

Review of: "What is the place of naturalistic philosophy in the doing of science? Implications for the teaching of science"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

It seems to me that there are some points that should be better explained. Since in the final version of the paper there will be parts that by now are not published, my remarks can be taken not as a criticism, but rather as the suggestion that in the final version expecially these points should be discussed in order to make clear the autors' point of view. What is exactly the meaning of the thesis that natural philosophy is related to some "natural languages"?

If this means only that the persons' knowledge is expressed by those languages, this is obvious.

If it means that these languages are "constitutive" of their knowledge, this is dubious. Why epistemic claims should rely on a "language" by itself? Does this entail that who lives within one culture, for this reason, should "ignore" the knowledge "contained" in other languages?

Within a language we can articulate our reasons to adopt tools contained in another language, but in this way the reference to natural languages probably cannot play anymore a relevant epistemic function.

Is it not better to begin directly with a different order of categories? If we take the contents of individual experience as the ground of knowledge, we can define "science" as the discourse where a highest level of intersubjectivity is found, while in "natural philosophy" there is only a "high" (not highest) level of intersubjectivity (or it is limited to particular communities).

It is to be noticed that in this way also the function of natural languages can be easily explained, since they presuppose that the individuals make the proper experience in order to understand them.

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