Review of: "Naturalism's maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?"

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I agree with the author that philosophy differs from science by the a priori nature of its reasoning and the lack of empirical confirmation of theoretical propositions. However, in my opinion, the real picture of the relationship between philosophy and science is more complex [1].

E.Durkheim, G.I.Chelpanov, M.A.Rozov (including the author of the reviewed article)[2][3][4] believe that philosophy has a normative character, while science is descriptive, which characterizes them in terms of the modality of reasoning as mutually exclusive disciplines. In my opinion, there is an attempt to artificially separate philosophy and science, which are just joined together by the modality of duty: philosophy is dual and tends, on the one hand, to build possible models of the world, and on the other – to talk about how the world should be arranged and give appropriate prescriptions; whereas science uses philosophical prescriptions as norms of research activity.

Consider theoretical mechanics as an example. In it, the concept of "material point" is a theoretical construction that performs a prescriptive function and acts as a norm of activity in the study of any cases of movement of physical bodies. Any moving body, be it a projectile fired from a cannon, a stone thrown by a man, a planet moving around the sun – can be described using the concept of a "material point". At the same time, the nature of such work on the formulation of prescriptions is clearly philosophical, prescriptive: we are talking about what a scientist's activity should be in order to describe a whole class of moving bodies.

Along with this, philosophical prescriptions within scientific theory differ from philosophical metaphysical prescriptions by the need to enter empirical reality. If philosophical metaphysical prescriptions, as a rule, have the character of a possible project of activity, then within scientific theory philosophical prescriptions have direct access to empiricism and, accordingly, there is a practical implementation of the project of activity. At the same time, philosophical metaphysical prescriptions are much richer than scientific ones, since metaphysics grasps the problem in its entirety. For example, Plato, formulating prescriptions for the inclusion of objects of the universe in the world of human culture in the form of eidos – ideas, notes four forms of ideas: "1) patterns, standards, according to which all nature was created; 2) the causes or source of the existence of things, their properties and relationships; 3) ideals, goals, to which everything that exists aspires; 4) general concepts of the meaning, essence of the object" [[5]:23]. In scientific theory, ideal objects are used that fix the norms of activity and act in the Platonic sense as the reasons for the formation of scientific reality. Two main types of ideal objects are distinguished among them: The first type is general concepts that determine the nature of the activity of fixing sets of similar objects and are used in classification; at the same time, there is an ontologization of activity: an

ideal object is a common set of objects, fixed in general terms, as the norm of activity for identifying common features of a set of objects, was attributed to reality itself began to act as an objectively existing common set. In other words, in the case of classification, the nature of general concepts as norms defining scientific activity is not realized by scientists. The second type is actually the ideal, the norm of scientific activity, explicitly explicated by scientists, for example, in theoretical mechanics, a material point is used that sets the nature of scientists' activities, while it is realized that a material point does not really exist.

So, the basis of the functioning of scientific theory is the previous philosophical work on the formulation of prescriptions, from which science selects the norms of scientific activity necessary for the study of the aspect of the surrounding world allocated to it. Accordingly, there are two types of scientific activity within the framework of one theory: empirical work carried out in accordance with historically established patterns of scientific activity and philosophical work – the formulation of a strict concept that fixes the norms of empirical activity. And in this sense, the relation of complementarity between philosophical and empirical work takes place just inside scientific theory in the sense of N. Bohr, and not between philosophy and science as cultural traditions, as M.A.Rozov believed, since philosophical metaphysical prescriptions are not directly related to empirical reality.

References

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