Modood. Although Modood starts his thesis by stating that the immigrants he is speaking of are poor, he never analyses their own perspectives and strategies to progress economically and educationally. He develops a thesis founded on the desire to build up a coherent and militant group on the basis of religion. Saunders analyses the strategies of migrating people and immigrants in the light of a search for a better future and of the challenges and obstacles they encounter. A pragmatic, down to earth, postcolonial and liberal perspective (Saunders) is very different from that of the Muslim point of view (Modood). However, Modood sometimes recognizes that thanks to immigration, immigrants gain a lot economically, "groups such as the Indians,

Chinese, Koreans and some other East-Asians, for example, are developing a more middle-class profile than whites” (p. 44), a fact also acknowledged by Doug Saunders in *Arrival City*.

Although Tariq Modood recognizes that many immigrants succeed in getting a better economic life when immigrating in the UK, he does not really elaborate the means and the kind of cultural accommodation that makes this success possible and in particular he does not reflect on the situation of women. Neither does he talk about Muslims as succeeding in their professional fields. This is probably because success within the new society tends to show differences between individuals within the group. This dynamic would go against his view that the whole Muslim group is discriminated against. Modood goes directly in the opposite direction of Saunders. In his book, Saunders shows that migration from countryside to the city slums, or to another country, makes life better. He also shows that there is a strong and constant current of migration from city slums towards better neighbourhoods within the city. For him, the slums, the favellas, and the banlieues produce the future wealth of the new cities and megalopolises where some of its leaders and entrepreneurs are born.

6. Resentment and multiculturalism

For Modood and Bonilla Maldonado, multiculturalism is in part based on a reaction to a “wound” one tries to compensate by a kind of affirmation mixed with resentment. Sometimes, as it is emphasized by Salman Rushdie, this “wound” leads to direct aggression and terrorism. He says that we have to ask ourselves and “all Muslims in the world... have to ask themselves why the faith they venerate ends up producing so many aggressive mutations” (2001)¹². The definition of multiculturalism by Modood as the accommodation of poor people coming to the prosperous West clearly implies resentment. However, he does not analyse why these people were poor in their countries and why some of them may stay poor in the country that accepts them. Modood does not even try to see if to be poor in the West is similar to being poor in the Middle East, Asia or in Africa. For Modood, the situation of these poor immigrants does not seem to improve. Hence, in the perspective of Modood, the need for a conflictive multiculturalism. The same is true of Bonilla Maldonado who clearly demonstrates resentment against liberalism and Western societies.

Resentment, as was emphasized by Angenot, (1996) leads to trying to transform a weakness into a strength often by lowering standards, or by adjusting to a lower common denominator. This is often the case as shown by Albert Memmi in *Le portrait du colonisé*, because the colonized, and the underdog, does not think that all the wealth accumulated can be for him. In the worst-case scenario, this

situation turns into an all-out war against so-called privileged citizens such as during the cultural revolution in China or during the dictatorship of Pol Pot in Cambodia. In these cases, all those who were deemed to be bourgeois, or who were at least partially educated, or who were living in cities, were obliged to work in the countryside and be re-educated. Millions died in camps or in prisons.

The basis of resentment could be found either in an impossibility to be equal or in an impossibility to be recognized as valuable and different. For the immigrants of whom Modood speaks, in their country of origin, the main problem was not-to-be-recognized as different, because all were supposed to be identical and believe in Islam. They were all supposed to be a member of the group and refer to the same valued object: the word of God as presented by the Iman reading the Koran. In the case of Modood, multiculturalism plays on a resentment that is based on the valorization of an equality linked to the supposed identical characteristics of all the members of the group. This equality is seen by Modood as being denied in the UK although he does not analyse the status of women in Islam. This is why Modood insists upon a parallel system of laws and institutions to be recognized by the state and on the prohibition to exit the group. The first element is incompatible with Kymlicka's perspective on multiculturalism, and the second one is incompatible both with Kymlicka's perspective and with Human Rights.

In the case of Bonilla Maldonado, the kind of multiculturalism discussed is one playing on a resentment based on an incommensurable difference: that of illiberal societies facing liberal ones. In this case, Bonilla Maldonado insists on the fact that multiculturalism cannot accommodate illiberal groups and therefore, cannot accommodate difference. For him, multiculturalism should be discarded altogether. For Modood, recognizing difference is not the main point. The perspective is to recognize the group as a parallel and equal system because each member of the group has no differing individuality within the group. He is equal to the other (and not different) and must submit to the will of God. For Bonilla Maldonado, it is impossible for liberal multiculturalism to recognize the difference of the indigenous groups who also may have no concept of individuality. Hence, for him, they will never reach the status of equals in the context of multiculturalism.

To the opposite with the perspectives of Modood and Bonilla Maldonado, we can see that individuals or groups who base their vision on the realization that they have been discriminated against in their country of origin (and sometimes worse as it is emphasized by Gérard Étienne who has been imprisoned and tortured (1982) because of their difference or their disagreement with a destructive political regime, will be relatively easily accommodated by multicultural policies and perspectives as

they are developed by Kymlicka. We can think of many groups, like Jewish groups, or ex-colonised groups having lived through a culture of “not quite” as it is presented by Homi Bhabha (1994) where they were not allowed to compete against the coloniser, etc. We can even think of Doukhobors and Mennonites who have created somewhat parallel systems of living but who do not ask for full recognition by the state for a parallel system of laws and regulation such as was the case a few years ago for the Shariah in Ontario. These groups and people will tend to seek to be recognized for their difference within the general Canadian system of laws. This difference, which was denied for them in their country of origin, plunged them into unequal and discriminatory situation which led them to emigrate. However, being recognized with their culture and their values in the new society allows them to enter the dynamic of equality that is, the dynamic of access to competing with those already established within the Canadian economic and educational system. If they are recognized as different, they will be less discriminated against. This will help them to have access to education and economic opportunities. They will then be able to get into established centers of institutional, knowledge and economic power as individuals presenting different cultural norms but using their knowledge and know-how in order to develop their potential in the multilingual and multicultural context of globalization and the knowledge-based society.

7. René Girard's conception of exclusion and resentment

In our opinion, the capacity of a group to participate actively in the new society depends in part, on the fact that the group can understand that the important question is recognition of their difference as a group and of their difference within the group. A strong insistence on equality contributes to hide the universal Girardian dynamic of exclusion (1978) under the very optimistic illusion that every member of the group is fully protected from violence by the group, and its leaders.

Let us remember the basis of Girard's theory of appropriation mimesis. Appropriation mimesis is based on reciprocal violence linked to the object of desire. By engaging in reciprocal violence every member of the group becomes identical to other members trying to control the object of desire. This reciprocal violence destroys the community and its foundation: difference. A solution is found for this conflict: the sacrifice of a scapegoat who is innocent of what the group accuses him or her. The invention of a scapegoat presented as the cause of all evil destroying the community pacifies the community. The scapegoat transforms reciprocal violence into unanimous violence focused on

himself. The scapegoat is simultaneously perceived as an evil element and as a beneficial one, a sacred one who allows internal conflicts to stop.

Hence, the group in which everybody fights in order to gain control of the desired object shown by a model is regularly rebuilt in its illusory homogeneity because it constantly produces a scapegoat being excluded from the group. This agreement is reinforced by mythic or literary narratives training readers to look for clues, through the enjoyment of pseudo-rational causality/consequences nodal points which explain why such an agent in the narrative is a bad or a good character (Imbert: 2014, 3.8, 3.14). Any group is a group in which there are two cultures. There is the culture of the lynchers who say that a subgroup or an individual is bad because he is responsible for the social evil which destroys society. There is also the culture of the scapegoat, or the victim, whose resentment will be transferred to others or to future generations. Both groups are linked by this exclusionary process. However, the powerful group eventually produces an official story where he presents itself as self-generated by being linked to a pure origin. This power allows for this group to impose what Andreas Wimmer et Nina Glick Schiller criticize in 2002, namely methodological nationalism, also criticized by Will Kymlicka in 2007. This methodological nationalism leads to the organization of research following official state borders and historical/mythic/narrative limits. This leads to the organization of research in a static way which allows to ignoring or silencing minorities. It also prevents researchers to make comparisons based on the study of geographical and symbolic displacements a situation also criticized by Carlos Sandoval García in 2007 in his study of immigration and emigration in Costa Rica. This situation is particularly counterproductive in the contemporary global context, as well as for the Americas which have been invented more from coincidences than from causal and long-term authoritarian relationships and evidences. This leads one to often ignore the fact that the long-term relationships in the Americas are not linked to historical monuments built by aristocratic groups, but to the development of a democratic culture striving, as we can see in Randolph Bourne essay entitled "Transnational America" written in 1916, to be as inclusive as possible.

In this constant power relationship struggle, the discriminated-against group emphasizes its terrible fate by insisting on the fact that others are responsible for every calamity falling on the group. This leads to strategies based on a strong resentment and a calling for reparation while allowing to hide the fact that every group, including the discriminated against group, produces its own victims and is as prone as others to be racist and/or sexist, etc. Hence, resentment is a powerful tool for gaining recognition but it also can generate a dangerous appeal if it is based on a call for equality originating in

the source society where it is thought of as synonymous with homogeneity. In this case, resentment may lead to the deploying of strategies leading to not blend in the new society which can be considered as having no core values to share with newcomers as was stated by Modood for the UK in a kind of potential reverse colonialism. Hence, taking into account the multiple aspects of resentment would help to foster coexistence that is, as stated by J-M-G Le Clézio (2014), to understand what can offend others.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, resentment represents the emotional basis for failing to actively participate in a society, and for being unable to expand one's own potential away from the belief that life is a zero-sum game. It prevents people and groups to capitalize knowledge. It prevents people and groups to hybridize intellectually and emotionally, a key dynamic for developing oneself in the present and for the future good life in the new society. Hence, a theory dealing with multiculturalism should also develop insights and concepts linked to the multifaceted aspects of resentment and its permanence (Rawi Hage, *Cockroach*), its recontextualisation (Marco Micone, *Gens du silence*), or its absence (Yann Martel, *Life of Pi*) in the new society. The goal of multiculturalism is to change some traditions and ways of considering immigrants in the culture of the society where immigrants settle, as well as the original culture of immigrants so as to invent a new self who can be more open, more free and more able to have access to what is desired. This implies what Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra, Alejandra Machado Maturana, Adolfo León Rodríguez Sánchez explain “*No se debe defender ni el universalismo ni el relativismo sino la globalización de las preocupaciones morales y políticas y las luchas contra la opresión y el sufrimiento humanos*” (2010:155) (One should neither defend universalism nor relativism, but only the globalization of moral and political preoccupations, as well as the fight against oppression and human suffering.) This means that limits sometimes change greatly. However, changing limits does not mean accepting everything, for accepting everything would be to live in a society based on the arbitrariness of traditional or new elites, who usually oppress youth, women, creative people, and repress any kind of innovation. Valorizing change and socio-cultural displacements do not imply the loss of self because life is not a zero-sum game, as Iain Chambers insists by citing Arturo Islas: “To live elsewhere, means to continually find yourself involved in a conversation in which different identities are recognized, exchanged and mixed, but do not vanish.” (1993:18).

Biobibliographical Note

Patrick Imbert, University of Ottawa. Distinguished Professor. He has been Director of the Chair: “Canada: Social and Cultural Challenges in a Knowledge-Based Society (2003–2018), Executive Director of the International American Studies Association (2007–2009) and President of the Academy of Arts and Humanities of the Royal Society of Canada (2009–2011). He has published 44 books and 300 articles dealing with comparing the Americas, multiculturalism, theories of exclusion/inclusion, semiotics, and Québec and Canadian literatures.

Footnotes

¹ This complies with the Government of Canada’s policies that are cited by Kymlicka: “*Le modèle polyethnique qui inspire les politiques gouvernementales au Canada, en Australie et aux États-Unis laisse à l’immigrant le choix de conserver ou non son identité ethnique. Ces politiques ne donnent pas aux groupes la possibilité d’intervenir dans le choix individuel de préserver ou non cette identité. En fait, ces politiques admettent quelques mesures de protection externe, tout en rejetant les mesures de contrainte interne* (Gouvernement du Canada 1991b:11).”

² For Peru, see *The Other Path: the Invisible Revolution in the Third World*, New York: Harper and Row, 1990.

³ The new constitution is founded on two criteria: a) political equality and unity, and b) political diversity and autonomy. We thus see a certain tension between unity and diversity that is managed case by case by the Constitutional Court. The court can decide to give priority to either liberal values (El Tambo case) or illiberal values (Embera Chani case). This does not comply with Taylor or Kymlicka’s reflections. It can also aim for the middle when it decides to limit the individual right if there is no other way to guarantee the survival of the minority as a different cultural identity (Arhuaco case on the subject of evangelisation), which ties in with one of Kymlicka’s criteria.

⁴ Cited by Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys*, p. 271.

⁵ Same thing in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, etc.

⁶ Will Kymlicka notes that while the Latin American states are often open to multiculturalism for Aboriginals and give them rights on territories, they have a tendency to forget Afro-Latinos, who are not considered indigenous.

⁷ For a discussion dealing with Europe, see: Patrick Imbert, “Francophones, Multiculturalism and Interculturalism in Canada, Québec and Europe” dans *Citizenship and Belonging in France and North America: Multicultural Perspectives on Political, Cultural and Artistic Representations of Immigration*, (Ramona Mielusel and Simona Pruteanu, eds.), New York, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2020, p. 33-53.

⁸ For Modood, it is the Christian religions in the UK.

⁹ Here is Gordon Brown’s sentence: “When we look at history and at the values and ideas that shape British national identity, I would want to stress a belief in tolerance and liberty, a sense of civic duty, a sense of fair play, a sense of being open to the world”. “Round table: Britain rediscovered”, *Prospect*, March 17, 2005, p. 1.

¹⁰ Here is the answer to this claim by Gordon Brown: “To get back to Tariq’s broader point, I am not proposing some formulaic list of values that embodies Britain for the next 200 years. Equally, I don’t think it’s good enough just to have all these ideas floating around and to say the debate is an end in itself”. “Round table: Britain rediscovered”, *Prospect*, March 17, 2005, p. 6.

¹¹ This sentence and the reference to Brown, is not clear. Is this said by Gordon Brown? No. Is it in the roundtable? Not even. So, why is there a reference to Brown after this sentence? Let’s also note that it is a roundtable and that Gordon Brown is only one of the many participants whose names are following: Neal Ascherson, Billy Bragg, Gordon Brown, Linda Colley, David Goodhart, Eric Kaufmann, David Lammy, Tariq Modood, Roger Scruton.

¹² *Le Devoir*, 4 octobre 2001, p. A 7. Traduction de P. Imbert. Citation originale: Il faut que tous les musulmans du monde entier ...s’interrogent pour savoir pourquoi la foi qu’ils vénèrent produit tant de mutations virulentes.

Bibliography

- Marc Angenot, *Les idéologies du ressentiment*, Montréal, XYZ, 1996.
- Stewart Bell, “Reflect Canadian values school told”, *National Post*, Saturday, November 10, 2012, p. A12.
- Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London/New York, Routledge, 1994.
- Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, *La Constitución multicultural*, Bogotá, Siglo del hombre editores, 2006.
- Randolph Bourne, « Trans-National America », *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 118, 1916, p. 86-97.
- Iain Chambers, *Migrancy, Culture, Identity*, London-New York, Routledge, 1993.

- Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: the Invisible Revolution in the Third World*, New York: Harper and Row, 1990.
- Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York, Pocket Books, 1998.
- Gérard Étienne, *Cri pour ne pas crever de honte*, Montréal, Nouvelle optique, 1982.
- Michael Finkenthal, *Complexity, Multidisciplinarity and Beyond*, New York, Peter Lang, 2008.
- René Girard, *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde*, Paris, Livre de poche, 1978.
- *The Globe and Mail*, Reuters News Agency, Thursday, February 3, 2011, p. A13.
- Antoine Grandjean, « Nietzsche et le 'génie' du ressentiment » in *Le ressentiment, passion sociale* (dir. Florent Guénard et Antoine Grandjean), Rennes, Presses de l'Université de Rennes, 2012, p. 22.
- Rawi Hage, *Cockroach*, New York, Norton and Company, 2010.
- Patrick Imbert, « Transculturalité et Amériques » in *Transcultural Americas/Amériques transculturelles* (dir Afef Benessaïeh), Ottawa, Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 2010, p. 39-68.
- Patrick Imbert, *Les Amériques transculturelles: les stéréotypes du jeu à somme nulle*, Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 2013, 332 p.
- Patrick Imbert, *Comparing Canada and the Americas: From Roots to Transcultural Networks*, New York, Peter Lang, 2019.
- Patrick Imbert, "Francophones, Multiculturalism and Interculturalism in Canada, Québec and Europe" dans *Citizenship and Belonging in France and North America: Multicultural Perspectives on Political, Cultural and Artistic Representations of Immigration*, (Ramona Mielusel and Simona Pruteanu, eds.), New York, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2020, p. 33-53.
- Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International politics of Diversity*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Pablo Lazo Briones, *Crítica del multiculturalismo, resemantización de la multiculturalidad*, Mexico, Universidad Iberoamericana, 2010.
- J-M.G. Le Clézio, "Coexister, c'est comprendre ce qui peut offenser l'autre", www.nrgui.com/46-culture »3790-j-m-g-le-clezio-prix-nobel-de-litterature-coexister... (consulté le 13/09/2014).
- Yann Martel, *Life of Pi*, Toronto, Vintage, 2001.
- Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé*, Montréal, Éditions du Bas-Canada, 1963.
- Marco Micone, *Gens du silence*, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1982.
- Tariq Modood, *Multiculturalism*, Cambridge, Polity, 2007.

- Héctor Alonso Moreno Parra, Alejandra Machado Maturana and Adolfo León Rodríguez Sánchez's *El multiculturalismo en la Constitución de 1991: en el marco del bicentenario*, Cali, Universidad del Valle, 2010.
- *Prospect*, March 17, 2005.
- Salman Rushdie, *Le Devoir*, jeudi 4 octobre 2001, p. A 7.
- Carlos Sandoval García, *El mito roto: Inmigración y emigración en Costa Rica*, San José, Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 2007.
- Doug Saunders, *Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World*, Toronto, Knopf, 2010.
- Michel Seymour, *De la tolérance à la reconnaissance*, Montréal, Boréal, 2008.
- Wolfgang Welsch, « Transculturality: the puzzling form of cultures today », dans Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (eds.), *Space of Culture: City, Nation, World*, London, Sage, 1999, p. 194-195.
- Andreas Wimmer et Nina Glick Schiller, «Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences», *Global Networks* 2-4, 2002, p. 301-334.

Declarations

Funding: No specific funding was received for this work.

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.