

# Review of: "Either you know or you've gotta believe"

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This paper purports to provide a new line of argument against the entailment thesis (that knowledge entails belief): briefly, that belief, unlike knowledge, requires an agent's actions, where action includes making a judgement. The bulk of the paper is a discussion on extant work, which, though interesting, does not directly support this 'new' argument. This is unfortunate because it is an interesting idea, but little is done to support it. There are problems with the idea, such as the fact that we can often come by knowledge through judgement, and some philosophers, e.g. Russell, think that knowledge *is* a kind of judgement. Sometimes knowledge is not 'easy', and does require 'cognitive action'.

Furthermore, it is also commonly thought that when we think we know something, but do not (because it happens to be false), we merely believe it. Something like this intuition may be behind the attractiveness of the entailment thesis. But if Gruber is right, then we need a new concept to describe this state of failed knowledge (usually taken to be belief), because it is only the state of the world that differentiates it from knowledge. (There is nothing that the agent is doing or not doing that is different.)

I don't think the case is hopeless, but much more needs to be done to make it plausible.