Review of: ""Sex" and "gender" as constitutional categories — Critical notes from iusfeminist legal dogmatics"

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The paper is not very innovative. There is already a great deal of literature on under-discrimination. In the Spanish context, for example, the work of Maggy Barrère and Ana Rubio Castro in legal feminism is pioneering. And the non-neutrality of law is a classic theme in both Marxist and decolonial legal studies. For this reason, the article is neither original nor innovative. As for the triple dimension (normative, axiological and sociological), why cite Torres when this distinction is much earlier? Authors such as Norberto Bobbio were already making this distinction 70 years ago. Why cite Araiza to talk about situated knowledge and not Donnah Haraway? What does the author mean by "sex" as "the biological"? Does she propose an "essence" that the legal system must assume? Access to legal guarantees through biological prerequisites or bodily characteristics (skin pigmentation, genitalia, etc.)? What happens when we introduce intersex people into the legal debate, would they be excluded according to the author's proposal?