

Review of: "The Synthetic Concept of Truth and Its Descendants"

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This paper is interesting to read, and it touches many complex issues in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic (among other areas). However, the discussion is somewhat lacking in detail: theses are advanced, but they are not quite adequately defended, and there is usually much that is left in the background. I will focus on the semantic theory presented in Sect. 2, as it is my area of specialization.

(1) Central to section 2 is the development of a semantic theory for names, predicate expressions, and atomic sentences. This semantics seems to be broadly Fregean, with each expression having both a meaning and a semantic value, though not much is said about this duality as it relates to sentences (e.g., do these procedures compose, so as to yield a procedure for determining the truth value of the sentence?). However, the central concept of this semantics, meaning, understood as an **investigative procedure** for predicate expressions, and as **full meaning** for names, is left relatively obscure (what does an investigative procedure amount to? What is the "full meaning" of a name? Is it a procedure for finding a referent? If not, what?). The idea of meaning as procedure reminds one of Dummett's or Tichý's renditions of Frege, but these authors are not mentioned, so it is hard to see what the differences are, and thus the specificity of the view being developed.

(2) Also in this section, the language- or carving-dependent nature of reality is put forward, but there is no account of other, already existing carving views of reality, like (without going too deep) Frege's view in the **Grundlagen**, neo-Fregean views like Wright and Hale & Wright, or Carnapian/neo-Carnapian ontologies, all of which could be seen as positing theses in the ballpark of the construction of reality by means of language/concepts/etc. Absent these references and comparisons, it is hard to form a definite picture of what the semantic theory of this paper would amount to in a concrete implementation.

(3) Other semantic theses lack appropriate details. For example, how should we understand the assumption of existing reference for proper names? Is it a semantic presupposition, as in Frege's own view? Is it something else? Once again, references to quite an extensive literature are lacking here, and we do not get the full semantic picture.

(4) The assumption of completeness for predicates (the analogous of the referent thesis for proper names) is at odds with the way we behave towards vague and indeterminate predicates. The author acknowledges the presence of this kind of term but asserts that the assumption is made with respect to them. However, this does not seem to be correct, as we hardly make such assumptions for predicates such as "tall," for which we recognize the existence of borderline cases

(moreover, we think of such borderline cases as inherent to their semantic functioning). We do not assume precise boundaries for them and use them in successful communication nonetheless.