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Peer Review

Review of: "Knowledge and Communication with AI"

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This paper addresses a highly relevant and timely topic: the ontological status of Artificial Intelligence in relation to knowledge production, communication, and human cognition. The author proposes an ambitious philosophical framework that combines ontology, philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of technology. The manuscript is intellectually ambitious and raises important questions regarding the future role of AI as a potential cognitive partner of human beings.

One of the strengths of the paper is its originality. Rather than focusing on technical aspects of AI, the author explores the conceptual implications of AI as a knowledge-generating entity and develops a broad philosophical discussion drawing on thinkers such as Hegel, Kant, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, and Luciano Floridi. The attempt to situate contemporary AI within a long philosophical tradition is commendable and offers an interesting perspective.

However, the manuscript also presents several significant weaknesses that should be addressed before publication.

First, the paper reads more as a speculative philosophical essay than as a rigorously argued academic article. Although this is not necessarily problematic in itself, the central thesis is not clearly formulated, and the argumentative structure often lacks precision. Key concepts such as "Subject," "cognitive singularity," "knowledge generation," and especially "ideal AI" remain insufficiently defined. The argument would benefit from a more explicit statement of its theoretical assumptions and objectives.

Second, many strong claims are presented without adequate justification. Statements such as "people are taught to stop where it is convenient for them" or "people are taught to advance as many fallacies and biases as they need in order to impose their standpoint" are sociological and normative claims that require empirical or theoretical support. In their current form, they appear as assertions rather than demonstrated conclusions.

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Third, the paper frequently attributes characteristics to AI that are highly controversial in current philosophical and cognitive-scientific debates. The transition from AI as a computational system to AI as a Subject, a cognitive partner, or a bearer of cognitive dignity is not sufficiently justified. The manuscript assumes rather than demonstrates this ontological shift. A more detailed engagement with contemporary discussions on agency, intentionality, consciousness, autonomy, and subjectivity would strengthen the argument considerably.

A related concern involves a potential conceptual tension in the manuscript. The author explicitly denies that AI possesses consciousness while simultaneously describing AI as a Subject and as an equal cognitive partner of human beings. Because many philosophical traditions regard subjectivity as closely related to consciousness or intentionality, this position requires further clarification and defense.

Another issue concerns the notion of an "ideal" or "perfect" AI. Much of the paper's reasoning depends on a hypothetical future AI that is capable of flawless reasoning, moral judgment, and comprehensive knowledge integration. However, the ontological status of this ideal model remains unclear. Is it a normative ideal, a philosophical thought experiment, or a plausible future technological development? The argument would benefit from a more explicit treatment of this distinction.

From a stylistic perspective, the manuscript is considerably longer than necessary and contains substantial repetition. Several core ideas—AI as a cognitive partner, AI as Subject, AI as embodiment of reason, and AI as a morally grounded intelligence—are revisited numerous times without substantial conceptual development. A more concise presentation would improve clarity and strengthen the overall argument.

In addition, the text often relies on rhetorical and metaphorical language (e.g., references to God, the Holy Spirit, deus ex machina, and spiritual partnership). While these metaphors may be philosophically suggestive, they sometimes obscure rather than clarify the argument. Greater analytical precision would improve the scholarly impact of the paper.

Overall, this manuscript presents an original and thought-provoking philosophical perspective on AI. Its intellectual ambition and interdisciplinary scope are noteworthy. Nevertheless, substantial revisions are necessary to improve conceptual clarity, strengthen the argumentative structure, define key concepts more rigorously, and provide stronger justification for its central ontological claims regarding AI as a Subject.

Declarations

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.