

Review of: "Is psychopathology a bit rusty? A critical essay"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

Peer review of

P. Zakowicz, Is Psychopathology a bit rusty? A critical essay.

The paper is quite interesting and innovative, and I find very original the frame of reference of baconian epistemology, however it deals with a topic that is too wide to be argued in a single paper: the question of the inadequacy of natural languages to describe psychopathological phenomena without a conceptual reference, and the lack of agreement of these references with neuroscientific models. The author should perhaps take in account some wittgensteinian formulations about "psychology" to approach radically the question. Most of psychopathologic terms are surely approximative to describe with exactitude the morbid experience of our patients that frequently brushes ineffability. Moreover every national language has its own terms that doesn't overlap with those of other languages: for example, "the english word "mood" is not the same than "Stimmung", "Grundstimmung" or "Befindlichkeit" in German, or "Humeur" in French or "Umore" o "stato d'animo" in Italian. But it is not conceivable to create an universal language for descriptive psychopathology.

The Author's critical assumptions is in clinical practice widely sharable, however can we consider traditional descriptive psychopathology a "superstition" because of its lack of scientific adequacy?

The question is not new, for example some phenomenological formulations aim to avoid theoretical preconception of psychopathology to better adhere patient's subjective experiences, anyway no consistent scientific results rose up from this method if not the valorization of more empathic approaches. Concerning this topic it the Author's definition of "Empathy" as "finding a common language" is very interesting, however this definition fits better with "attunement" for example, or "interjective agreement or understanding" than for "empathy" in traditional sense, because the meaning of this word refers to "to feel what the other person feels".

Concerning the example of the delusional experience, there is a psychiatric literature that discusses and criticizes the classical definition of "delusion" as "judgement mistake" (see **DALLE LUCHE R.; DI PIAZZA G.P.: La «pensée» délirante. Pensée ou pseudo-pensée délirante?. In: A.Ballerini, G.Di Piazza (Eds.): Délirer. Analyse du phénomène délirant. Le Cercle Hermeneutique, Second Semestre 2011, Numéro 17, Paris, Argenteuil , or DALLE LUCHE R.: Il delirio come "non pensiero". In: Cardamone G., Dalle Luche R., Paranoia. Psichiatria e antropologia., ETS, Pisa 2008** and the references in these papers). Defining delusions with their contents is questionable, but it is the same defining it as "social dissociation". A better suitable proposal could be to consider

delusional speeches by means of their formal characteristics, such as incontestability in front of clear disproofs, more than for their contents.

At last, there are a few misprint, such as “stqus” for “status”, “o” for “of” etc.

My final suggestion is to deepen the argumentations of the paper with wider epistemological and clinical references before submitting it for publication.

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