

Review of: "A Philosophical Analysis of Sartre's Critique of Freud's Depth-psychological Account of Self-Deception"

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The article "A Philosophical Analysis of Sartre's Critique of Freud's Depth-psychological Account of Self-Deception" is devoted to the complex problem of the ontology of human being and its consciousness, touches on the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The author reveals these issues through an analysis of the concept of bad faith by J.-P. Sartre and S. Freud and Sartre's criticism of Freud's concept, as if Freud easily gets rid of the issue, replacing it with a terminological game in his doctrine of the split of the mental Self, censorship and symbolization.

I consider author's main conclusion to be true, that the presence of unconscious motives in the psyche of the individual, proved by Freud and recent discoveries, can be relevant, effective on the conscious life and behavior of a person, but I count this insufficient for a complete disclosure of the issue, for which it would be desirable:

1. As an argument, it would be better not to limit oneself to references to works based more on studies of somatic factors and instincts, but to focus more on Sartre's teaching about the duality of being and that consciousness generates its own being and nothing, bifurcating into a factual and transcendent principle, which ontologically do not coincide and mutually negate each other, which creates a condition for self-deception. When consciousness considers itself factually, it coincides with itself as an object, becomes a thing, but does not coincide with itself as transcendent, self-positing itself by consciousness, and vice versa, when consciousness considers itself in a transcendent plane, this does not coincide with what it is in empirically immediate being. For example, Sartre considers such a phenomenon as sincerity, which does not achieve its goal, and Sartre considers this as bad faith: "Thus the essential structure of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith since the sincere man constitutes himself as what he is in order not to be it. ... In the final analysis the goal of sincerity and the goal of bad faith are not so different. ... Thus, in order for bad faith to be possible, sincerity itself must be in bad faith. The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the intra-structure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is." (J.-P. Sartre. *Being and Nothingness*).
2. It seems to be more effective to consider the controversial, though true, question of the pre-reflexive Cogito (knowledge that does not know itself - consciousness that posits the object, but does not posit itself as conscious), which is central to Sartre's understanding of the nature of bad faith (J.-P. Sartre. *The Transcendence of the Ego*), Sartre does not consider it as the unconscious, although it is a non-reflexive, non-thetic consciousness, Sartre considered the unconscious as a simple area of instinct.
3. I think it is also necessary to take into account that in the concept of being, Sartre adheres to M. Heidegger, being is understood by him as presence, something that "has place", hence, apparently, all the inconsistencies and insolubility of the issue of bad faith developed by Sartre, which makes it clearly insufficient and ineffective the Sartre's critique of Freud.
4. It seems that the very concept of Sartre's *inferiority project* is contradictory, because when the chosen goal is itself

negative, but the individual believes in it at the level of emotions and feelings and self-deceives, and when he fails, he can only blame himself for his own inferiority, then in this case it can hardly be called self-deception in the meaning of this concept, it is rather can be called a mistake and a choice of negative meaning, although consciously approved. The project is associated with freedom - it is a choice of different probabilities of development, meanings of being-in-the-world, including, unfortunately, negative ones.

5. I think, it must also be borne in mind, that Freud, in his writings after the 1920s, considered the ego to a greater extent as the unconscious. Jacques Lacan, following Freud, emphasized that the subject is mostly unconscious, and consciousness, rather superficially, has the character of direct perception of images.

One can agree that the prevalence of the unconscious indicates a restriction of freedom and choice of a person, and vice versa, the presence of consciousness indicates rather the position of a strong responsible person who is aware of his goals and, accordingly, is able to change social life, this is true, but one must also take into account the creative potential of the unconscious at a certain level, when thinking implicitly can move from consciousness and continue further in the unconscious (artists who are not fully aware of their idea, but feel and experience it, creating a masterpiece). Freud himself pointed out that the repressed motives and thoughts in the unconscious do not just sit idle, they have meaning, their mental life continues and affects conscious behavior and can lead to certain results, and this applies to the everyday normal life of a person, not only in patients with neurosis.