

Review of: "An Ontological Turn for Psychology in the age of the Machine and Global Warming"

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The paper deals with relevant issues. The contrast between Occidental patterns of thinking and those of other cultures brings philosophical, ethical and methodological problems. The charge against Occidental and scientific thought is that it is “analytic”, losing the global meaning of the contexts and the concrete facts. I think this remark is correct. But I would like to propose a different way of seeing at this point. In the mainstream philosophy of science there are basic principles that are exposed to such a charge. But it is possible to observe that a fundamental tool of scientific methodology is induction, and induction is a non-monotonic form of inference. Therefore the outcomes of an inductive inference should be relativized to the set of (all and only) its premises. Philosophers like Carnap and Hempel admit that inductive inference formally speaking should take in account “all” the background knowledge that is available: in this sense induction is holistic in its deep philosophical meaning.

Is it not reasonable to think that from this principle - if we give it the right weight – we can “start” from Occidental model of thinking and “arrive” to a pluralistic one, that is aware of the relevance of the different (also cultural) contexts?

If science and empirical knowledge are the peculiar features of Occidental thought, and a non-monotonic form of inference, namely induction, is the main ground of this intellectual attitude, we should hold that the deep and real meaning of Occidental thought is in the possibility of openness, and that the claim to exclude the value of other models of society is not expressive of a true Occidental attitude. (Of course there is a great simplification in this argument.)

This is not a criticism against the paper, but it allows to search different answers to some of the questions that the paper deals with.

Is it possible to establish a firm boundary between subject and object? Even if it is utterly correct the wish to defend the reasons of the “subjectivity” (it is still fundamental Husserl's “Crisis of the European Sciences”), it is not clear if this boundary is simple to trace. In Iran today which are the relevant boundaries, “women” vs “males” or “Islam” vs “Occidental society”? My proposal is to use a non-monotonic conception of induction to describe the development of the single individual point of view on the world and on human life. The same analytical tool can be applied also to social groups and cultures.

In this way the line of boundary between subjectivities is not rigid, and at the same time the Occidental model of thinking is epistemologically pushed to deny and overcome its traditional limits.

This is a simple theoretical sketch, but I am trying to explore this perspective in many works, where I can offer further

relevant remarks.