

Review of: "Social context of the brain and law: Is consciousness social?"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

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This article attempts to address the question of whether consciousness is a social phenomenon. However, throughout its text, the article fails to provide a clear answer to this question. From this point forward, I will offer only a few comments for which I believe I have compelling arguments, or at least reasonable objections. First and foremost, the overall idea of the article is intriguing, but it is very hard to see what an intrigue is.

(1) The entirety of the text is a discussion, but it does not directly answer the question posed in its title. Instead, the discussion covers a variety of distinct topics, including the relationship between the brain and consciousness, the relationship between society and consciousness, and the relationship between law and consciousness, among others. These topics are quite distinct from one another, and while there may be some connections between them, such connections must be substantiated through further analysis.

(2) In reading between the lines, the author appears to endorse the theory proposing the social origin of consciousness, as evidenced by the author's citation of certain sources. Furthermore, the author seems to imply that consciousness is fundamentally a social phenomenon. However, it is important to note that the assertion that consciousness is essentially social, in terms of its origin, duration, and cessation (leading to various states of unconsciousness), can sometimes be conflated with the notion of "social consciousness" or "social awareness" - i.e., a collective consciousness shared by individuals as members of a group.

(3) Regarding the remark on Wittgenstein, it is my belief that his understanding of consciousness does not align with either of the claims made in the previous remark. While there are certainly some social elements to Wittgenstein's conception of consciousness, they are not in line with the author's present discussion. Rather, Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness is primarily linked to the entirety of the human experience, including feelings, thoughts, desires, actions, and so on (as noted by Krkač and Lukin in 2006, and Krkač in 2012). As for the mentions and citations of other authors, I am unable to engage in any meaningful discussion regarding their philosophies due to my limited knowledge on the subject matter.

In light of the points raised in the preceding comments (1-3), I would suggest that the author consider making some

revisions to this text or in their future research. These revisions should be directed in two key areas. Firstly, there should be a clear separation of the distinct issues discussed, with efforts made to establish connections between them in a coherent and transparent manner. Secondly, there should be greater precision and clarity in the use of various sources, some of which may not be directly relevant to the fundamental claims put forth in specific sections of the article.

References

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