

Review of: "Either you know or you've gotta believe"

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The author has picked an interesting topic for discussion and has engaged with relevant literature. I have a few quibbles, that I would like to present, as well as a few suggestions for further improvement.

In the beginning of the section “Cases against the entailment thesis”, the author pinpoints Antognazza’s (2020) view that, traditionally, belief and knowledge have been taken to be mutually exclusive. It is important to note that Antognazza’s view on the subject is by no means orthodox amongst those who deny the JTB account. On the contrary, standard view is that according to JTB belief is included in the very definition of knowledge. Within a traditional (JTB) view, thus, belief and knowledge are not mutually exclusive – if you have knowledge that p, it follows, you do have belief that p. So for a view such as Antognazza’s to gain traction in the paper, it needs to be argued for, and discussed in its strengths and weaknesses, rather than just alluded to, or taken for granted.

The same problem presents itself again at the beginning of the section “On knowledge vs. belief”, where the author discusses Thomas Aquinas. There, again, the idea that belief and knowledge are mutually exclusive is brought up without being argued for. Aquinas’ case is an even more complicated one (would require more arguing for, if it were to be established, rather than just evoked), because it is not clear from Aquinas’ texts whether or not he is actually addressing the relevant notion of belief, i.e., the one that is at stake in discussions pertaining contemporary epistemology. He might as well be discussing faith, or religious belief, which is a variety of the concept at stake, rather than a relevant sample of it.

Another thing I’ve observed concerns the Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel thought experiments, mentioned in the section “Cases against the entailment thesis”. The first thought experiment, featuring Kate, has been construed in a way that is self-undermining, because it states that Kate has learnt the contents C of which, at the moment of the test, she is unsure about. That is, the experiment already states that Kate knows C. But that’s exactly the intuition that the experiment is designed to test – it is designed to test whether the students at the University of Wisconsin at Madison would class Kate as knowing C or merely believing C. But it undermines itself by telling the students that Mary knew C, in spite of not believing that she did.

Later on, while discussing the position of Cook Wilson, the author appears to subscribe to the view that it is possible to decide to believe. Here, again, the author’s position is kept to an unfortunate low standard, because it is merely stated, rather than properly argued for. Upon subscribing to a heterodox position such as doxastic voluntarism (the view that believing involves deciding to believe) it is important to present reasons for it, and also to address the most remarkable

objections against it. For instance, it would have been important for the author, here, to address the arguments presented by Bernard Williams in his 1973 *Problems of the Self* against the possibility of believing at will. Williams, however, is only vaguely mentioned later in the text.

Lastly, I would like to mention the following. The most interesting cases of knowledge without the corresponding belief (and the most promising ones, for the purpose of the present discussion), in my opinion, are the cases of skilled action, which are cases of know-how. The author hasn't engaged with them. There is a variety of cases of the like in the literature, and those can be put together to yield a stronger case against the entailment thesis. I would like to suggest two references, for further reading on the topic:

- Brownstein, Michael and Eliot Michaelson (2016). Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution. *Synthese* 193(9): 2815-2836.
- Williams, John (2008). Propositional Knowledge and Know-How. *Synthese* 165(1): 107-125.