

Review of: "Neuropsych psychoanalysis and Dual-Aspect Monism"

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The authors raise a major epistemological problem for neuropsych psychoanalysis, a hybrid field created in the early 2000s. Their proposal challenges not only the practice of neuropsych psychoanalysis itself, but the entire field of the "neuro", as they point out its logical and epistemological flaws.

They point out the logical error of explaining the mental in terms of the cerebral, as if they were the same category. This outdated idea was proposed by Wittgenstein and Ryle many years ago. The mental and cerebral are two distinct categories with different ontological realities. One could argue that the only way to associate these two categories is through language, which is normative and exclusive to linguistic beings. Neuropsych psychoanalysts and neuroscientists make a mistake when they try to explain neurobiological processes using the language of the mind, such as intentions, emotions, and other qualities that belong to the normative and linguistic contexts. If they use a purely mechanical and neural language instead, they are simply left with neurology, a field in which psychoanalysis has little to say.

Like many other new fields with the prefix "neuro," neuropsych psychoanalysis is likely a vain attempt, even if the authors may not consciously recognize it. Their analysis implicitly reveals a core issue that concerns not only neuropsych psychoanalysis but the entire neuroscientific project.

While a human being's brain must function adequately for that person to function, we cannot use biological language alone to describe people's actions and traits. The concept of mind has a logical category that does not allow it to be reduced to purely biological notions. Strictly speaking, people think, not their brains, and people write, not their hands. In this, as in many other cases, one cannot ascribe to the parts what is true of the whole.

The text contradicts itself between the end of the "second case" and the Conclusion. In the second case, the authors seem to advocate for greater dualism and reductionism to resolve the epistemological impasse of Mosri's proposal. However, in the Conclusion, they advocate for anti-reductionist monism. It is therefore unclear what stance the authors ultimately take.

Ultimately, it could be argued that the DAM does not offer neuropsych psychoanalysis a solution to its impasse, as it inevitably falls into the category mistake that the authors describe. Precisely because neuroscience, and all its derivatives, entail *de facto* this category mistake.