

Review of: "Brain Patterns Shaping Embodied Activities of Their Bodily Limbs in Perception and Cognition"

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The paper titled "Brain Patterns Shaping Embodied Activities of Their Bodily Limbs in Perception and Cognition" argues the role of brain patterns in perception and cognition. The authors offer the article several examples (empirical and non-empirical) in order to emphasize that sensorimotor contingencies are not metaphysically constitutive of perception. They intend to undermine the enactivist thesis to show why, according to them, enactivist is false. I consider that an advantage of this document is to propose a dialog between theoretical approaches and concrete examples that highlight critical points in arguments.

The following are some concrete comments:

1. On page 2, the authors mention a distinction of enactivism proposed by Gallagher; however, it is not clear what the purpose of this differentiation is at the beginning of the document. Perhaps the authors want to emphasize that their claims undermine all enactivism proposals of the three periods or mainly the proposals of Nöe, Hutto, and Myin? I think it is better to clarify your goal in this sense because enactivism is a broad perspective within current cognitive sciences and includes debates beyond what you refer to in the paper.
2. Across the paper, you use bold text and quotation marks and underline the text several times. These marks can become oversaturated and interrupt the flow of reading. I suggest considering whether they are indispensable in all cases (especially at the beginning they appear a lot).
3. The introduction could be more precise, mainly because on page 2, you mention that you will point out some ideas of enactivism; however, at the same time, in this brief section, you introduce a criticism about them but now with insufficient development. For example, you mention regarding reason forth the ecology perspective of Gibson, but it does not develop his approach or clarify why your perspective contradicts it.
4. On page 4, you introduce a central concept within phenomenology that is a basis of enactivism: lived body. I suggest clarifying this concept; otherwise, their position is not entirely understood in later sections. I can see that you have an epistemological position about enactivism; however, as part of philosophical debate, it is so important to state crystally the concepts or assumptions under discussion.
5. On page 13, you say, "Every anorexic looks at herself in the mirror as "obese," even if she looks like a survivor of a Nazi concentration camp!". I think that this statement is tricky. First, anorexia is not just a women's issue, although there is a predominance; second, I think that the reference to "Nazi concentration camp" is unnecessary to argue a conceptual claim; 3) the psychopathological and bodily experience in eating disorders is much more complex than the ideas you point out.

6. I recommend reviewing the use of first-person pronouns in the section "The Whereabouts of Consciousness." It seems that only one author wrote it.

General comment: Throughout your paper, you mention some ideas several times. It may be convenient to review that in order to avoid wordiness.