

Review of: "History as an Ethical Craft — A Study of Ethical Reasons in the Explanation of Historical Acts"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

The paper can be summarized as an investigation into the impact of ethical reasoning on education by examining the norms and values of historical figures. My remarks are focused on the purported primacy of reason. It should be clarified from the outset that the author does not, in any way, reject the presence of alternative faculties, methodologies, or resources.

On pages 1, 5, and 12, the paper employs the term "craft," which, while not commonly used in philosophical texts, is highly appropriate in this context. Here, "craft" can be defined as the amalgamation of various studies, principles, experiences, and data that collectively form an evolving, multifaceted body of knowledge on a specific subject. In this case, it may be beneficial to include a brief comment or footnote, as the following references might be of use: Sennett, R. (2008). "The Craftsman." Yale University Press; Parker, M. (2012). "Ethical Problems and Genetic Practice." Cambridge University Press; Clotet, J. (2021). "Empirical Ethics and Moral Craft." *Revista Bioética do Conselho Federal de Medicina*, 29(1), 27-35.

On page 1, the paper asserts that "ethical reasoning constitutes a rational component within historical explanations." While this assertion holds validity, it is crucial to recognize that "ethical reasoning" represents just one among several potential approaches for furnishing historical explanations. Various other avenues, such as the poetic, literary, social, and economic dimensions, warrant exploration, study, and consideration to provide a comprehensive understanding of historical phenomena.

Certainly, the concept of 'ethical reasoning' holds pivotal significance. Reason, while undeniably important, does not exclusively dictate human will. Actions, emotions, and beliefs can exert influence, offer clarity, and even determine behavior and moral attitudes. Ethical reasoning, as discussed on pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12, undeniably constitutes a critical aspect distinguishing the paper. Nevertheless, it is essential to emphasize that reason is not the sole factor at play; in short, personality represents a fusion of both reason and emotion. Reason and feelings are regarded as pivotal elements in the moral philosophies of Kant and Hume, respectively. However, it is essential to note that Kant does not entirely dismiss feelings, nor does Hume disregard reason. Kant's perspective is elucidated in his statement, "Respect is a feeling of personal species, it is not a judgment about an object. This feeling (which is a feeling of one's own kind) becomes the basis (Grund) for certain actions" (Kant I. *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 2014. I, d.). Here, Kant acknowledges the role of feelings, particularly the sentiment of respect, as a foundational element for certain moral actions. Similarly, Hume's viewpoint is captured in his statement, "according as our

reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it" (Hume D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed., Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989. p. 415). Hume recognizes that while reasoning guides actions, the initial impulse is rooted in emotions and sentiments. It is evident that the origins and development of morality differ between these two philosophers. In practical ethics or practical moral philosophy, actions and emotions can often come into conflict with reason, principles, or norms, which can be perceived as representing a complex interplay between normative ethics and descriptive ethics. The fields of empirical ethics and experimental ethics, prioritize the examination of individual actions within their respective social, familial, and cultural contexts, as well as the exploration of emotions, feelings, and beliefs. This observation underscores the necessity for interdisciplinary engagement, as noted by Tappolet (Tappolet C. "Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction." New York: Routledge, 2023. p. 16). It also highlights the limitations of purely speculative analyses divorced from scientific, personal, or social realities, a foundational tenet of empirical ethics (Ives J.; Draper H. "Appropriate Methodologies for Empirical Bioethics: It's All Relative." *Bioethics*, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 249-258, 2009. p. 250). Their aim is to provide specific solutions or norms for particular cases through inductive and, at times, intuitive reasoning, which may not always rely exclusively on general norms or principles. This approach entails a harmonization of normativism and prescriptivism. This perspective allows us to assert that moral judgments and values are inherently linked to various contextual factors, giving rise to indexical contextual relativism. It emphasizes that moral standards and values are not fixed or immutable, as contexts and individuals can vary significantly. Moreover, it underscores that principles inherently permit exceptions, thus presenting a challenge and an ongoing subject of discussion among ethicists.

On page 1, the paper utilizes the terms "conscience" and "consciousness," while on pages 2, 5, and 12, it consistently employs "consciousness." Some authors consider both terms synonymous. However, the majority of them employ 'consciousness' to refer to psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical concepts, while 'conscience' is utilized in a moral context. Additionally, certain philosophers, such as Hume and Mill, employ 'conscience' with both of these meanings (Hume D. "Conscience or a sense of morals." *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. p. 458; Conscience, "this everyone may find in himself." *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. OUP, 1989. p. 220) (Mill J. S. *Utilitarianism*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001. Ch. 3, p. 29.). Furthermore, Hegel introduces the term 'historical conscience' to denote an understanding of rationality linked to historical progress and human liberty (Hegel G. W. F. "Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process." Hegel G. W. F. *The Philosophy of History*. Batoche Books: Kitchener, 2001. Introduction, p. 22). The question of whether moral judgments are or should be grounded in reason has provoked an ongoing debate throughout the history of Western philosophy. Given the significance and diversity inherent in these two terms, I would recommend specifying the intended meanings within the present text.

The paper deserves recognition for its logical and well-structured presentation from start to finish. Furthermore, it is notably clear, comprehensible, well-articulated, and precise. I believe it is commendable to integrate ethics, history, and education within the same text, making it a valuable addition to the field of humanities and worthy of consideration.

