

Conceptual oxymoron, oxymetaphor, and oxymetaphonymy: inclusive border and violent inclusion in close-up

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Abstract

Inclusive border and *violent inclusion* are analyzed here as conceptual, indirect oxymora. They obtain their value within the broader context of (1) border, redefined as space and instrument of control, and (2) the inclusion–exclusion continuum – taken together, they can function as a coherent conceptualization. *Violent inclusion* is also classified as oxymetaphor, whereas *inclusive border* as oxymetaphonymy, an analysis that recognizes the verbal and discourse levels of oxymoronic structures. Finally, a suggestion is made for further study to view these oxymora in terms of parallax, a phenomenon that involves mediation between the subject and object of conceptualization.

Keywords: oxymoron; conceptual oxymoron; oxymetaphor; oxymetaphonymy; inclusive border; violent inclusion.

1. *Inclusive border and violent inclusion*

Consider these examples of *inclusive border*:

1. Safe and **Inclusive Border** between Slovakia and Ukraine (SIBSU)

Sharing just 97 km of border, the two countries are good neighbors and trustful friends. To continue good relations between Slovakia and Ukraine, the contact points for mutual learning and cooperation is needed.

(<https://www.sfpa.sk/en/project/safe-and-inclusive-border-between-slovakia-and-ukraine-sibsu/>, accessed 29 Dec, 2022; emphasis added)

2. The implication of ISER in scientific, research and development projects at the Hungarian-Romanian border comes to actually prove how a long term **exclusive border** has been turning into an inclusive border. A discontinuous border has become a true borderland, a strong development core in a region located on the outskirts of Hungary and Romania. (Horga & Brie 2013: 47; emphasis added)

3. Demonstrators from Solidarity Across Borders gathered near Roxham Road in Hemmingford to promote an open and **inclusive border**. (caption under an image, “One arrested during heated demonstration at Lacolle border”, CTV Montreal, published and updated 19 May, 2018; <https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/one-arrested-during-heated->

[demonstration-at-lacolle-border-1.3937547](#), accessed 29 Dec, 2022; emphasis added)

I consider this expression to be an oxymoron (I'm only exemplifying here the ADJ+N construction, and omit cases where *border* is used attributively with a following noun, as *ininclusive border management* or *inclusive border town*). Admittedly, some speakers (personal communication) have expressed their doubt as to whether *inclusive border* is an oxymoron. To me, its oxymoronic nature is unquestionable, in the same way as *divisive border* feels pleonastic: borders divide by definition and can only be inclusive in some redefined sense, as discussed in this study.¹ I hope the arguments become clearer in Section 4, where *inclusive border* is classified as indirect oxymoron.

The emotional and axiological overtones of examples (1)–(3) are predominantly positive. In contrast, consider these rather typical uses of *violent inclusion* in academic English, another oxymoron:

4. Crackdown economics: Policing of hawkers in Nairobi as **violent inclusion** (title of Dragstead 2019; emphasis added)
5. Muslim women's experiences of exclusion are often at the forefront of academic literature on ethnicity and race in Myanmar. Yet Muslim women's varying experiences of exclusion involve more than discursive Othering and state violence. [...] We argue that capital articulates with social difference to create conditions of **violent inclusion** in precarious labor markets and the emergence of new labor subjectivities. (Frydenlund & Lei 2021, the Abstract; emphasis added)
6. Where neoliberalism creates conditions for dispossession in the present as financialization and debt, the bordertown is the space of exclusion, elimination, and **violent inclusion**. (Irwin J. Matthew, "Detroit is a Bordertown", <https://www.matthewjirwin.com/stng/bordertowns>, accessed 29 Dec, 2022; emphasis added)

There is clearly an aura of negativity and hidden aggression in these samples, although rather vague without larger context.

Thus, on the one hand, inclusivity as a positive notion can project its quality onto the otherwise divisive notion of border. On the other hand, it can be basically deprived of that quality under the pressure of the semantics of violence. We will look here into a complex conceptualization that combines the notions of inclusive borders and violent inclusion in Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson's (2013) *Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor*. We will inquire into the nature of these oxymora, their contextual grounding, internal architectures, and possible relationship between them. First, however, a more general discussion of the oxymoron will help us paint a larger picture.

2. Conceptual oxymoron and oxymetaphor

Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2014) notes that in contrast to vast research on metaphor and metonymy in cognitive linguistics, oxymoron, hyperbole, irony, or paradox have not received adequate attention. Filling this gap will help us obtain important generalizations, such as those offered by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, who proposes to account for all those instances of figurative language in terms of conceptual mapping. Indeed, it has been proposed in cognitive linguistic literature to view oxymoron, not as a rhetorical trope or stylistic device, but as a conceptual mechanism. Conceptual

oxymoron (cf. Gibbs 1994; Gibbs & Kearney 1994; Belehova 2006) has been defined as “the ability of the human mind to combine contradictory and divergent concepts to explain events and experiences” (Shurma & Lu 2018: 143). Several decades ago, Albert Rothenberg described it as “Janusian thinking” or “the capacity to conceive and utilize two or more opposite or contradictory ideas, concepts, or images *simultaneously*” (Rothenberg 1971: 197, original emphasis).² It is something that functions as one of the foundations of human conceptual grasp of reality: for John Lyons, the human mind is predisposed to “think in oppositions” or “categorise experience in terms of binary contrasts” (Lyons 1977: 271). For Marina (2017), this kind of propensity underlies human conceptualization of the world on a par with metaphorization.

Indeed, oxymora have been summoned to act as peculiar signposts to direct our thinking about specific contexts and situations. One example is the slogan *Alone together*, which in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic has been employed to frame our thinking and assessment of social behaviour, as well as to actually promote or enforce it (“Keeping together by staying apart”) (Gibbs 2021).³ Another is the complex conceptualization of *inclusive border* and *violent inclusion* analyzed below.⁴

How do these notions play with that of oxymoron in a broader perspective? Of the several definitions of oxymoron, the ones in Merriam-Webster Dictionary online seem especially instructive:

- i. a combination of contradictory or incongruous words (such as *cruel kindness*)
- ii. *broadly*: something (such as a concept) that is made up of contradictory or incongruous elements
(<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oxymoron>, accessed 29 Dec, 2022)

The first definition takes us to the verbal level and remains at the level of contradiction/incongruity, whereas in the second one, oxymoron can be a coherent conceptual unit. That second definition is a more useful view, one that very well corresponds with the two levels of oxymoron recognized by Gozzi (1999: 212): the object level, or “what the words say” (which I will call here the *verbal level*), and the “meta” level in discourse (or perhaps, for simplicity, the *discourse level*). Gozzi provides examples of what he calls *oxymetaphors*, such as Marshall McLuhan’s *global village*, arguing that it’s an oxymoron at the verbal level, whereas at the discourse level it’s a metaphor (or: an oxymoron that is used as a metaphor). Its verbal incongruence produces a coherent idea, sanctioned by metaphorical mappings: this is one Gozzi proposes his impressively convincing terminological blend, *oxymetaphor*.

But even if the metaphorical aspect of oxymora is absent or hard to detect, there are still two levels to it, as explained by Rudkiewicz (2019: 226-228). Rudkiewicz analyzes the expression *accidentally on purpose*, which in the example that is quotes is used with reference to tipping a glass of water. These two contradictory elements taken together allow the hearer to interpret this act as “intentionally unintentional”: the doer wants to manipulate others into believing that the act was accidental, whereas (s)he really did it on purpose. That is, the illogical and contradictory description at the verbal level becomes logical under this interpretation.⁵

One must be careful, however, not to attribute the oxymoronic quality to expressions too easily. Rudkiewicz’s other example, *almost exactly*, is in my opinion not an oxymoron because it does not involve clashing or contradictory meanings. Nor do I view it as an “upward counterfactual” (i.e., one that posits “alternative circumstances that are

evaluatively better than actuality”, Roese 1997: 134, referenced in Rudkiewicz 2019: 231) because it isn’t a counterfactual at all. Rather, one of its elements (*almost*) modifies the other (*exactly*) in a way that reduces its “degree of exactness”. There is a reference here to a somewhat vague and unspecified location in time, yet within a certain “range of exactitude”. Indeed, Rudkiewicz herself suggests this by referring to Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987): “The trajector is located very close to the landmark [*exactly*], or approaches the landmark [*almost*], not achieving its position” (Rudkiewicz 2019: 229).

Another dubious case is *original copy* (in Gibbs 2021: 48), which involves the polysemy of its second element: the expression only looks oxymoronic if we take *copy* to mean ‘replica’ but not when we take it to mean ‘an individual example of mechanical reproduction of an original impression’, as in *They sent me a copy of the book*. In this sense, the book that they sent me is very much an original – not *the* original because there usually are thousands of equally valid original copies.

Polysemy also plays a role in *plastic glasses*, which Littlemore (2015: 74) analyzes in terms of highlighting: the function of glasses is highlighted, whereas the material they are usually made of is downplayed. However, one might also claim that for many speakers the expression may have lost its oxymoronic aspect; after all, we may be dealing with non-glass glasses more often than with those actually made of glass. On the other hand, the non-glass ones may more readily be called *cups* (e.g. paper coffee cups), rather than glasses. Research on speakers’ intuitions, with statistics, may shed some light on the issue but it does appear that to a large extent oxymoron lies in the eye/ear of the beholder.

3. *Inclusive border and violent inclusion* as indirect oxymora

How can we locate *inclusive border* and *violent inclusion* and in this broader context? Let’s quote Mezzadra & Neilson:

7. ...the image of the border as a wall, or as a device that serves first and foremost to **exclude** ... is misleading in the end. Isolating a single function of the border does not allow us to grasp the flexibility of this institution. Nor does it facilitate an understanding of the diffusion of practices and techniques of border control within territorially bound spaces of citizenship and their associated labor markets. We claim that borders are equally **devices of inclusion** that select and filter people and different forms of circulation in ways no **less violent** than those deployed in **exclusionary** measures. (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013: 6; emphasis added)

Let’s note first of all that the authors do not express these oxymora overtly at the verbal level. Instead, they project an image of borders as devices of violent inclusion at discourse level.⁶ But *inclusive border* and *violent inclusion* do function as expressions in other contexts (cf. examples 1-6 above and many other Google hits, easily testable), while here, in Mezzadra and Neilson’s *Border as Method*, we are more concerned with the discourse level of conceptualization. (By analogy, Denroche 2018 talks about metaphonymy at discourse level as Text Metaphonymy).⁷

Mezzadra and Neilson’s imagery rests on a set of key assumptions that they propose for their reconceptualization of borders:

- the border is not only an “object” but an “epistemic angle”, a method or way of doing things (p. viii);
- focus is placed not only on international borders between states but also social, cultural, political, and economic ones – borders are heterogeneous in nature (p. 3);
- borders don’t only block flows (of people, money, labour, or goods) but function as devices or instruments for their articulation (p. 3);
- they therefore perform the “world-configuring function” (Balibar 2002: 79, in Mezzadra & Neilson 2013: 4)⁸;
- borders are also spaces (rather than lines) where politics, power, power transformations, and violence all meet (pp. 3-4);
- they act upon and affect people, “cross[ing] the lives of millions of men and women who are on the move, or, remaining sedentary, have borders cross them” (p. 6) (cf. a slogan of Latinos in the United States: “we did not cross the border, the border crossed us”, p. xi).

It is against this complex, re-defined notion of the border as instrument and space that we need to consider *violent inclusion* and *inclusive border*. Both can be classified as *indirect oxymora*, i.e. they involve “a structure in which one of [the] two terms is not the direct antonym of the other, but rather the *hyponym of its antonym*” (Shen 1987: 109, emphasis original; cf. also Gibbs & Kearney 1994; Shurma & Lu 2018). However, one linguistic detail needs to be added to this definition: in oxymoron, the two elements belong to different grammatical classes (and one is syntactically dependent on the other), as in *sweet sorrow* (ADJ+N) or *the silence whistles* (N+V) (cf. Plett 2010).⁹ Therefore, we can represent *violent inclusion* as in Figure 1, with a recategorization of one of its elements.




Figure 1. *Violent inclusion* as indirect oxymoron

It seems to be a secondary issue at this point whether recategorization operates on the antonym to *violent* (*peaceful* ADJ *peaceful approach* N) or reversely, on the superordinate term to *inclusion* (i.e., *peaceful approach* N *peace* ADJ), and then its antonym *violent* is provided. What matters is that the difference in syntactic categories must be noted here.

For *inclusive border*, consistently, I propose Figure 2.




Figure 2. *Inclusive border* as indirect oxymoron

As mentioned in Section 1, *inclusive border* doesn't have an oxymoronic feel to some speakers. Indeed, apart from classifying it as indirect, in the specific sense explained above, one can perhaps consider it as "hidden", "covert", "disguised", etc., the choice of the appropriate term still pending. The crux of the matter is that its oxymoronic nature only becomes apparent when one recognizes the typical characteristics of borders as lines, boundaries, or structures of division and separation. *Inclusive border* thus seems to be similar to the title of Emil Cioran's book *On the Heights of Despair*, where the typical characteristics of despair and depression are usually expressed metaphorically as feeling "low" or "in the depths/abyss of nothingness".¹⁰

In view of this discussion, one should therefore redefine indirect oxymoron, perhaps somewhat awkwardly, as "a structure that involves terms belonging to different grammatical classes, such that the second term is a hyponym of its superordinate, that superordinate being a reategorized antonym to the oxymoron's first term".

4. *Inclusive border* and *violent inclusion* in a redefined context: from oxymoron to oxymetaphonymy

But how can borders be inclusive? Recall that Mezzadra and Neilson redefine them as spaces where things happen. Furthermore, those things involve not an opposition of inclusion vs. exclusion but a cline: "borders establish multiple points of control along key lines and geographies of wealth and power, ... inclusion exist[s] in a continuum with exclusion, rather than in opposition to it" (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013: 6). In contrast to common image, inclusion need not always be a social good but can be performed through violence. When inclusion happens through the working of border as space (and as an instrument of control), it is differential and violent, especially as borders are heterogeneous: not just political but also ethnic, social, cultural, commercial, linguistic, etc.¹¹

In this light, both *violent inclusion* and *inclusive border* should be analyzed not only as oxymora but as figurative

conceptualizations that involve metaphor, metonymy, or both (recall Gozzi's 1999, 2003 notion of oxymetaphor).

In *violent inclusion*, there is metaphorical mapping from the domain of physical violence to sociopolitical, labour-related maneuvers that both include individuals "within borders" and place them in precarious situations of little choice and control. In fact, the redefined context of border as space and method is itself metaphorical in nature.

That redefined context also provides the grounding for *inclusive border*. Once it has been established, we metonymically activate space for action within that space: borders themselves (as spaces) are not inclusive but the actions that happen there can be.¹² Thus, we have a metaphonymy here: the metaphorical background of the redefined border and the metonymy space for action within that space. Following Denroche (2018), one might call it Text Metaphonymy, or perhaps *discourse metaphonymy*.

However, its architecture seems rather elusive. Is it (A) metonymy within metaphor (which is one type of integrated metaphonymy) or (B) metonymy from metaphor (one type of cumulative metaphonymy), in the sense of Goossens (1990)? Option (A) means that borders are spaces is a contextual metaphor that provides an environment for the metonymic space for action within that space to function within it (the metonymy is embedded in the metaphor). In option (B), the contextual metaphor borders are spaces does not so much create an environment for but "feeds" the metonymy, so that the metonymy is only possible thanks to the metaphor being constructed prior to it.

But there is also a third option of analyzing *inclusive border*, where (C) its metaphorical and metonymic aspects are intimately integrated: borders are spaces (metaphor) and space for action within that space (metonymy) are activated simultaneously as a complex conceptualization, the metaphonymic inclusive borders are spaces that stand for actions in those spaces.¹³ Would this be a third kind of Goossen's integrated metaphonymy, with its two components being intimately integrated with each other in one multifarious conceptualizing effort?

Figures 2(a-c) represent those options diagrammatically, without me assigning priority to any of them at this point.




Figure 2(a). *Inclusive border*: the metonymy within metaphor (integrated metaphonymy) interpretation




Figure 2(b). *Inclusive border*: the metonymy from metaphor (cumulative metaphonymy) interpretation




Figure 2(c). *Inclusive border*: the simultaneous (integrated metaphonymy?) interpretation

The choice of one of these interpretations as more accurate than the others must at this point await further study. What I do believe, however, is that while *violent inclusion* can be classified as oxymetaphor (following Gozzi 1999, 2003), *inclusive border* is a good candidate to upgrade Gozzi's finely blended terminology and consider it an example of *oxymetaphonymy*.

5. *Violent inclusion* and *inclusive border*: distinct or combined? A complex oxymoron?

Finally, let us consider whether *violent inclusion* and *inclusive border*, in the context of Mezzadra and Neilson's redefined notion of border, are

1. two distinct discourse oxymora (oxymetaphor and oxymetaphonymy);
2. distinct oxymora but combined into a coherent conceptualization; or
3. one complex double (text/discourse) metaphonymic oxymoron (essentially, a complex oxymetaphonymy)?

Again, at the current stage I can only suggest what seems to me the most convincing but a tentative solution. Option (1) clearly seems to miss something: after all, the redefined border context embraces both oxymora and both play with the concept of inclusion. That concept's basically positive overtones are on the one hand harnessed to re-assess the negativity and divisiveness of border into a positive image, but on the other hand they are downplayed and subdued

under the influence of violence. A convincing analysis must surely incorporate these processes. At the other extreme, however, option (3) seems too radical, lacking a description of the complex oxymoron's architecture or direct evidence for its singular nature.

Therefore, until more research is carried out, I assume we're dealing here with option (2): Mezzadra & Neilson's (2013) redefined notion of heterogeneous, multifarious border as space and instrument, which doesn't only block but articulates flows, along with the idea of inclusion and exclusion forming a continuum, creates a context for borders as spaces to become inclusive of people – but these processes of inclusion can be characterized by forcefulness, exercise of power, or social and politicized violence.

6. Conclusions

Let me formulate conclusions to this study in two broad points:

- Oxymoron as a cognitive mechanism, a figure of thought (cf. conceptual oxymoron above), is not (or not always) a “standalone” but can be integrated with other cognitive processes, notably metaphor and metonymy, to form a complex multilevel mechanism. Following Gozzi's (1999, 2003) notion of oxymetaphor, we can talk here about *oxymetaphonymy*. (It seems that in principle nothing can prevent us from also postulating *oxytonymy*, that is, oxymoron in combination with metonymy alone – it's just that specific examples of it still need to be identified.)
- The oxymora investigated here, *violent inclusion* and *inclusive border*, function in a carefully wrought sociopolitical and geopolitical framework that redefines the notions of border and inclusion.

7. Coda

The present study can perhaps serve as the starting point for one more analytical step. Marina (2017, with references to Žižek 2006) looks at oxymoron in the context of paradox, which in turn can be viewed as underlain by the phenomenon of parallax. Parallax is “the apparent displacement of an observed object due to a change in the position of the observer” ([dictionary.com](https://www.dictionary.com), 31 Dec, 2022). This is what happens when we look at an object through the camera lens, compared with its view through a viewfinder, when the lines formed, respectively, by the object and the lens, and object and the viewfinder diverge at an angle. Parallax in fact has a specific astronomical sense of the angular difference or displacement of a celestial body due to its being observed from different vantage points.¹⁴

This notion receives an extended understanding in Žižek (2006): “subject and object are inherently ‘mediated,’ so that an ‘epistemological’ shift in the subject's point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ shift in the object itself” (Žižek 2006: 17). Let us note that Žižek subverts and plays with the notion of astronomical parallax, where the position of the observer determines the apparent (vs. real) position of the object. For Žižek, the reverse seems to be true: when the object changes ontologically, this is reflected in the subject's epistemology. However, the key idea in the parallax conception, which Žižek attributes to Hegel, is the constant mediation between the subject and object. Marina (2017) takes this as an

attempt to capture the dynamism of perception and conceptualization of the world, where the perspective constantly shifts between two or more points of view. Such is the nature, claims Marina, of conceptual oxymoron, which involves contrasting conceptualizations, paradoxical juxtapositions, apparently incompatible images that can nevertheless be combined into a congruent whole. Equipped with these notions, the author looks into oxymora in poetry.

It appears that the notion of parallax as the cognitive foundation of paradox, and – through paradox – of oxymoron, is a promising direction for analyzing the sociopolitically grounded discourse oxymora discussed above, as well as other oxymora that also function in broader sociopolitical and cultural contexts, such as *creative destruction* or *radical empathy*.

Footnotes

¹ Of course, being pleonastic doesn't stop it from being actually used. However, the usage suggests that in an ideal world borders are neutral, they are "just there", whereas in reality some are (particularly) divisive, e.g.: "... the identities of people who have risked everything to cross the divisive border between the US and Mexico"

(<https://www.nowness.com/series/world-service/lines-in-the-sand-jem-goulding-mexico-border>; accessed 5 Jan, 2023).

² The two-faced Roman god Janus kept vigil of the interior and exterior of a house, looking in two opposite directions.

³ In fact, Gibbs (2021: 48) considers these slogans as "somewhat oxymoronic" but closer to irony. Details of his analysis need not concern us here but one interpretation does not preclude the other.

⁴ Yet another is the concept of radical empathy, which links the positive notion of empathy with rather negatively evaluated radicalism. It has been defined as "actively striving to better understand and share the feelings of others. To fundamentally change our perspectives from judgmental to accepting, in an attempt to more authentically connect with ourselves and others. Our radically empathetic community places this at the root of everything we do. [...] In essence what we are saying is that basic empathy isn't enough." (<https://campstompingground.org/blog/2017/2/16/what-is-radical-empathy>, accessed 29 Dec, 2022). Thus, radical empathy is meant to be not only positive but actually more positive than "basic empathy", intensified through combination with radicalism.

⁵ In fact, Rudkiewicz calls it "unintentionally intentional" (2019: 226), which I take to be an error: after all, the doer's real intention was to actually tip the glass but (s)he performed it in such a way as to fool the viewers into believing that it wasn't. So, (s)he "intends" it to be "unintentional".

⁶ Though they do use differential inclusion, not an oxymoron.

⁷ Certainly, the analysis would require somewhat different solutions if, for example, we considered the violence of inclusion, rather than violent inclusion. This would not, however, significantly alter observations and interpretations of these conceptualizations at the discourse, "meta" level.

⁸ In this context, the authors use another wonderfully wrought oxymoron, creative destruction: "Rather than organizing a stable map of the world, the processes of proliferation and transformation of borders we analyze in this book aim at managing the creative destruction and constant recombining of spaces and times that lie at the heart of contemporary capitalist globalization" (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013: 6, emphasis added). Although it cries out, demanding to be analyzed, I

will have to leave this for another occasion, so as not to overkill the current study.

⁹ In what are called direct oxymora, this need not be the case, e.g. bitter sweet (ADJ+ADJ). Cases like living dead lie in-between: both living and dead are adjectives but dead is nominalized (into ADJ+N) (cf. Shurma & Lu 2018: 143). Internal structure is one of the things that formally distinguish oxymoron from antithesis: in the latter, the elements contrast in meaning but are parallel in structure, e.g. To be or not to be or black and white. The antithetical black and white differs from the oxymoronic bitter sweet in that the two notions it evokes stay distinct, whereas in the oxymoron they are merged (blended) into a new quality. For a broader discussion, cf. Kaluža (1984) or Shurma & Lu (2018).

¹⁰ I'm referring here to the English translation of the title, not being competent enough to discuss the connotations of the original Romanian *Pe culmile disperării*.

¹¹ Manzanas Calvo (2022) has explored these notions in the context of a redefined “interior border” in contemporary American literature – cf. Julia Alvarez’s *Afterlife* (2020) as a recent poignant example.

¹² Inclusive border can perhaps be considered referential metonymy (cf. Warren 2006), where border as space is a salient aspect of the whole configuration (metaphorical location), activated to refer to actions within that space. Its precise classification, however, does not directly impinge on the current analysis.

¹³ I resort here to the standard practice of formulating metonymies in terms of something (the vehicle) “standing for” the target that is contiguous to it, which is a stylistically convenient shortcut for the more accurate notion of the vehicle providing mental access to the target (cf. Kövecses & Radden 1998: 39). Yet, one must bear in mind that in metonymy there is no substitution of the vehicle for target (as “standing for” might suggest) but their coactivation.

¹⁴ It's further subdivided into diurnal/geocentric and annual/heliocentric parallax (cf.

<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/parallax>). See also <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parallax>.

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