

# Review of: "The Synthetic Concept of Truth and Its Descendants"

Benjamín Valdivia<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Universidad de Guanajuato

**Potential competing interests:** No potential competing interests to declare.

As the synthetic concept of truth points to a basic expression from which several more of them come to the analysis, focusing on that concept takes us to the foundations of the whole building of reason. When we search for the truth, there are assumptions to be clarified. For instance, a thing that is an object linked to a predicate inside a determined context could function as a predicate part in another context.

To attend to this condition, Boris Čulina searches amongst different logical (and philosophical) positions to establish what this synthetic concept of truth is about. He presents a discussion on language as a structured conductor, accepting, or not, the words as having, in different occasions, the changeable task of being objects or predicates.

Since words may have or may not have a strong metaphysical connection, Boris Čulina progresses in the research to establish this aspect. The medieval problem of “suppositio” faced, from those centuries, the question of relating a word and the very reality it points to. For instance, see William of Ockham’s posture, as presented in my article on this ontological topic: [\[1\]](#) Derived from this, truth could be a property of objects themselves or, alternatively, an attribution we make to them; i. e., truth belongs to the world’s beings or to the language about them.

In this sense, Čulina’s investigation aims to a wider field: the correspondences between words and objects, and shows present answers to these classic problems. In the same way, he advances more to questions about the conventionality of words, temporal permanence of meaning, and what he named “interaction with nature” (even if ‘nature’ is something to be accepted by us only ex hypothesi). In any case, it is a necessity to distinguish between semantic value and truth value, tracing from that the border of two logical schemes, in the same form as, at the beginning, the author separated languages (L) from metalanguages (ML).

One relevant issue in presenting the case of the truth is the experience with those things signified by language, especially in the sciences, since atoms, electrons, and smaller particles we cannot see are referred to by expressions in the realm of language. Čulina points out two possibilities: direct and indirect experiences. And yet these experiences are differently stated by different users. Apart, in the scientific use of language, we ask the nature, and it “says” its thing, adding a specific meaning in the answer, resolving if the enunciated statement is true or false.

The text follows, thus, the prints of logical, scientific, and mathematic components of truth. And occupies a whole section to discuss Tarski’s T-scheme to solve some issues in reviewing the weight of metalanguages to ensure the truth manifested by the ML in the languages makes a valuation of L’s values, true and false.

The “synthetic concept of truth” accepts that “values of atomic sentences are primitive semantic elements of language determined by the process of rational cognition. In this way, the truth value of each sentence is connected with reality in a completely determined way”. So, semantics, epistemology, and experiential analysis converge to control the basic limits of a sentence. Nature, reason, and language are unified (synthesized) to form sentences we can value as true ones.

With a lot of examples of symbolic logical analysis, the article by Boris Čulina declares the connection of the concept of truth he proposes with the reality as a “suppositio” of sentences about the real. In particular, he concludes that this concept “gives us the legitimacy to ask” for the hidden political reality beneath historical actions, “and all of the above aspects of the concept of truth can help us get the answer” following this synthetic concept of truth.

## References

1. <sup>^</sup> Benjamin Valdivia. (1993). *Ockham: suposición y ontología. Analogía filosófica, vol. 2*.