

Review of: "Is psychopathology a bit rusty? A critical essay"

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I will begin by saying this paper is in the pre-draft stage. Setting aside the constant grammatical, syntactic, and other general writing issues (why are all centuries given in Roman numerals?), the paper lacks focus. It isn't entirely clear what it wants to argue.

It would seem the paper seeks to make sense of the apparent divide between psychiatry and neuroscience. Wreathed in allusion to Bacon's *Novum Organum*, this problem is contextualized by the following claim: "current progress in cognitive sciences thoroughly explain interconnection between mind and body, blurring the border between them. Despite this, psychopathology seems to reject this eye-catching theories, stubbornly residing in nineteenth century mentality."

Herein lies a major issue with this paper. Neuroscience is presently far from adequate to the task of fully describing even moderately complex mental phenomena, and all the less so when we speak on something as complex as mental disturbances. Were that the case, psychiatry, and particularly for-profit psychiatry, would look very different. Reading this sentence, I immediately thought of the criticisms of "brain mythology" levelled against Theodor Meynert, who likewise claimed that neurophysiology was sufficient to the task of describing all mental states in physiological terms. Which is to say, I am not convinced that psychiatry relies on a "dualism," as the author suggests, strictly out of convention or convenience, but rather out of necessity. There's no concrete neuroscientific basis with which to approach mental illness. Even if there were, there would still be pesky epistemic issues concerning the extension of experimentally derived physiological norms into the profoundly complex neurological strata of a particular individual, among many others.

Sure enough, there is a great deal written addressing the enduring epistemic issues which surround existing psychiatric classification. On the subject of trans-cultural differences in functional disease entities, one could go as far as questioning the extent to which specific mental illnesses are dynamic or natural kinds. Though it seeks to touch on many of the same issues, this paper does not engage with this literature in any capacity.

As it stands, this paper needs a complete overhaul, and it is difficult to make further comment.