

Review of: "Resentment and Multiculturalism: Kymlicka's Canada, Bonilla Maldonado's Colombia and Modood's UK"

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The article "Resentment and Multiculturalism: Kymlicka's Canada, Bonilla Maldonado's Colombia, and Modood's UK," seeks to defend Kymlicka's definition of multiculturalism as not dualist.

The author's thoughts, like Kymlicka's, have been developed within a rational/liberal framework. Even the idea of triangulation is orchestrated based on the proximity or distance between dualities, minor or major culture/society/rights. Maldonado's argument does not revolve around losses or victories; it simply asserts that illiberal people are compelled to reduce their spirituality, identities, sense of belonging, values, and morals to the dualistic rational/liberal game of multiculturalism, whether they are winning or losing. There can never be a win-win situation in multiculturalism for the minority culture if what is lost cannot be seen, felt, or understood by the so-called majority. Perhaps that's why both the author and Kymlicka claim there is no penalty for individuals who leave a minority group. Kymlicka argues that the acceptance of certain procedural principles (inadvertently deeply rooted in Western and liberal culture) by all members of a political community is required, while also allowing for the diversity of cultural (or religious) values. Politically, this presupposes that those engaged in the dialogue accept a liberal, capitalist, and multicultural state, disregarding the fact that the very structure of this multicultural state, as it exists today, is an expression of Western culture and limits the possibility of survival for all other cultures.

Maldonado questions the value of liberal principles because there is nothing objectively making the liberal/rational/democratic episteme superior, except for the strategies perpetuated by institutions over time to validate this regime of truth. In this regard, regardless of whether the principles and values represent the will of the majority or not, if the systematic organization of the system is producing inequalities, poverty, war, genocide, femicide, and homophobia, why shouldn't the state promote the values of the so-called minority as well? Perhaps the problem here can be better explained by Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm; he argues that thoughts developed in a different episteme are not "directly accessible," leading to partial communication and mutual incomprehension. Placing the debate between the majority and the minority implies the existence of a norm, a rule based on the characteristics of the major group, and the minority represents the adverse, the point outside the curve, the dissonant element concerning beauty, rights, policies, intellect, and competence. This is the trap within the North-centric episteme. Instead of exposing the circular and self-referential nature of knowledge production, Kymlicka repeatedly reaffirms the premises ingrained in this North-centric system of representations, based on dualistic thinking. Maldonado focuses on how this framework also supports the possibility of considering a contesting episteme, centered on social transformation and the end of oppression, guided by

"otherness" (or the "minority," as the author and his interlocutor prefer). We must not forget that Western culture, with its evident "Occidentalism," has positioned all other cultures as primitive, premodern, traditional, and underdeveloped. Both the author and his interlocutor fail to see the "border" (the "frontier") between two cultures (majority/minority) as a locus for "critical thought." Therefore, as Enrique Dussel suggests, an intercultural dialogue that challenges the idea that tradition is arbitrary or oppresses women and creative individuals, stifling innovation, is crucial. Tradition or otherness is not merely negative; it represents the positivity rooted in a tradition distinct from the modern/postmodern world.

Therefore, I understand that the author has failed to demonstrate how Kymlicka's perspective goes beyond dualism (capital-pre-capital, Europe-non-Europe, primitive-civilized, traditional-modern, etc.), which is an expression of the exaggerated ethnocentrism of recently formed Europe. This dualism is notably present through the distorted temporal relocation of all those differences by placing non-Europeans in the past. I suggest that the author provides a better definition of what they mean by dualism and how the concept of triangulation can overcome this dualism. These two concepts have not been appropriately introduced, weakening the construction of the remaining arguments. The text offers a partial and distorted way to consider the transcendence of dualism in Kymlicka. This is an inevitable consequence of the Eurocentric perspective, despite his efforts to overcome naturalism, as it reproduces a dualistic view of history that separates nature from society, the body from reason, and does not address the question of totality (denying it outright like postmodernism).