

Review of: "Three Unique Virtues of Approval Voting"

Asma Khalid

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Approval Voting (AV) and its superiority over other voting systems for single-winner elections. The three virtues of AV outlined - its adherence to the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion, prevention of manipulation through agenda setting, and avoidance of intransitive majority preference cycles - are convincingly argued, underscoring its viability as a mechanism for realizing majoritarian democratic will.

The authors effectively convey the significance of AV's unique features, particularly its ability to maintain rationality while upholding the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion. The discussion on the prevention of agenda-setting games adds depth to the analysis, highlighting AV's role in safeguarding the integrity of democratic processes. Additionally, the explanation of how AV mitigates the risk of intransitive preference cycles bolsters its appeal as a robust voting system.

Overall, the paper presents a compelling case for the adoption of Approval Voting, backed by theoretical underpinnings and practical implications. The clarity of argumentation and the cogent presentation of evidence contribute to its strength. However, further exploration of real-world applications and potential challenges in implementing AV could enhance the paper's depth and relevance. Nevertheless, it serves as a valuable contribution to the discourse on voting systems and social choice theory.